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Selection of combat aircraft during crisis action planning can be of critical 
importance. In determining the value of force mixes, it is proposed that one can evaluate 
extrinsic and intrinsic value separately. Intrinsic value is the designed capability of a 
weapons platform to accomplish a specified aerospace mission. Extrinsic value is the 
expected appropriateness of such platforms, given the environmental characteristics in 
which they must operate. This research develops a decision support tool for planners in 
determining the extrinsic value of force mixes, which then expedites the selection of best 
overall force mixes. 
The research included: content analysis of official guidance, Critical Decision 
Methodology interviews, a Delphi study (to define and quantify the factors, and establish 
a hierarchy and global weights), generation of the Value Focused Thinking decision tool, 
and establishment of an appropriate representation of the relationship between extrinsic 
and intrinsic value. 
This research provides planners—throughout the USAF—with a decision support 
tool that objectively compares alternative force packages for specific deployments. This 
represents a first step toward codifying or formalizing the art of force selection. These 
results will help reduce the crisis action response timeline, and should lead to more 
accurate modeling of force mix applicability. 
A QUANTITATIVE DECISION SUPPORT MODEL TO AID SELECTION OF 
COMBAT AIRCRAFT FORCE MIXES FOR CONTINGENCY DEPLOYMENT 
I. Introduction 
Background 
Contingency deployment planning is as critical to the United States Air Force's 
(USAF) wartime mission accomplishment as any task could be. During both deliberate 
and crisis action planning processes, decision makers must allocate resources and 
manpower with sufficient strategic and tactical vision to affect total mission 
accomplishment under conditions of both uncertainty and risk. Limited resources of all 
types among all of the armed forces significantly constrain decision makers during such 
planning, and necessitate paradigm-shifting, creative solutions. 
The USAF has responded with the Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) concept while 
simultaneously pursuing initiatives to reduce the resources required for deployment (the 
deployment footprint) and to increase management flexibility with regard to resource 
allocation [Godfrey, 1998; Looney, 1996]. The AEF concept reflects the Air Force's 
policy of Global Engagement, in which forces deploy worldwide from the continental 
United States on short notice rather than maintaining a permanent presence at forward, 
overseas locations. Additionally, the AEF approach attempts to provide operational units 
important reconstitution and training periods by allowing for cyclic rotation of the Air 
Expeditionary Wings (AEW's) to which the units are attached. The AEF concept allows 
the decision makers visibility of which units are both on tap and available for 
deployment. It also generates flexibility in managing scarce resources by virtue of the 
relative centrality offerees within the continental United States, which can then be 
projected anywhere in the world. 
Enhancing the visibility and flexibility—as well as the response time—of 
resources in today's planning environment is vital to future USAF mission success. The 
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) has spent four years developing 
a distributed computing architecture that will create a new and improved process for 
deployment planning for all U.S. military forces. This architecture, known as the 
Advanced Logistics Project (ALP), has been geared toward total, near instantaneous asset 
visibility among all Department of Defense (DoD) units. Such real-time visibility will 
naturally present planners with many options but will also present possibly complicated 
tradeoffs. 
It is the measure of these potential tradeoffs in resources and force mixes to 
optimal mission accomplishment that constitutes the "value" of a given decision. This is 
where the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) enters. This research effort is 
focused in support of AFIT's contribution to the ALP endeavor. AFIT's role in this 
project is to provide a value assessment architecture that provides decision support to 
contingency planners by identifying utility levels for force mixes (different mixes of 
fighters and bombers) and their time-phased requirements and respective lift constraints. 
Overall force mix utility (value) levels may be determined through an appropriate 
combination and valuation of factors, and those factors can be divided into two general 
categories: extrinsic and intrinsic. In theory, separate utilities can be established for each 
category. The extrinsic utility, or value, of a force mix (interchangeably referred to as an 
asset set) includes all factors that are external to the set's inherent operational 
capabilities, such as beddown location, fuels support, and political considerations. 
Conversely, intrinsic or inherent utility or value is represented by the actual 
combat capability of a resource. Obviously, the first concern in evaluating a force mix is 
that the aircraft comprising the set are fully capable of carrying out the designated 
aerospace combat missions required by the theater commander. Although intrinsic value 
is critical to force mix selection and would serve as a worthwhile research topic, it is 
beyond the scope of this research. 
Problem Statement 
Given that ALP will grant instantaneous visibility of all available resources, while 
providing an architecture to generate a detailed deployment plan in just minutes versus 
hours or days, planners at all appropriate echelons will have an opportunity to judge 
many deployment scenarios at the touch of a computer key. Planners will have 
expediting tools and complete resource visibility never before seen. 
With such information at their fingertips, how then would campaign planners 
choose from among the competing deployment plans? This research intends to answer 
that question. 
As mentioned, ALP will provide the visibility and the architecture. AFIT's 
specific contribution to ALP will be the "M-R VAT," the Mission-Resource Value 
Assessment Tool. The M-R VAT will provide support for time-phased decisions that 
goes beyond current time phased force deployment documents (TPFDD's) and will help 
to evaluate operational campaign requirements along a timeline before the deployment 
occurs. Chapter II provides more information on the ALP and M-R VAT. 
The basic premise of both M-R VAT and this supporting research is that 
campaign planners should identify, strategically and then tactically, the time-phased 
sortie requirements by specific mission type—before the resource selection process 
begins. That way, a truer representation of what is needed, where it is needed, and 
exactly when it is needed, will surface. Only then can fully-informed decisions be made 
as to which force mixes are most appropriate and present the best value. 
To aid decision makers in selection of force mixes, this research proposes a 
decision model, or tool, that integrates and quantifies all of the extrinsic factors that affect 
force mix selection. It is important to note that campaign planners will judge the inherent 
operational value of force mixes (their absolute mission capability) separate from this 
model, using criteria that are beyond the scope of this research. This research provides 
one necessary step to aid war planners in selecting the highest value force mixes in the 
shortest possible time. 
However, in accomplishing the goal of this research, it is necessary to establish 
that both extrinsic and intrinsic factors exist and to clearly define each type. Chapter II 
addresses these issues. 
Research Questions 
Central to providing an executable, integrative decision analysis model to enhance 
the force mix selection efforts of campaign planners, this research addresses the 
following six questions: 
1. Can the factors affecting force mix selection in response to theater crises be clearly 
categorized as extrinsic and intrinsic, and can these categories be clearly defined? 
2. What extrinsic factors are important to campaign planners when selecting aircraft 
force mixes in response to theater crises? 
3. How are these factors quantified, and what are the relationships between them? 
4. How should these factors and the relationships between them be modeled? 
5. Can the research results be applied US AF-wide? 
6. How can the now-quantified extrinsic factors be effectively combined with the 
intrinsic factors to develop an overall asset set utility or value? 
Methodology 
This research involved four broad phases aimed at answering the six research 
questions. The first phase was comprised of a form of Cognitive Task Analysis 
interviewing known as Critical Decision Methodology (CDM). These interviews were 
conducted with 34 campaign planning experts from the Pentagon (HQ US AF), four 
USAF major commands, the USAF Air Expeditionary Force Center (AEFC), and three 
USAF academic "schoolhouses." The purpose of the interviews was three fold: to 
validate the extrinsic factors that had been identified in previous AFIT research 
(discussed in Chapter II), to identify any factors that had not been previously captured by 
a decision support model, and to determine appropriate definitions for every factor 
identified. Post interview content analysis and literature review were the primary tools 
for extracting the factors. This phase addressed research questions 1, 2 and 5. 
The second phase of research consisted of a literature review to determine the 
most appropriate Decision Analysis technique with which to model this decision 
situation. This phase addressed research question 4. 
The third phase of research was conducted by in-person interviews and e-mail 
questionnaires, using a modified "Delphi" approach, and was built upon the foundational 
work of Phase 1. By exploring and defining the relationships between the factors, 
consistent with expert responses via the Delphi questionnaires, a conceptual map or 
model of the factors was developed. The completion of Phase 2, due in large part to the 
diversified expert pool, addressed research question 3 and laid the groundwork for 
addressing research question 6. 
Phase 4 of the research focused on final development of the decision support 
model and explored the mathematical relationships between the proposed decision 
support model and the intrinsic value of a candidate force mix (research question 6). 
Extensive consultation with colleagues performing parallel research and a comprehensive 
literature review comprised this phase. 
Assumptions 
The validity of this decision support model is dependent upon the assumption that 
the US AF theme of Global Engagement does not dramatically change. That is, the US AF 
currently provides for combat forces to respond to theater crises primarily from stations 
within the continental United States, on a rotational basis. A dramatic change would 
most closely approximate a return to the pre-drawdown military doctrine of forward 
basing, in which almost all required active duty forces are already in place in the theaters 
of crisis. Such a scenario could lessen or eliminate the positive impact of this decision 
support model. However, the assumption of a continuing Global Engagement theme is 
sound, given the end of the cold war and the relative inefficiency of forward basing. 
Scope and Limitations 
DARPA's ALP initiative encompasses the entire Department of Defense. The 
ALP will grant streamlined, automated deployment planning capabilities and real-time 
asset visibility for resources spread among all of the military services. However, the 
efforts of this research are limited to force mix selection for the United States Air Force 
only, without regard to other services or other service capabilities. On a highly positive 
note, this research applies to the entire Air Force rather than being limited to a single 
theater of operations or a single major command, as was the case with previous research 
in this area (discussed in Chapter II). The diversity of the expert pool, as well as the 
phrasing of interview questions, was designed to provide that this research is 
representative of the Air Force as a whole. 
Due to the nature of this research and the fact that key operating instructions and 
concepts of operations are classified, highly sensitive, or not pertinent to this study, both 
the research conclusions and the information used are limited to an unclassified level. 
Although the focus of this research is to create a decision support model that will 
aid campaign planners in selecting the best force mixes, the scope is limited to only those 
extrinsic factors that are important to such decisions. Intrinsic factors are addressed with 
respect to their existence, definition, and exclusivity to this model, but are not 
investigated further. Efforts will be made to mathematically relate or link the extrinsic 
factors to potential existing intrinsic values, but no attention will be given to the 
identification or development of an intrinsically-oriented decision support model. 
Finally, the basic framework for USAF expertise within this research is limited to 
current doctrinal and instructional USAF and Joint publications, and USAF campaign 
planning experts that are currently active in their respective fields. This scope limitation 
to present-day expertise and guidance is well-founded, given that doctrine and instruction 
are necessarily gleaned from past lessons. Furthermore, the experts presently assigned to 
planning positions or doctrinal/planning schoolhouses are the very individuals who are 
shaping the direction of contingency planning for the USAF into the near-term future. 
Summary 
This chapter provides the justification and motivation for developing a decision 
support model that will significantly aid campaign planners in selecting the best force 
mixes for contingencies. The critical nature of campaign/deployment planning in today's 
Air Force is undeniable. This research quantifies the extrinsic deployment planning 
factors and integrates them into an executable decision model that will simplify and 
streamline this most critical process. 
Chapter II discusses deliberate and crisis action planning under the AEF concept 
as well as the initial extrinsic and intrinsic factors, then provides a thorough background 
discussion of DARPA, ALP, and the M-R VAT. The chapter also covers the previous 
research effort that generated an initial collection of extrinsic factors and an executable 
decision support model. The chapter ends with a review of CDM interviewing, content 
analysis, and Delphi studies—all of which were used in this research. 
Chapter III is a continuation of the literature review that focuses on the 
background and theory of decision analysis, and reviews a number of candidate decision 
analysis tools and models, providing the pros and cons by which to measure each tool's 
suitability to this research problem. The chapter ends with identification of the selected 
decision analysis technique for this research. 
Chapter IV lays out the methodology of this research. It begins with an overview 
of the research plan, to include the research design, and then covers the three main phases 
of research in depth. 
Chapter V presents the results of each research phase. It goes further in 
describing the final decision support model, the sensitive analysis, and the justification 
for the mathematical concepts used. 
Chapter VI provides conclusions, as well as discussions about this model's 
applicability to DARPA, ALP, M-R VAT, and the US AF. Recommendations are made 
as to how to integrate this model with existing research results and what further research 
is most appropriate. 
II. Literature Review 
Introduction 
Campaign planning in today's military environment is both challenging and 
extraordinarily critical, with the decisions of planning experts not only affecting the lives 
and well being of friendly forces but possibly affecting the final outcome of the conflict 
itself. In the USAF, a fundamental mission of planners at all echelons is to provide the 
Joint Air Component Commander and or Theater Commander a set of combat aircraft 
sufficiently capable of meeting theater air combat requirements. These sets of combat 
aircraft are referred to throughout this work as force mixes. A force mix is defined here 
as any combination of USAF weapon systems that collectively possesses the inherent 
capability to meet or exceed the air combat requirements for a specific conflict within a 
specific theater—as determined by the appropriate campaign planners. This definition is 
important when noting that planners must select force mixes that are inherently capable 
of accomplishing a given mission. The central theme of this research is that these 
planners must do so while faced with extremely short time constraints, high stress, and a 
large number of extrinsic factors that compound an already complex decision situation. 
This chapter first provides an overview of the current USAF 
deployment/contingency planning process and addresses the fundamental problem: the 
need for quick, effective, and efficient force mix selection. It also defines both extrinsic 
and intrinsic factors, and provides an initial listing of factors for each type—in their 
broadest forms.   The chapter then presents an overview and background of the ALP and 
the M-R VAT. Together, these sections serve to orient the reader and to establish the 
importance and support for this research. 
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The fourth section of the chapter presents a background of a previous research 
effort that specifically spurred this current investigation. The chapter concludes by 
discussing the two primary knowledge elicitation techniques used during this study, 
Delphi and Critical Decision Methodology (CDM). 
Deployment Planning Overview 
The AEF Perspective on Campaign Planning. Faced with a continuous threat 
from the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc during the Cold War, the United States spent 
half a century building and maintaining a significant number of combat resources and 
military personnel overseas, primarily in the European and Pacific theaters. Such 
presence was deemed necessary to counter the sizable force-to-force advantage held by 
communist nations in these respective regions. Today, with the end of the Cold War, 
such force-to-force mismatches no longer exist. Although legitimate threats to the 
national security of the United States have not been eliminated, the single, most central 
threat has been reduced sufficiently to generate a new way of strategically addressing 
national defense. 
In the United States Air Force (USAF), Global Engagement is the new strategic 
direction. It is aimed at supporting the country's national interests anywhere in the 
world, any time, from force pools located primarily within the continental United States 
(CONUS). The Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) concept has taken hold as the USAF's 
primary tool in carrying out the potentially formidable tasks presented by the Global 
Engagement theme—quick regional response from CONUS-based forces, regardless of 
the nature and extent of the conflict. Explicitly, the USAF is tasked with providing air 
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and space forces that meet specific theater requirements across the full spectrum of 
military possibilities [Cohen, 1998]. 
Today, the AEF concept is in full force, with the establishment of the AEF Center 
(under the Air Staff) at Langley Air Force Base, Virginia. The AEF approach cements 
the US AF change in strategy from forward basing with abundant resources to global 
engagement with scarcer resources and greater flexibility [Looney, 1996: 5]. 
Within just 48 hours following an execute order, AEF units are expected to have 
deployed to the theater and commenced combat air operations. Typically, an AEF unit's 
force mix consists of 36 aircraft combining Air Superiority, Air Strike, and Suppression 
of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD) mission capabilities [Godfrey, 1998: 1]. However, such 
packages can be, and often are, tailored to meet specific requirements. Regardless, an 
AEF unit is expected to conduct either defensive or offensive air operations 
independently for the first seven days, in effect buying time until reinforcements (if 
necessary) become available [Godfrey, 1998: 2]. 
It is easy to see the criticality of proper force mix selection, given the AEF 
environment. The AEF must respond to crises ranging across the full spectrum of 
potential military operations, and must do so in extremely limited time. Compounding 
the situation is the fact that individual deployable AEF force mixes may soon be reduced 
to six-, four-, or two-ship packages rather than the much larger Unit Type Codes (UTCs) 
by which they now deploy [Petersen, 2000]. UTCs are essentially squadron-sized (or 
slightly smaller) force packages that planners then tailor to suit their individual 
requirements. They provide for resource justification and accountability and are 
extremely convenient when planners are pressed for time. Given the current initiatives to 
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either reduce or eliminate UTCs [Petersen, 2000], timely selection of the best force mixes 
will become increasingly challenging and potentially overwhelming. 
Campaifin Planning;—The Force Mix Selection. As previously mentioned, force 
mix selection for response to contingency requirements is the fundamental problem 
addressed by this research. However, force mix selection is just part of a complicated 
campaign planning process. The selection of a force mix begins a chain reaction logistics 
response aimed at getting the desired forces and the necessary support resources to the 
right place at the right time. Therefore, force mix selection might have the single greatest 
impact on the size of the deployment footprint and the deployment speed, as well as 
overall force sustainment over the course of the conflict. Of all campaign planning tasks, 
force mix selection is of prime importance. 
Campaign planners at all levels within the DoD have access to volumes of official 
publications to guide the planning process. The joint planning environment is where it all 
begins during times of crisis. Joint operations are those involving cooperation and 
interplay within theater by more than one US military service. The joint planning process 
is what makes this possible, and it serves as the solid bridge along the command trail that 
extends from the National Command Authority (NCA), through the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
(JCS), to the military services and respective Commanders in Chief (CINCs) of given 
theaters of operation. Joint planning is a systematic procedure used by relevant 
commanders to ascertain the best solution for accomplishing assigned mission tasks 
[JSOG, 1997: para 500]. 
The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) is the information, 
command, and control tool that integrates DoD resource and readiness information to 
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meet the needs of joint planning decision makers. JOPES expedites the development of 
both options and subsequent operational orders during crisis action planning, and is the 
primary management tool for the generation and execution of all necessary operations 
along the crisis response timeline, including mobilization, deployment, employment, 
sustainment, and redeployment [JSOG, 1997: para 506]. 
Planners utilizing JOPES have two volumes of Joint Pub 5-03.1, Joint Operation 
Planning and Execution System, that describe operation of the system. Volume I 
provides instruction on planning policies and procedures. Volume II deals with formats 
and guidance. Both volumes are unclassified, and they exhaustively address—from a 
generalized joint operations perspective—the full spectrum of joint planning under 
JOPES. 
Official guidance for addressing both the planning and the command and control 
issues during joint-level crisis action planning is contained in Joint Pub 3-56.1, Command 
and Control of Joint Operations, and Joint Pub 5-00, Doctrine for Planning Joint 
Operations. Both are unclassified, and both provide broad guidance not limited to JOPES 
usage. 
Clearly, campaign planners have ample joint operations guidance. However, such 
guidance is not specific to uniquely USAF-oriented operations. Two volumes of Air 
Force Manual 10-401 serve to supplement joint instructions. Volume I, Operation Plan 
and Concept Plan Development and Implementation, provides guidance that maintains 
the necessary joint perspective while focusing on US air power and its proper 
implementation. Volume II, Planning Formats and Guidance, provides instruction on 
JOPES utilization to generate such plans. Further, USAF war planners draw directly 
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from the basic concepts of Air Force doctrine in matching mission requirements to 
available resources in times of crisis. To this end, all USAF planners keep and maintain 
copies of Air Force Doctrine Document 1, Basic Air Force Doctrine [AFDD 1, 1997], 
and Air Force Doctrine Document 2 [AFDD 2, 1998], Organization and Employment of 
Aerospace Power. 
Although comprehensive and thoroughly representative, this listing of 
publications available to campaign planning experts is by no means exhaustive. It is 
merely a snap shot of the wealth of information and tools available to decision makers 
today, and it serves to illustrate the potential complexity of campaign planning and force 
mix selection. This research depended heavily on content analysis of many sections of 
these publications, as well as an overview reading of each. However, aside from the 
identification of extrinsic factors and intrinsic factor categories to be addressed later, 
these publications will not be discussed in depth. 
Although force mix selection is just one part of a complicated planning process 
that includes use of JOPES and many official publications as guidance, it is indeed this 
selection of forces that drives the requirements for the entire deployment and 
employment process. Decision makers need a tool, a decision model, that incorporates 
both the judgement of seasoned planning experts and the guidance of official publications 
in order to very quickly and effectively select the best force mixes to meet requirements. 
Planning Decision Factors: Extrinsic Versus Intrinsic. It is proposed that the 
factors to be evaluated in determining the best force mix can be divided into two 
categories, intrinsic and extrinsic. Because this research is limited to the creation of a 
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decision model for extrinsic factors only, it is necessary to clearly define both types of 
factors. 
Definition 1: Intrinsic factors represent a weapons platform's fundamental ability 
to accomplish a specified aerospace mission or tasking [Buzo, 2000: 2], and are limited to 
determinations of efficacy in a given situation related only to the designated purpose of 
its design. For example, an A-10 aircraft's fundamental ability is Air-to-Ground Attack; 
its intrinsic value for such missions is high because Air-to-Ground Attack is the 
designated purpose of an A-10's design. 
Definition 2: Extrinsic factors are situational considerations, external to and 
independent of the purpose of a weapons platform's design, that affect determination of 
the appropriateness and subsequent goodness ofthat weapons platform for a specified 
mission—given a specific contextual environment that requires evaluation [Buzo, 2000: 
2-3]. For example, an A-10 aircraft's extrinsic value, given a situation where the 
operating location is 2,000 miles from the primary targets and 30mm ammunition is 
unavailable, might be quite low due to the A-10's lack of speed and need for 30mm 
ammunition. 
Definitions 1 and 2 were refined via interviews with subject matter experts during 
the early phases of research. Although the final forms are presented here, discussion of 
their development is reserved for Chapter IV. 
Intrinsic and extrinsic factors form a natural, logical separation during the course 
of crisis action planning (CAP). Given an overarching mission in response to a crisis, 
planners immediately conceptualize potential force mixes based upon factors related only 
to the individual weapons platforms' capabilities to accomplish the tasks called for, a sort 
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of "pie in the sky" wish list of combat forces [Duvall, 2000; 12 AF, 2000]. This early 
process is more "artwork than science," and leads to course of action (COA) development 
based initially on the force mixes desired [Duvall, 2000]. This subsequent COA then 
introduces situational factors and logistical requirements—the extrinsic factors—in 
accomplishment of various feasibility analyses [12 AF, 2000]. 
Consider a campaign planner's need to provide a force mix capable of 
accomplishing air interdiction. Candidate weapons platforms can be considered solely on 
the basis of their designed capability to accomplish this aerospace mission. The F-15E 
Strike Eagle is certainly qualified for air interdiction when considered independently of 
any other situational factors. The A-10A ground attack aircraft is not. The platform's . 
designed capability is thus an intrinsic factor. 
In consideration of time limitations and resource constraints, this research is 
limited to extrinsic factors only. However, the question of intrinsic value is being 
investigated by others at AFIT in support of the ALP, concurrently with this research. 
Given a weapons platform that is intrinsically capable of accomplishing a desired 
aerospace mission, the extrinsic factors affecting the situation could determine the overall 
suitability of the platform. For example, an excessive distance of the staging base from 
the desired targets may negate the use of the desired platform, even though the platform 
is intrinsically capable. If the staging base in question is the only available operating 
location option, then this extrinsic factor would affect the selection of the force mix. 
This research posits that extrinsic factors can be quantified and valued 
independently of intrinsic factors because all extrinsic factors are situational, and any 
candidate force mix can be weighed against a given situation. However, the relationship 
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between a situation and its impact on a candidate force mix requires study. One can be 
evaluated without the other, but final selection of a best force mix cannot occur without a 
final integration of the two. Hence, force mixes will have separate intrinsic and extrinsic 
utilities that will induce potential tradeoffs in value that result in an overall value for a 
given force mix in a given situation. 
As the central starting point for determining the decision factors which form the 
foundation of this research, content analysis was accomplished on Air Force Doctrine 
Document 2 [AFDD 2, 1998: 76], Air Force Doctrine Document 1 [AFDD 1, 1997: 46- 
60], Joint Operation Planning and Execution System [JPUB 5-03.1, 1994: P-l to P-5], 
and A Decision Support Tool to Aid Campaign Planners in Selecting Combat Aircraft for 
Theater Crisis [Buzo, 2000: 42]. The content analysis yielded sets of intrinsic and 
extrinsic decision factors that campaign planners must consider in times of crisis (see 
Figure 1) 
The factors gleaned are broad and general, more probably serving as categories of 
decision factors rather than factors in and of themselves. Such broadness is desirable at 
this point because it presents a fundamental starting point. Notice upon examination of 
Figure 1 that both extrinsic and intrinsic factors or categories are identified. This 
research focuses, from this point forward, on only the extrinsic factors. Perhaps a 
number of future studies will be necessary in order to properly address the intrinsic 
decision factors of campaign planning. Figure 1 presents the initial factors. 
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EXTRINSIC 
FACTORS / ISSUES 
INTRINSIC 
FACTORS / ISSUES 
Enemy Capability Counter Air Mission Suitability 
International Politics Counter Land Mission Suitability 
Deployment Resources Counter Sea Mission Suitability 
Sustainment Resources Strategic Attack Suitability 
Staging Base Considerations Special Operations 
Location Characteristics Surveillance Mission Suitability 
Host Nation Capabilities Reconnaissance 
Host Nation Support Combat Search & Rescue Requirements 
Figure 1: Extrinsic and intrinsic decision factors/issues 
The Advanced Logistics Project and the M-R VAT 
The general factors identified in Figure 1 provide a starting point for discussing 
force mix selection criteria. Crisis action planning for contingency deployments, for both 
joint operations and within the Air Force, is a complicated task involving a myriad of 
complex decisions under high pressure situations, often with severe time constraints. The 
selection of force mixes to best accomplish the mission is the prime prerequisite for 
development of the overall logistics plan. Errors or miscalculations in the initial selection 
of force mixes may create undesirable repercussions in the logistics plan development to 
follow, lending criticality to the importance of force mix selection decision support tools. 
The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is in its fifth year of 
developing the Advanced Logistics Project (ALP), a technological approach to 
significantly reducing the logistics planning process time that could change the face of 
deployment planning for all military departments [Carrico, 1999]. The ALP will be a 
"distributed computing architecture that will create a near-real-time deployment planning 
process for military forces by enabling logistics planners from the US military services to 
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quickly and efficiently develop and implement a situation-tailored logistics plan" 
[Carrico, 1999: 1]. 
The ALP is an automated system that will integrate all logistics missions and 
organizations, utilizing a single system to expedite seamless planning and execution 
[Shaneman, 1999: 6]. An "object-oriented design methodology" uses simplified but 
well-defined components to spur comprehensive logistics management across the full 
system. These components are the "basic building blocks," known as the ALP clusters, 
that represent combat units, support units, and command and control responsibilities 
[Shaneman, 1999: 6]. For the USAF, the ALP contingency process begins when the 
deployment order is initiated. Clusters for deploying units, in real time, fill the required 
AEF clusters with forces and resources. The AEF cluster immediately tailors all 
requirements based on decision rules and sends these requirements to the Logistics 
Readiness Center (LRC) cluster. The LRC cluster sources all requirements using 
optimization techniques and submits the results to the US Transportation Command 
(TRANSCOM) cluster. Finally, the TRANSCOM cluster integrates these requirements 
with those of the other services' deploying forces, optimizing the sequence and speed of 
airlift while reducing the deployment footprint [Shaneman, 1999: 7]. 
The ALP presented a "landmark" demonstration in 1998, building a Level 5 (the 
most detailed) logistics plan for the US Army's 3rd Infantry Division from their home 
station through full administrative load onto a ship in port. Using a small set of 
directives, ALP produced the required high-detail logistics plan in less than one hour 
[Carrico, 1998: 5]. 
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It is important to note that the demonstration used standard internet bandwidth 
and medium capability personal computers, and built the detailed plan based on live data 
from the Joint Total Asset Visibility (JTAV), Global Transportation Network (GTN), and 
Global Decision Support System (GDSS) databases [Carrico, 1998: 5]. The ALP will 
quickly provide joint detailed logistics plans, the results of which can then be transmitted 
instantaneously to all of the critical players to generate significantly reduced deployment 
timelines. 
However, the process as it stands now begins with the deployment order. The 
ALP has not yet attained the ability to expedite selection of the best logistics plan from 
among competing alternatives [Buzo, 2000: 1]. Selection of the best logistics plan cannot 
occur without beginning the process with selection of the best force mix. 
Recognizing the logical requirement of having a best force mix as input into the 
ALP architecture, DARPA enlisted the aid of the Air Force Institute of Technology 
(AFIT). Lieutenant Colonel Alan Johnson and Major Stephen Swartz, both assistant 
professors at AFIT, seized this tasking in conceptualizing the Mission-Resource Value 
Assessment Tool (M-R VAT). The M-R VAT will assign relative values to critical 
resources over time, better coordinating the time-phased arrivals of resources on given 
days of the contingency with actual requirements for those given days [Swartz, 2000: 1]. 
The most fundamental concept embraced by the M-R VAT is the time value of 
logistics [Swartz, 2000: 1]. That is, the value of a resource changes over time as a 
campaign progresses. Because the nature of the mission changes over the course of a 
conflict, the value of required combat resources must change to reflect this [Swartz, 
1999b: 1]. Existing time phased force deployment documents (TPFDDs) already 
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prioritize resource movement to theaters, but such prioritization is based on the criticality 
of combat units rather than the time-phased criticality of resources within these units. 
The M-R VAT shifts this prioritization paradigm. It will go further by decreasing the 
logistics footprint in the crucial early days of airlift operations by enabling commanders 
to select the force mixes that possess the best time-phased utility before they request 
resource allocations. 
Initialization, Analysis, and Monitoring/Replanning comprise the three phases of 
the M-R VAT operation, explained by Major Swartz: 
During the Initialization Phase, the M-R VAT elicits critical information 
from the user and structures the nature of the specific situation to be addressed. 
The Analysis Phase consists of determining the best set of solutions for the 
problem, and assisting the decision maker in considering tradeoffs before making 
the final selections. During Monitoring and Replanning, the system databases are 
updated as the plan is executed. The decision maker is presented with a running 
summary of plan execution, and he or she is able to re-solve the problem as the 
situation changes. [Swartz, 2000: 2] 
This research is in direct support of the M-R VAT. Specifically, the extrinsically- 
centered decision support tool developed here will provide the decision factors to be used 
by the campaign planner in addressing the specific situation during the M-R VAT 
Initialization Phase. Furthermore, the decision support tool will provide a scored set of 
feasible solutions during the M-R VAT Analysis Phase. 
The Existing Decision Support Tool for M-R VAT 
This research, aimed at developing an extrinsically-oriented decision support 
model, is a direct follow-on to Lieutenant Christopher Buzo's work, A Decision Support 
22 
Tool to Aid Campaign Planners in Selecting Combat Aircraft for Theater Crisis [Buzo, 
2000]. 
In his work, Buzo used content analysis of JPUB 5-03.1 and AFDD 2 to establish 
the minimum, basic set of extrinsic considerations necessary for campaign planning 
[Buzo, 2000: 42]. He then used modified Cognitive Decision Method (CDM) 
interviewing techniques to elicit additional extrinsic factors related to campaign planning 
from 25 USAF subject matter experts [Buzo, 2000: 16-20, 46]. The interviews also 
served to refine, define, and expand those factors that had been previously identified 
through content analysis. All of the subject matter experts were USAF officers holding 
the ranks of Major through Colonel (0-4 through 0-6), and were drawn from Air Combat 
Command, Air Force Central Command, Air University, and Air Staff [Buzo, 2000: 46]. 
Challenged with developing an executable decision support tool using these 
extrinsic factors, Buzo investigated two Decision Analysis (DA) models [Buzo, 2000]. 
His candidate models included Thomas L. Saaty's Analytic Hierarchy Process [Saaty, 
1982], and a form of Multi-Attribute Utility Theory (MAUT) that utilizes Value Focused 
Thinking, developed by Ralph Keeney [Keeney, 1992]. 
Citing several potential shortcomings with the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP), 
Buzo selected Keeney's Value Focused Thinking (VFT) application of MAUT [Buzo, 
2000: 20-21]. Lieutenant Colonel Jack Kloeber, Associate Professor of Operations 
Research at AFIT, advocated the use of VFT over other Decision Analysis methods and 
helped to develop the theoretical foundations of Buzo's work. VFT's appeal is that it 
provides a method for quantifying otherwise qualified objectives, rather than alternatives, 
in structuring a decision maker's values—a hierarchical, objectives-oriented approach to 
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decision making that integrates all of the important considerations [Keeney, 1992; Buzo, 
2000: 21]. Both AHP and the VFT application of MAUT are discussed as decision 
model alternatives in Chapter III. 
Having used VFT techniques to establish a hierarchy of factors representing the 
extrinsic decision objectives of force mix selection, Buzo conducted additional interviews 
with the subject matter experts to obtain scores, weights, and relationships for and among 
the factors [Buzo, 2000: 44]. An important consideration is that Buzo concentrated these 
follow-up VFT model-building efforts on the expertise of USAF Central Command 
planners, intentionally limiting the scope and applicability of his decision support tool to 
theater operations in Southwest Asia [Buzo, 2000: 6, 44]. 
Crisis Action Planning for contingency deployments in the USAF involves group 
decision making. Furthermore, the decentralization of responsibilities and authority 
among the USAF Major Commands may have resulted in individual sets of business 
rules that are not universally applied throughout the USAF. For these reasons, Buzo used 
a modified Delphi study (comprised of 3 rounds of questionnaires) that generated subject 
matter expert agreement on the structure, scores, and weights used in his VFT decision 
support tool [Buzo, 2000: 44, 55-63]. However, only ten of the original 25 subject matter 
experts participated through the final round of questionnaires [Buzo, 2000: 81]. 
Buzo's extensive use of Craig W. Kirkwood's Strategic Decision Making: 
Multiobjective Decision Analysis with Spreadsheets [Kirkwood, 1997] enabled him to 
create a spreadsheet-based, executable decision support tool that quantified and related 
the extrinsic decision factors that are important to campaign planning. Such a tool holds 
extreme value in today's military operations planning environment and could be 
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integrated into the M-R VAT and subsequently linked to the ALP. Buzo's work puts the 
US AF one step closer to optimal force mix selection and near-instantaneous logistics plan 
development and execution through ALP and the M-R VAT. This one step sets the stage 
for further research. 
Given a wide range of DA tools, techniques, and models available, Buzo 
examined the merits of only two [Buzo, 2000:20-21]. This current research improves 
upon that effort by investigating a number of candidate DA tools, beginning with an 
overview of the field and a general categorization of techniques. 
Additionally, Buzo created a single VFT hierarchy using over 20 extrinsic 
decision factors gleaned from his research [Buzo, 2000: 80, 105-112]. Although VFT 
may be a desired DA methodology in this arena, the initial research did not investigate 
the possibility that some factors may not belong within the hierarchy, or may at least be 
better suited to inclusion within a co-hierarchy or subset that integrates with the main 
hierarchy. Some of the factors may more appropriately serve as a filter or screen for the 
main tool. The existence and importance of the factors notwithstanding, it is their place 
and function within the decision support tool that may be in question. It is important to 
interject here that the extrinsic categories identified in Figure 1, gleaned from content 
analysis, are the exact starting categories that had been identified by Buzo. 
The mathematical relationships that drive the Buzo decision support tool are 
drawn almost exclusively from Kirkwood's instruction and represent modified MAUT 
[Kirkwood, 1997]. The factors and sub-factors are additive. This approach is not 
inherently flawed. However, the current research effort addresses other potential 
mathematical relationships, between and among factors and sub-factors, as they might 
25 
apply to this specific context. The goal is not to introduce altogether different equations 
and formulas, rather the goal is to avoid exclusion of other mathematical functions that 
might enhance model performance. 
Another area of potential improvement is the subject matter expert pool itself. 
The Buzo model was built upon the expertise of representatives from just two major 
commands, one schoolhouse, and the Air Staff. Furthermore, the actual scores and 
weights of factors were decided by experts from just the Air Force Central Command 
[Buzo, 2000: 44]. This was the intended scope of Buzo's work, and he does not claim 
universal applicability to the entire USAF. However, the goal of this current research is 
just that—universal application for the USAF. To that end, the subject matter pool is 
larger and represents the four operational major commands (within CONUS), two 
schoolhouses, and the Air Staff. 
This literature review has provided an overview of crisis action campaign 
planning and illustrated its criticality to USAF operations. It has also given an overview 
of the ALP and the M-R VAT, the driving forces behind this research. The preceding 
section discussed the original extrinsically-oriented decision support tool that was 
developed to meet the needs of M-R VAT and ALP. Next is a discussion of the 
knowledge elicitation techniques used for this current research. 
Eliciting Knowledge: Interviewing/CDM, Content Analysis, and Delphi 
Interviewing/CDM and Content Analysis. The Critical Decision Method (CDM) 
of semi-structured interviewing was developed in 1989 by Klein, Calderwood, and 
MacGregor. It is an expert decision and judgement centered approach to the Cognitive 
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Task Analysis (CTA) methodology [Buzo, 2000: 16], a methodology that enhances the 
study of non-observable skills and expert thinking [Seamster, 1997: 25]. 
CDM goes beyond traditional CTA in that it is a retrospective and introspective 
interviewing approach that applies cognitive probes to the critical decision points that 
require expert-level decisions or judgements [Klein et al, 1994: 464]. 
The processes of making decisions and solving problems on the level of force mix 
selection are complex and highly cognitive tasks that require considerable skills. They 
are the processes that actually drive the motor behaviors that have been the subject of 
traditional task analyses in the past [Seamster, 1997: 78]. The important issues to this 
research are the previous experiences of subject matter experts and their expert responses 
to (and their lessons learned from) critical decision making opportunities, not just the 
motor tasks or structurally imposed behaviors. Hence, CDM, with its emphasis on 
retrospective cognitive responses, is ideally suited to this research. 
In conducting CDM interviewing, the interviewer is tasked with eliciting 
comprehensive job information from the respondent. This is best accomplished in a 
semi-structured environment in which the interviewer uses his or her specific knowledge 
of the information needed to guide the respondent to appropriate personal reference 
points. The respondent is asked to relay his or her personal experience, given the now 
developed reference point that involves critical decision making opportunities. 
The interviewer uses the situational reference point to probe decision making 
opportunities, specific to the subject matter expert's personal experience. The challenge 
is to remain on subject, with the interviewer getting the respondent to answer the 
questions posed [Interview Research Manual, 1976: 15]. In dealing with incomplete or 
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inappropriate responses, the interviewer repeats the question, exhibits expectant pause, 
repeats the respondent's reply, asks a neutral question, or asks outright for clarification 
[Interview Research Manual, 1976: 15-16]. 
Questions might arise as to the reliability and validity of information gleaned 
from CDM interviewing to obtain extrinsic decision factors for crisis action campaign 
planning. However, some experts clearly advocate the process. According to Canter, 
Brown, and Groat, "Research would be more effective if procedures allowed the 
interviewees to express their own view of the issues at hand, in their own way, whilst still 
providing information that is structured enough for systematic analysis and reporting" 
[Canter et al, 1985:83]. 
The combination of CDM interviewing and content analysis, when done properly, 
provide for relatively sound reliability and validity. According to Brenner, Brown, and 
Canter, the processes of content analysis and multidimensional scaling (done in this 
research via decision analysis) make it possible to develop systematic and quantitative 
summaries of data that "would not have been amenable to analysis in the past, when such 
data might have been dismissed as 'too qualitative.' These data can now form the basis 
of research activity" [Brenner et al, 1985: 1].   Open-ended, largely unstructured research 
material should not impose "unnatural restraints" on a researcher's analysis [Mostyn, 
1985: 115]. The researcher's purpose is to systematically identify the specific elements 
of communication so that conversion into scientific data can be objectively accomplished 
[Mostyn, 1985: 117]. 
This research probes the experiences of subject matter experts using CDM 
interviewing and content analysis in order to develop an exhaustive listing of extrinsic 
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decision factors necessary to consider during the force mix selection portion of crisis 
action planning. Buzo's work on the initial decision support tool followed the same early 
process [Buzo, 2000]. Elicitation using CDM interviewing is a sound approach to 
gathering the extrinsic factors necessary to build a decision support tool. Content 
analysis of the interviews, as well as the official guidance provided for deployment 
planning, is the intermediate step in gathering and quantifying the factors. Final 
quantification of factors involves the application of DA techniques, discussed at length in 
Chapters III and IV. 
The Delphi Study. Modified Delphi techniques comprised the preferred method 
for gaining a consensus of this current decision support tool from among the selected 
campaign planning experts. Linstone and Turoff define the Delphi technique as 
"structured communication that allows a group of individuals, as a whole, deal with a 
complex problem" [Linstone and Turoff, 1975: 3]. Norman Dalkey, one of the 
originators of the Delphi method, states that the rationale for the use of the technique is to 
obtain the intuitive insights of experts and to use their judgement as systematically as one 
can [Adler, 1996: 4]. In order to pool the opinions and expertise of individuals within a 
group into a central theme or direction, Delphi techniques allow feedback of individual 
contributions of knowledge, provide assessment of the group judgement or view, allow 
individuals to then revise their views in light of other views or a developing central 
theme, and provide for anonymity among individual participants [Linstone and Turoff, 
1975:3]. 
What the Delphi technique offers is what is specifically required in this research 
situation: access to the opinions and judgements of subject matter experts, controlled 
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feedback to refine these judgements, and a necessary measure of anonymity to assure 
honest responses that are free from the pressures to conform to group dynamics. The 
latter point is particularly important in a military setting. In group dynamics, a dominant 
individual can often influence the opinions of others [Brown, 1968: 2-3]. The effects of 
individual dominance can be amplified by the clear rank structure within the military, 
leading subordinates to outwardly concur with the opinions of their supervisors even 
though they may privately disagree. Delphi techniques eliminate this effect because all 
responses are anonymous [Brown, 1968: 3]. 
Linstone and Turoff provide several reasons for using the Delphi method. The 
first is when the problem cannot be addressed with "precise analytical techniques," but is 
better suited to the collection of individual subjective judgements [Linstone and Turoff, 
1975: 4]. Given the need for wide-ranging expertise on decision making during 
campaign planning, this reason certainly applies to this research. The second reason 
offered is when more experts are needed than can interact in a committee-type exchange 
or face-to-face group interview [Linstone and Turoff, 1975: 4]. Again, this applies to this 
research because campaign planning experts are currently on duty in their respective 
critical fields, and spread among a number of offices and agencies across the United 
States. The third reason, similar to the second reason in substance and applicability here, 
is when the time and cost are sufficiently high to preclude frequent group meetings 
[Linstone and Turoff, 1975: 4]. The final reason to use the Delphi method is to avoid 
group domination by quantity (majority), personality, or position [Linstone and Turoff, 
1975: 4]. Again, given the clear rank structure and disciplined superior-subordinate 
relationships in the military, this fourth reason is especially applicable to this research. 
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Having established the suitability of the Delphi method for this research, it is 
necessary to discuss the process. 
Generally put, the Delphi method is used to collect and distill the knowledge of 
subject matter experts by using controlled opinion feedback that is interspersed within a 
series of questionnaires [Adler, 1996: 3]. The Delphi technique is usually executed in 3-4 
rounds that may or may not involve the two general phases of exploration and evaluation 
[Turoff, 1975: 89]. Given a generalized problem with no central theories in which 
neither the issues nor the solutions are clear, an exploration phase can approximate the 
start of ungrounded research. However, a study in which theory discovery is not a goal 
and in which issues are clearly identified need only use an evaluation phase, bypassing an 
unnecessary exploration. 
The first round of Delphi is "seeded" with an initial range of options (in general, 
but particularly in this research), but allows individuals almost absolute freedom to 
expand or alter the list [Turoff, 1975: 89]. During this round, group members come to 
understand the goals of the study, as well as the terminology and taxonomy, and they 
examine the subject issues to validate their personal competency levels with regard to the 
subject and direction of the study. 
The responses of the experts to the Delphi's first round begin the controlled 
feedback process that is an important aspect of this technique. The controlled feedback 
process reduces extraneous or redundant material that might otherwise obscure the more 
significant material offered by the experts [Dalkey, 1967: 3]. The researcher filters the 
extraneous or irrelevant information and summarizes the important contributions, re- 
submitting the results to the expert group. This second round provides experts with 
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points of view they may not have considered, while also providing all of the group 
experts a compilation of ideas that may begin to resemble either a central them or a 
divergence in schools of thought [Dalkey, 1968: 4]. 
How does this work? Each member must justify their responses (anonymously), 
which are then made available to all other group members. Through Round 2 and 
subsequent iterations of the process, experts begin to take into account "considerations 
they might through inadvertence have neglected, and to give due weight to factors they 
were inclined to dismiss as unimportant at first thought" [Brown, 1968: 2-7]. 
The number of rounds used to accomplish a Delphi study is not necessarily a good 
measure of the technique's success. Furthermore, the reaching of a consensus or central 
theme is also not a measure of Delphi success. Turoff explains some approaches that 
could go far in reducing the number of necessary Delphi rounds, beginning with the 
researcher's dedication of considerable time and effort to the formulation of obvious 
issues that are clearly exhibited [Turoff, 1975: 89]. A second approach is to ask the 
expert participants for both their positions on an item and their underlying assumptions— 
in the very first round of the study [Turoff, 1975: 89]. These approaches could result in a 
2-3 round Delphi study that holds extreme value to the researcher. As for reaching a 
consensus, it is not necessary and may not be desirable in some situations. Delphi studies 
can result in divergence of ideas, the polarization of experts into two camps. This in 
itself is valuable insight into the applicable issues that could make a given Delphi study 
quite fruitful. However, in the case of this research aimed at creating a decision support 
tool that is universally applicable to the entire USAF, a group consensus was desired. 
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The Delphi method is a well-tested and appropriate approach to efforts geared 
toward generating a consensus [Linstone and Turoff, 1975: 75]. In the case of this 
research, the extrinsic decision factors affecting force mix selection were already gleaned 
through CDM interviewing and content analysis. It was the determination of the best 
relationships of these factors within the candidate decision support tool that required a 
method of access to individual expertise and judgements that had not yet been, and could 
not be, provided for by basic research interviewing. In this light, the Delphi technique 
was the most appropriate method. 
Having established the background for this research and the elicitation methods 
used, Chapter III discusses the Decision Analysis field and the selection of the most 
appropriate Decision Analysis technique for this decision situation. 
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III. Determining the Best Decision Analysis Model 
Decision Analysis 
This chapter discusses the progression of decision analysis applications from their 
basest forms to more complex approaches that deal with uncertainty, risk, sequentiality, 
and multiple criteria and objectives. 
Structuring a Decision. According to Derek W. Bunn, decision analysis (DA) is 
conventionally understood to fall within the larger study of the entire management field, 
with a primary focus on choosing a sound alternative from among competing potential 
alternatives using a perspective that is essentially methodological [Bunn, 1984: 1]. 
A fundamental philosophy of DA is the breaking down of a decision into its 
component parts. An otherwise overwhelmingly complex problem can then be astutely 
analyzed piece-by-piece, with the subsequent re-composition of the problem providing 
insights and recommendations that allow the decision maker to attack the overall 
situation with more confidence and competence [Bunn, 1984: 4, and Clemen, 1990: 4-5]. 
The pattern of relationships developed by breaking a decision problem down come to 
constitute a particular decision model [Bunn, 1984: 4]. 
The situational features that can make a decision problem sufficiently complex to 
warrant DA techniques include uncertainty, multiple objectives, multiple options, and 
sequentiality [Bunn, 1984: 4]. These features are discussed in greater detail periodically 
throughout the chapter. 
In first approaching a decision situation, decision makers often begin with an 
elementary framework, "taught throughout private industry, schools, and even the Girl 
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Scouts," that includes 1) defining the problem 2) gathering facts and making 
assumptions 3) developing possible solutions 4) analyzing and comparing possible 
solutions 5) selecting the best solution [Lemire, 1991: 5].   This framework constitutes a 
decision model in its most basic form, and serves as the sequence flow for DA processes. 
Robert T. Clemen refines and expands upon this basic DA sequence. In his book, 
Making; Hard Decisions, Clemen describes a step-by-step process that also begins with 
identifying the problem [Clemen, 1990: 5]. His second step is the identification of 
objectives and alternatives. He refers to the third and fourth steps, decomposing and 
modeling the problem and choosing the best alternative, respectively, as the "modeling 
and solution [which] form the heart of most textbooks on decision analysis" [Clemen, 
1990: 6-7]. While many discussions of the decision making process stop at Clemen's 
fourth step, Clemen adds more. Sensitivity analysis should be performed once a solution 
is selected, and this should be followed by a determination of whether further analysis 
might be necessary before implementing the proposed solution [Clemen, 1990: 7]. 
Figure 2 depicts a flow chart representation of Clemen's decision analysis 
process. The process serves as a sequential guide to analyzing decision problems in 
almost any managerial arena. However, such flow chart guides are woefully inadequate 
in that they leave the decision maker to rely on his or her own capabilities, experience, 
education, and resources in the accomplishment of the steps of the process. More 
advanced DA models provide many of those tools so essential to decision makers in 
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Figure 2: Decision analysis process flow chart 
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The framework established by DA flow charts like that shown in Figure 2 serve as 
the foundation for more comprehensive decision support tools that subsequently break 
decision situations into their component parts. 
Howard and Matheson, in their book The Principles and Applications of Decision 
Analysis, address the "heart of.. .decision analysis" (Clemen's decomposing and 
modeling the problem and choosing the best alternative) with an analysis flow diagram 
that forms the basis for creating a decision support tool [Howard and Matheson, 1983: 
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Figure 3: The decision analysis cycle 
This DA cycle provides for the structuring and analysis of those decision 
problems that are sufficiently complex to warrant decomposition; namely, those that 
include probabilities, uncertainty, risk, and sequentiality—as illustrated by the phases 
shown in Figure 3. 
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Extending Decision Structures: Probability, Uncertainty and Risk. Decision trees 
and influence diagrams provide decision makers with useful means for decomposing 
decision problems that have multiple steps (sequential) and that involve measures of 
probability and uncertainty. 
Influence diagrams help decision makers conceptualize all of the elements of a 
situation, providing simple graphical representations of which decisions are to be 
considered, what uncertain events will influence intermediate and final outcomes, and 
what values are to be placed on potential outcomes [Clemen, 1990: 34]. 
Decision trees go further than influence diagrams, representing the specific 
decision points in a sequential process while providing choice branches for the decision 
maker to consider and probability branches that represent chance outcomes (events) that 
might follow these choices [Clemen, 1990: 49]. "A decision tree represents the possible 
unfolding of events in temporal order" [Heckerman et al, 1995: 2]. Together, influence 
diagrams and decision trees comprise DA models that serve as tools for decision makers. 
However, many decisions require substantially greater decomposition or an altogether 
different approach. Often, these models are used only for setting the basic structural 
foundation for addressing uncertainty and risk. One group of authors explains the place 
of uncertainty in decision making: 
.. .ambiguity or probabilism intervening among elements of the task 
environment. Such uncertainty is regarded as intrinsic within the judgement or 
decision problem; it cannot (at the time the judgement or decision is made, at 
least) be eliminated, and it exists independently of the judge or decision maker's 
(or the analyst's) representation of the problem. [Hammond et al, 1980: 193] 
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Using decision trees as their maps, decision makers can apply expected values and 
expected utilities to the elements of their respective situations in order to effectively 
account for uncertainty and risk. 
Expected value refers to the value of an uncertain outcome, computed as the 
probability-weighted average of all possible outcomes [Clemen, 1990: 178]. For 
example, if only two outcomes are possible, x and y, and each is weighted at a probability 
of .5, then the x value is multiplied by .5 and the y value is multiplied by .5 and the total 
is summed. Therefore, if x equals 100 units and y equals 200 units, then the expected 
value of the uncertain outcome would be .5(100) + .5(200) = 150 units. 
A decision maker's attitude toward risk in the face of such uncertainty is 
necessarily important to the development of a realistic decision support tool, and is most 
often captured with an expected utility function. Utility functions are computed using the 
decision maker's points of indifference concerning potential outcomes, and can identify 
the decision maker as either risk averse or risk seeking [Clemen, 1990: 376-377]. 
Decision makers can create decision trees that utilize expected values and 
expected utilities, using branches of decision nodes to correspond to alternatives and 
branches of chance nodes to correspond to possible states of individual variables 
[Heckerman et al, 1995: 2]. This alone can sufficiently decompose many complex 
decision situations, involving uncertainty, risk, and sequentiality, into points of analysis 
that can generate highly logical decisions. Perhaps Judith Lemire says it most succinctly: 
One approach to uncertainty is the expected value theory. In this case, one 
can calculate the expected value of the lottery by multiplying each outcome by the 
probability of it occurring and then summing the results. Without accounting for 
risk, an individual should be indifferent to the lottery and the certain receipt of the 
expected value ofthat lottery. Many of us, however, display risk aversion, where 
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we prefer the certainty. Some individuals are risk prone, where the game itself 
has value. [Lemire, 1991: 26] 
Often, the construction of decision trees that represent uncertainty, risk, and all 
the choice and chance points in a sequential decision situation can become quite complex. 
However, such models can still fall short of addressing all of the potential complexities of 
many decision situations. These additional complexities take the form of multiple 
criteria and multiple objectives. 
Multiple Criteria/Objective Decision Structures. Decision situations approach 
their most extreme complexities when they combine uncertainty and multiple criteria 
[Lemire, 1991: 8-9]. Decisions lacking certain information are difficult because of 
potentially misapplied probabilities and complications in pinpointing risk attitudes. 
Furthermore, such decisions can have negative results despite the soundness of the 
process [Lemire, 1991: 8]. Multiple objective decisions can add significantly to this 
difficulty in that they must often compare "apples to oranges" in considering possibly 
conflicting goals [Lemire, 1991: 8]. 
Derek W. Bunn quotes Milan Zeleny, "It has become more and more difficult to 
see the world around us in a unidimensional way and to use only a single criterion when 
judging what we see" [Bunn, 1984: 82]. Multiple objectives introduce complexities that 
can be quite challenging, such as in a situation where a combination of factors has an 
overall synergistic value that is attained by the peaking of all of the factors (far 
outweighing the sum of the individual factors), or in a situation where simultaneous 
success for all of the objectives is not necessary in order to optimize overall success 
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[Clemen, 1990:474]. Multiple objectives are fast becoming the norm in DA. Bunn 
points out: 
.. .many decisions in the public sector appear to involve payoff 
assessments in more than just monetary values. Siting a nuclear power plant, for 
example, involves issues of safety, health, environment, and reliability as well as 
cost. We must therefore look at decision criteria that are multi-dimensional, that 
can cope with the many conflicting objectives with which decision makers are 
sometimes faced. [Bunn, 1984: 82] 
There exist numerous approaches to dealing with multiple objectives and criteria, 
including the Kepner-Tregoe method and Multi-Attribute Utility Theory (MAUT), both 
of which are discussed later in this chapter. 
The progression of decision situations and DA techniques from simple to complex 
is presented in this section only to provide the setting for creating a decision support tool 
for force mix selection during USAF crisis action campaign planning. This situation 
most certainly involves the evaluation of multiple criteria. It is important to note, 
however, that such force mix selection is limited to a single decision of which asset set to 
deploy given a particular state of nature at a discrete point in time. Therefore, this 
decision support model need not allow for sequential decision making.   A decision tree 
format is neither required nor appropriate. 
Classifying the DA Approaches 
This section discusses the general theories of decision making and some of the 
general classes of models used in DA. Although this literature review is thorough, it is 
limited and is by no means exhaustive of the subject. DA is a growing field of study, 
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with literally thousands of works on the subject, of which the review of all is beyond the 
scope of this research. 
General Theories. The models, tools, and even the basic theories surrounding the 
science of decision analysis can be centered either prescriptively or descriptively—or in 
combination of both. Prescriptive approaches are also referred to as rational or 
normative, telling decision makers how to accomplish their task. Descriptive approaches, 
as the name implies, describe the processes of decision making [Oxenfeldt et al, 1978: v- 
vi]. This research requires the development of & prescriptive decision support tool that 
will aid campaign planners in quickly and effectively choosing force mixes in times of 
crises. Much of the descriptive requirements of such decision making are already 
provided in training and ample USAF and DoD instructions. However, the descriptive 
approach is mentioned here because descriptive versus prescriptive is the initial dividing 
point in establishing the classes of DA methods. 
According to Oxenfeldt et al, writings on decision making and analysis differ by 
two fundamental orientations: The mathematical and statistical orientation that 
constitutes statistical decision theory, and the cognitive decision functioning that 
constitutes psychological decision theory [Oxenfeldt et al, 1978: vii]. 
Hammond, McClelland, and Mumpower, in their book Human Judgement and 
Decision Making, provide six general theoretical approaches to the study of decision 
making: Decision Theory, Behavioral Decision Theory, Psychological Decision Theory, 
Social Judgement Theory, Information Integration Theory, and Attribution Theory. 
According to the authors, the first three approaches are seated in economics, while the 
last three are rooted in psychology [Hammond et al, 1980: 9]. 
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Decision Theory (as specifically described and limited here by Hammond et al), is 
that work most closely associated with Ralph Keeney and Howard Raiffa, and is 
concerned with choosing among alternatives with multiple attributes [Hammond et al, 
1980: 10]. The parameters of choosing one alternative over another are the probability of 
the occurrence of the alternative and the expected utility to the decision maker 
[Hammond et al, 1980: 9], placing this approach under the statistical decision theory 
umbrella of Oxenfeldt et al. 
Behavioral Decision Theory is based upon the central idea of human decision 
making falling short of true rationality. This approach describes the less than optimal 
behavior of the decision maker [Hammond et al, 1980: 10]. It is a descriptive approach 
that falls within the economics sphere but not necessarily within statistical decision 
theory. 
Psychological Decision Theory moves one step beyond description of human 
decision making and moves toward explanation and prediction of decision behavior 
[Hammond et al, 1980: 10]. It does not, however, prescribe action or behavior. 
Social Judgement Theory emphasizes the interaction between environment and 
cognitive systems, having its origins in the field of perception [Hammond et al, 1980: 10- 
11]. Once again, its study is descriptive in nature and clearly falls under the 
psychological decision theory umbrella. 
The second purely psychological approach (fifth approach overall) is Information 
Integration Theory. "IIT emphasizes and provides for the analysis of the cognitive 
integration of multiple pieces of information that are measured subjectively, and for 
which subjective importance is also measured" [Hammond et al, 1980: 12]. This theory 
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deals with the situational "cognitive algebra" employed, such as the averaging of factor 
values in some cases and the multiplying of factor values in other cases [Hammond et al, 
1980: 12]. Although this approach is descriptive in nature, it clearly has the potential to 
prescribe. However, the approach falls under descriptive psychological decision theory. 
Finally, Attribution Theory studies causal attribution under the "psychology of 
common sense," directly addressing the tension between common sense and refined 
knowledge [Hammond et al, 1980: 12]. Simply, this approach addresses the question of 
"when will a person rather than circumstances be blamed" [Hammomd et al, 1980: 12]. 
Jon Doyle, of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, provides another 
grouping of decision making theories. He refers to rational decision making as "choosing 
among alternatives in a way that 'properly' accords with the preferences and beliefs of an 
individual decision maker or those of a group making a joint decision" [Doyle, 1998: 1]. 
The subject is developed under six general theories: Decision Theory, Decision Analysis, 
Game Theory, Political Theory, Psychology, and Economics [Doyle, 1998:1]. 
Doyle discusses Decision Theory and Decision Analysis interchangeably. Game 
Theory is sequential by nature, involving premeditated, strategic actions and cognitively 
contrived responses, and so is not applicable to this research. Political Theory, 
Psychology, and Economics are not expounded upon by Doyle [Doyle, 1998] and are 
considered here as descriptive schools concerning decision making; they necessarily 
cross over to statistical decision theory when attempting prescription. 
Illustration of the basic separation of classes and general theories of decision 
making is important to this research in developing the most appropriately structured and 
oriented decision support tool in aiding campaign planners. 
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Force mix selection decisions require prescriptive tools that fall within statistical 
decision theory. Theories and studies concerned with describing the psychology of 
decision making offer little value within the scope of this thesis. The remainder of this 
chapter discusses methods and models that fall within statistical decision theory, the most 
appropriate candidates for this research problem. 
Classes of DA Methods. The classes of DA methods are not always exclusive. 
Review of the previous section will show that some models can fall under several 
theoretical umbrellas. Operations research and psychology are the primary fields of 
study concerned with DA, and DA methods overlap between the two fields. Figure 4 





Figure 4: Sample of decision making approaches 
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Having already established the need in the USAF for a prescriptive (rational), 
statistical decision theory-based decision support tool for campaign planners in selecting 
force mixes, the reader can readily grasp the sphere of influence this research falls under 
by reviewing Figure 4. Some examples of rational and descriptive DA methodologies are 
shown in Figure 5. 
Methodologies 
Rational (Prescriptive) Descriptive  
Multi-Attribute Utility Theory 
Analytical Hierarchy Process 
Multi-objective Linear Programming 
Psychological Decision Theory 
Social Judgement Theory 
Prospect Theory 
Figure 5: Rational and prescriptive DA methodologies 
Michael R. Klein and Leif B. Methlie, in Knowledge-Based Decision Support 
Systems, offer what might be the most easily discernable break down of DA methods 
within respective fields [Klein and Methlie, 1990]. Interestingly, they illustrate 
differentiated groupings of techniques within individual fields of study, and then show a 
natural convergence of all towards a common master product—a complete knowledge- 
based decision support system [Klein and Methlie, 1990: 6]. Figure 6, borrowed from the 
Klein and Methlie text, illustrates perfectly this grouping of methods within disciplines. 
Notice that, according to Klein and Methlie, only prescriptive theories lead to decision 
support systems (the right side heading at the top of the figure), and a decision support 
system is what this research strives to create. 
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Data, Models, Rules 
User Control 
Figure 6: The scientific background of DA and support systems 
47 
In Figure 6, the acronym DSS stands for "decision support system," and KB-DSS 
stands for "knowledge-based decision support system." This research strives to create a 
decision support tool for campaign planners using techniques described along the right 
side of Figure 6, namely utility (or value) functions, maximizing, modeling, and 
optimizing, among others. 
With earlier sections having provided ample discussion of simple-to-complex DA 
situations and some of the general theories in the field, the right side of Figure 6 clearly 
narrows the direction of this thesis in satisfying research questions 3 and 4. This is 
vitally important because much of this entire thesis effort is the search for the most 
appropriate method for modeling the situation. 
Specific Approaches. There are many candidate DA methods for modeling this 
particular decision situation. The most appropriate method must be more than simply the 
most convenient, the simplest, or the easiest to use. Conversely, it need not be the most 
complex nor the most novel. It must simply be the most appropriate for the problem of 
force mix selection during crisis action campaign planning in the USAF. 
Initially, two economics-rooted decision making methods, the zero-sum technique 
and the mixed strategy game (and game theory in general), are discarded as candidates 
for this research. These techniques use the concepts of changing states of nature, 
sequentially-oriented decision structures, and competitor's actions in defining logical 
"moves" for the decision maker [Filippi and Nelson, 1984: 26]. Later discussion 
addresses the characteristics of this decision situation that disqualify these concepts as 
candidate models. 
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Expected value and expected utility (utility theory) were touched upon earlier. 
Utility theory has undeniable applicability to this decision situation in that potential 
decision makers in this case possess expertise that is highly subjective in nature and their 
decisions will necessarily involve subjective factors. Jon Doyle states, "Though the 
notions of preference and optimal choice have qualitative foundations, most practical 
treatments of decision theory represent preference orders by means of numerical utility 
functions" [Doyle, 1998: 3]. Utility theory, on the surface, is certainly a viable candidate 
for this decision situation, given this researcher's goal of optimizing force mix selection. 
Note the following discourse: 
The principle of maximizing expected utility has long been established as 
the guide to making rational decisions (von Neumann and Morgenstern 1947; 
Savage 1954; Luce and Raiffa 1957). It rests on two components: probabilities 
for representing our uncertainty about the situation, and utilities for representing 
our preferences. [Chajewska and Koller, 1999: 1]. 
Despite their advantages in converting human judgement and preference into 
quantitative mathematical measures, utility functions can be problematic. The process of 
acquiring a utility function from an individual decision maker is not sufficiently 
understood by many analysts, and "there are no experts to ask about the structure" 
because every person's utility function may be quite different [Chajewska and Koller, 
1999: 1]. Moreover, the elicitation process is cognitively difficult, error prone, and often 
time consuming [Chajewska and Koller, 1999: 1]. 
Another drawback to basic utility functions is that their elicitation takes decision 
makers away from reality and into the world of hypothetical lotteries [Goodwin and 
Wright, 1991: 83]. A decision maker's attitude towards risk may be quite different, given 
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a real situation, than that presented in the utility function that had been elicited. Even if 
this is not the case, utility functions can result in contradictory decisions as evidenced by 
the "Allais's paradox" put forward in 1953, in which the existence of a certain outcome 
among probable outcomes creates decisions that are inconsistent with the established 
expected utility [Goodwin and Wright, 1991: 84-85]. 
Nonetheless, utility theory is especially valuable in its application in advanced 
forms such as Multi-objective Linear Programming (MOLP) and Multi-Attribute Utility 
Theory (MAUT). MOLP and MAUT serve as the two major theoretical approaches to 
dealing with multiple criteria decision situations [Fuller and Carlsson, 1996: 140]. Basic, 
or single attribute, utility theory is not applicable to this research because this decision 
situation involves a number of potential attributes or criteria and an almost infinite 
number of alternatives. However, both MOLP and MAUT surface as highly viable 
candidate models in this case, as extensions of single attribute utility theory that 
encompass multiple attributes, criteria, and objectives. 
This chapter's discussion of decision making theory and different DA methods 
can now be focused clearly on multi-criteria models under the Operations Research 
umbrella of approaches to DA. In addition to MOLP and MAUT, there are many 
methods for addressing multiple criteria, some of which might be quite appropriate for 
this decision situation. 
Jack Kloeber, a former associate professor at the Air Force Institute of 
Technology, provides a break down of some common multi-attribute decision analysis 
techniques, presented in Table 1 [Kloeber, 1992: 16]. 
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Table 1: Breakdown of multiple attribute decision making tools 
CHARACTERISTICS SAWM MAUT MLR TOPSIS AHP 
Requires linearity of response Yes No Yes No No 
Independence of alternatives 
required 
Yes No Yes Yes No 
Easy to do sensitivity analysis Yes No/Yes Yes No Yes 
Rank reversal possible No No No Yes Yes 
Criteria importance 
determined within the model 
No Yes (VFT) Yes No Yes 



























Time intensive? No Yes No No Sometimes 
Past data required? No No Yes No No 







No No No 
Importance of user judgement None Extremely 
important 
None None Very 
important 
Scaling problems Yes No Yes No No 
Consistently and easily 
combines different criteria 
No Yes No No Yes? 
Prescriptive or Descriptive? Prescript. Prescript. Descript. Prescript. Prescript. 
Table 1 includes the Simple Additive Weighting Method (SAWM), MAUT with 
VFT (value focused thinking), Multiple Linear Regression (MLR), Distance from Ideal 
(TOPSIS for example), and the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP). This listing is 
certainly not exhaustive. Other multi-criteria approaches include the Kepner-Tregoe 
Method (discussed later), the Candidate/Critique approach (of Linden et al, also 
discussed later), and Multi-objective Linear Programming (MOLP). 
While the approaches presented by Kloeber in Table 1 are limited, the left column 
of his table presents the distinct characteristics, of any candidate DA approach, that are 
necessarily addressed in determining the most appropriate decision support tool for this 
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decision situation. Comparing the characteristics of various DA methods to the 
requirements of this decision situation generates a final set of viable candidate DA 
models. 
Characteristics of This Decision Problem. Campaign planners in today's USAF 
require a decision support tool that captures all of the relevant extrinsic factors and 
combines them into a quantitatively-oriented aid to evaluating candidate force mixes 
quickly and efficiently, with little end-user input or cognitive deliberation. Force mix 
selection during crisis action planning is a highly critical process that equates to a non- 
repetitive, executive-level decision of possibly overwhelming magnitude. 
Force mix selection is a non-sequential decision process that involves multiple 
criteria and requires a prescriptive (rational) support tool. The individual values or 
utilities of the extrinsic factors that affect force mix selection are not necessarily linear 
[Buzo, 2000]. What's more, user judgement is extremely important in this case because 
it is the expertise of the most knowledgeable campaign planners in the USAF today that 
should be incorporated into any support tool that hopes to produce the best options for 
campaign planners to choose from. 
Because of the criticality of the decisions to be made, this decision situation 
demands that the importance of all criteria be determined within the support tool, and that 
rank reversals among different criteria are not possible (discussed in greater detail later). 
To recap, the requirements of this decision situation are: 1) the model must be 
prescriptive, 2) it must account for multiple attributes, 3) it must provide for non-linear 
criteria values, 4) user judgement is extremely important, 5) criteria importance must be 
determined within the model, 6) rank reversals cannot be allowed. 
52 
Inappropriate Methods. Before addressing those multiple criteria DA techniques 
that are not appropriate for this situation, a quick review of other disqualified methods is 
in order. Decision trees and game trees are not appropriate because they require 
sequentially-oriented decision structures and/or known probabilities for chance 
occurrences, notwithstanding their potentially intractable compositions if many criteria 
are evaluated. Prakash Shenoy states: 
.. .valuation networks are more appropriate representations than decision 
trees and game trees for symmetric or almost symmetric decision problems 
involving many variables (italics added) since it is practically intractable to either 
represent or solve such problems using either decision or game trees. [Shenoy, 
1996: 2]. 
Also excluded as candidates are the zero-sum game, the mixed strategy game, 
game theory in general, and Bayesian Decision Criteria. Bayesian statistical theory 
allows for decisions based upon the introduction of new information that creates 
conditional probabilities [Bunn, 1984: 113-121]. More specifically, Bayes' Theorem 
allows for revision of initial probabilities to posterior probabilities, given the results of 
either a previous decision or an experiment [Hill et al, 1981: 143]. Even allowing for 
non-sequential decision making based upon numerous chance occurrences for which 
there exists any number of conditional probabilities, this decision situation involves no 
such chance occurrences within the decision process itself. 
Obviously, single attribute utility theory is also disqualified. However, utility 
theory in its expanded forms (i.e. MAUT) remains in consideration. 
As for multiple criteria DA methods, the single additive weighting method 
(SAWM), while easily applied and understood by decision makers, is disqualified as a 
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candidate model. Its most important disqualifying characteristics are that it requires 
linear value measurements for criteria, it provides no method for evaluating the relative 
importance of criteria within the model, and it does not provide an avenue for converting 
expert user judgement [Kloeber, 1992: 16]. 
Multiple linear regression (MLR) is likewise inappropriate. MLR also requires 
linear values for criteria. More importantly, it is a descriptive model that requires past 
data to generate results rather than the expert judgement of qualified decision makers, 
making it absolutely inappropriate for a decision support tool that attempts to use expert 
judgement in its formulation [Kloeber, 1992: 16]. 
Distance from Ideal (TOPSIS) does not meet the requirements of this decision 
situation because it likewise does not use expert judgement in its computations. 
Additionally, it provides no measure of the relative importance of criteria within the 
model while allowing for rank reversal among criteria (the importance of which is 
discussed later) [Kloeber, 1992: 16]. 
Methods Considered. The multi-attribute DA method selected to create the 
decision support tool for this research must provide an avenue for quantifying the value 
that campaign planners in the USAF place on each of the individual extrinsic factors 
affecting force mix selection. This is necessary to provide for computing the overall 
worth of any candidate force mix—the overriding goal of the MR-VAT and this research. 
The primary challenge of creating a decision support tool for force mix selection is 
quantifying the multiple values and worth assessments of the decision makers. James R. 
Miller III states: 
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The concept of worth is a property of human beings. It is part of their 
conscious perceptual apparatus. Human beings may formulate notions of worth 
by observing external objects and activities and by considering situational 
circumstances; and they may impute or project these notions, once formulated, 
onto the external objects and activities being assessed; but the real locus of worth 
remains within the subjective minds of human decision-makers. 
[Miller, 1970: 14]. 
Miller claims that "any assessment of worth is by definition a subjective process" 
[Miller, 1970: 14]. This researcher agrees. What is required is a decision support tool 
capable of quantifying this subjectivity and doing so for multiple attributes. 
The chosen multi-attribute method must also allow for the integration of all 
factors into an overall value that can be maximized according to the decision maker's 
preferences. In common practice, decision makers often examine only parts of their 
overall decision situations. They compare (A) to (B) only on price, for example, under 
the assumption of ceteris paribus (other things being equal), often sub-optimizing the 
overall solution [Hill et al, 1981: 108-109]. Ceteris paribus is a "very handy 
methodological simplification" but one that should be limited to piece-meal construction 
of an overall, integrative matrix or model [Hill et al, 1981: 109-113]. 
Five multi-attribute DA techniques stood out as candidates for this decision 
situation. Each is discussed in detail in upcoming sections. The Kepner-Tregoe 
approach is the first method considered and is perhaps the simplest. It warrants 
consideration because it specifically addresses multiple criteria of highly subjective value 
in the making of decisions. It provides for the rank ordering and weighting of "wants" 
and a go/no go standard for "musts" [Filippi and Nelson, 1984: 81]. 
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The second method discussed is the Candidate/Critique approach in which an 
automated problem solver interactively presents candidate solutions to an end-user who 
critiques those solutions in accordance with his or her values [Linden et al, 1997: 67]. 
The third approach discussed is decision optimization via Multi-objective Linear 
Programming (MOLP) methods. 
The fourth approach is the Analytic Hierarchy Process introduced by Thomas L. 
Saaty in 1971. This method provides a means for decisions to be made on complex 
issues by simplifying "our natural decision-making processes" [Saaty, 1982: 5]. The 
method serves to capture multiple attributes and to assign quantified values to subjective 
judgements. 
Finally, Multi-attribute Utility Theory (MAUT) utilizing Value Focused Thinking 
(VFT) is examined. With VFT, utility functions are replaced by value functions, with a 
decision maker's values formed hierarchically in the model. Hereafter, MAUT with VFT 
is referred to as simply VFT. 
The Kepner-Tregoe Method 
The Kepner-Tregoe method was introduced by Charles H. Kepner and Benjamin 
B. Tregoe in 1965 as part of their firm's professional problem solving and decision 
making curriculum [Kepner and Tregoe, 1965: v-vi]. While the method is somewhat 
dated and surprisingly simple by modern DA standards, it nonetheless possesses intuitive 
merit in dealing with highly subjective, multi-attribute decision situations. 
In a 1984 thesis, A Heuristic Approach to Decision-Making for the Purchase of 
Acquisition Data, David Filippi and Richard Nelson claimed that "the only suitable 
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technique which utilizes both subjective criteria and the subjective ratings of those 
criteria is the Kepner-Tregoe approach" [Filippi and Nelson, 1984: 28]. While such a 
statement is in error given the work of Keeney, Raiffa, Saaty and others, it does serve to 
illustrate the usefulness of such an approach to the decision situation at hand. 
The Kepner-Tregoe approach is based upon seven concepts of decision making 
[Kepner and Tregoe, 1965:46-48]: 
1. Establish the objectives of the decision 
2. Determine the relative importance of the objectives 
3. Develop alternative actions 
4. Evaluate these potential alternatives against the established objectives 
5. Select a tentative decision (choice that best achieves the objectives) 
6. Explore this tentative decision for possible adverse consequences 
7. If this decision becomes final, control the effects of the adverse 
consequences with preventative planning 
The procedure for accomplishing the Kepner-Tregoe method follows these seven 
concepts almost exactly. The decision maker first establishes his or her objectives. 
Determining the relative importance of these objectives begins with a separation of them 
into "MUST" and "WANT" categories. A MUST objective is one that must be met and 
cannot be compromised. A WANT objective is one that can generate the best possible 
performance from a decision, but which can be bargained [Kepner and Tregoe, 1965: 48]. 
The MUST objectives are placed at the top as go/no go standards. The WANT 
objectives are then rank-ordered and given relative weights, either as multiples of the 
lowest-ranked objective or on a scale of 1 to 10 [Kepner-Tregoe, 1965: 48]. 
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The decision maker then develops alternative actions and evaluates them against 
the MUST and WANT objectives. Obviously, an alternative that does not meet all of the 
MUST objectives is discarded. The decision maker then values (scores) the surviving 
alternatives subjectively against each WANT objective using a scale of 1 to 10 or 1 to 
100, with each alternative's value multiplied by the weight of the corresponding WANT 
objective. These products are then summed to produce an overall score for each 
alternative [Kepner-Tregoe, 1965: 46-50]. 
The highest scoring alternative becomes the tentative solution. The decision 
maker is not done there. He or she must then brainstorm potential adverse consequences 
for implementing the tentative solution. These consequences are given "probabilities" of 
occurring from 1 to 10 (odd, but the scoring system requires that the probabilities be 
scored at greater than 1) and the decision maker again subjectively evaluates the value of 
each (negative impact) on a scale of 1 to 10 [Kepner-Tregoe, 1965: 198-199]. These 
values are summed and the total is subtracted from the original overall score for the 
alternative. Of course, this may reduce the tentative solution's value and result in a 
different alternative becoming the tentative solution, and the process is repeated. 
The final step is to plan for the adverse consequences and implement preventative 
measures that may mitigate their effects. Figure 7 provides an example of the Kepner- 
Tregoe scoring method. In the figure, notice that the campaign planner is evaluating two 
candidate force mixes, Mix A and Mix B, each with a distinct set of fighter and bomber 
aircraft. The MUST and WANT objectives are comprised of extrinsic force mix 
selection factors. 
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Mix A               Mix B 
MUST Objectives                                   Weight    Rating       Score     Rating      Score 
Host Nation Allow Assets In? N/A N/A Go N/A Go 
Runway Length and Width Sufficient at Loc? N/A N/A Go N/A Go 
Mix A              Mix B 
WANT Objectives                                  Weight    Rating       Score     Rating     Score 
Enemy ISR Capability 9.6 10 96 7 70 
POL Storage Capacity 8.7 7 60.9 9 78.3 
Distance from Mission Targets 7.8 6 46.8 8 62.4 
Ability to Re-Supply 6.9 7 48.3 9 62.1 
Tota 1 Score:    252                    272.8 
Figure 7: The Kepner-Tregoe scoring method 
Independent of potential adverse circumstances related to the decision that must 
be quantified as mentioned earlier, the campaign planner would select Mix B using the 
example shown in Figure 7. Notice that the Kepner-Tregoe method provides for decision 
makers to establish weights for the WANT objectives prior to assessing the value that 
each alternative has against each objective. The method allows for an infinite number of 
alternatives to then be valued against an existing model (i.e. mixes C, D, and F in the 
example). 
This method is well suited to the decision situation at hand. It provides for 
quantifying otherwise subjective decision factors and for doing so for multiple criteria. 
Furthermore, the development of the rank-ordering and weighting of the MUST and 
WANT objectives can be accomplished using the expert judgement of campaign planners 
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across the entire USAF. However, the ratings provided by the decision maker in valuing 
each alternative against each objective must be done independent of this USAF-wide 
expertise, during crisis action planning at the very time the decision must be made. A 
better decision support tool would allow the pool of representative USAF experts to 
develop the value of the alternatives (against the objectives) beforehand, along with the 
rankings and weights of the objectives. That would lend more consistency to results. 
The primary goal of this thesis is to develop a decision support tool that will 
enable selection of best possible force mixes. With the Kepner-Tregoe method, such a 
support tool could approach this goal, but would not reasonably assure its attainment. 
Why? Because the end-using decision maker inputs every value of every alternative in 
complete subjectivity. With Kepner-Tregoe, consistency could be almost nonexistent. 
The method could present significant sub-optimizations if a given campaign planner 
lacked the knowledge and experience to judge alternatives against objectives at the 
highest level possible. This researcher posits that the highest level possible is that 
expertise provided by a pool of the most expert campaign planners. Additionally, the 
end-using decision maker—even if the most qualified in his or her profession—may 
require considerable time and cognitive exertion in valuing the alternatives at the very 
moment when time is critical. Such a situation runs contrary to the goals of this decision 
support tool. 
The Kepner-Tregoe method is a marvelous approach when the end-using decision 
maker understands the alternatives and objectives better than anyone else, or when that 
decision maker is solely responsible for every aspect of the decision situation. For USAF 
campaign planning, we need something more. 
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The Candidate/Critique Method 
The key concept of the Candidate/Critique model of problem solving is that it is 
interactive. Decision makers input their subjective preferences via an iterative process 
with an automated decision support tool. This method is one of the latest developments 
in operations research, with Thomas and Fischer (1996), McCalla et al (1996), and 
Mukhopadhyay and Mostafa (1996), all paving the way by introducing decision 
support/information filtering models that automatically infer user preferences via 
multiple iterations driven internally [Linden et al, 1997: 67]. Actual Candidate/Critique 
methodology goes one step further. 
The natural extension of the approach is that of Linden et al. They are developing 
an automated decision support system utilizing a manual user model counterpart. Their 
system provides for progressive dialogue whereby the automated problem solver provides 
available options to the user and the user provides information as to the quality of those 
options [Linden et al, 1997: 68]. A key is that the system's user model improves over 
time and ultimately results in a solution that is acceptable to the decision maker [Linden 
et al, 1997: 68]. Figure 8 provides an example of a basic problem solving dialogue 
between a travel agent and a client. 
Figure 8 was borrowed from the Linden et al paper, Interactive Assessment of 
User Preference Models: The Automated Travel Assistant [Linden et al, 1997: 68]. 
Throughout the progressive interaction, the agent learns more and more about the client's 
subjective preferences such as his desire to fly on American Airlines and his moderate 
price sensitivity. An important consideration is that the client's preferences involve 
somewhat complicated tradeoffs between the flight, airline, and departure times that 
61 
could become intractable if modeled ahead of time within the automated decision tool 
[Linden et al 1997: 68]. 
Client: "I want to fly from Seattle to Newark next Tuesday afternoon." 
Agent: "I've got a United flight at 3:30pm for $500 and an American flight at 12:30pm 
for $520." 
Client: "I can't leave before 3:00pm but I do prefer American." 
Agent: "I have another American flight through Denver at 4:00pm for $530." 
Client: "That's pretty expensive. I'd be willing to go on a later flight or another airline 
if it'd be much cheaper." 
Agent: "The cheapest flight is USAir at 8:00pm for $490." 
Client: "In that case, the American flight is fine." 
Figure 8: Example dialogue between a travel agent and client. 
The Candidate/Critique method aims to replicate this iterative process between 
agent and client as closely as possible, with an automated problem solving tool that does 
not calculate subjective values ahead of time—it calculates them from the user model 
inputs as they occur [Linden et al, 1997: 69]. 
Although we do not attempt to implement a natural language interface, we 
would still like to capture the essence of this problem-solving process. In these 
problems, the system has access to a large dataset and the problem-solving 
methods unavailable to the user. The user has access to preference information 
not directly available to the system. The basic mode of interaction is iterative and 
cooperative, where the system and the user both attempt to convey only relevant 
knowledge. The problem is considered solved when the user is presented with a 
solution he considers acceptable. [Linden et al, 1997: 69] 
Two significant drawbacks exist with the Candidate/Critique method in its current 
early stage. First, the argument that computing subjective values ahead of time can 
become intractable is countered by the argument that any such computations that are in 
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fact manageable should be included ahead of time. This reduces or eliminates the 
possibility of involving the end-using decision maker in an intractable process. 
Especially in cases such as force mix selection during crisis action planning, whereby the 
expert opinions of seasoned campaign planners across the entire USAF can present a 
level of expertise not attainable by any one expert. Interestingly, the Candidate/Critique 
system uses MAUT as its underlying user model, differing from traditional MAUT only 
in that the system creates value functions at the time a decision is being made. While this 
gives a level of reflexive support to the subjective values of end-using decision makers 
that rivals, or exceeds, that of the Kepner-Tregoe method, it leaves out the valuable group 
expertise, could lead to significant inconsistencies, and could prove most time-consuming 
just when time is of the essence. 
The potential time-consuming property of the Candidate/Critique approach is its 
second major drawback. Depending upon the problem domain, preferences could 
"amount to an explicit total order over all candidate solutions" and the subjective 
critiques could become "pairwise comparisons between two candidates where nothing 
more could be inferred about the user's preference ordering" [Linden et al, 1997: 70]. 
The authors admit that the model could be "intractable and unrealistic in its full 
generality" [Linden et al, 1997: 70]. They suggest its use for graphical layout problems, 
internet searches, merchandise selection, and airline reservation selection [Linden et al 
1997: 69]. Force mix selection, on the other hand, involves a myriad of extrinsic and 
intrinsic factors that combine with an almost unlimited number of potential fighter and 
bomber force mix combinations, making Candidate/Critique unsuitable for now. 
63 
The Candidate/Critique method has tremendous potential in the campaign 
planning arena but not with respect to the extrinsically-oriented decision support tool 
researched here. Extrinsic factors, and intrinsic factors via future research, should be 
identified, valued, and structured into a viable model in support of M-R VAT. This 
would be necessary whether or not Candidate/Critique were used, since that method 
requires MAUT development anyway (a complete DA technique in its own right). 
However, the vision for M-R VAT is that it become a decision support model that 
integrates intrinsic and extrinsic decision factors along with corresponding resource lift 
requirements (and availability) and actual combat sortie projections. Given a situation of 
evaluating just these few subjective tradeoffs, the Candidate/Critique approach could 
prove most valuable as the user interface for M-R VAT. As for the extrinsic model 
proposed by this thesis, Candidate/Critique is an inappropriate method. 
Multi-Objective Linear Programming 
Multi-objective linear programming (MOLP) is an extension of basic linear 
programming that addresses the problem of competing objectives in a decision situation. 
Linear programming is essentially a solution optimizing technique developed in the 
1940's by George B. Dantzig and originally known as the "programming of 
interdependent activities in a linear structure" [Lee, 1972: 15]. Prior to addressing 
MOLP, it is important to discuss the structure of basic linear programs. 
Put simply, linear programming addresses situations in which a decision must be 
made, restrictions or constraints are placed upon the available alternatives, and a primary 
goal or objective is present [Ragsdale, 1998: 17-18]. With linear programming, it must 
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be possible to express all of the functions as a linear combination or weighted sum of the 
variables, producing the general form shown in Figure 9 [Ragsdale, 1998: 23]. 
MAX (or MIN): 
Subject to: 
cxXx+c1X1+... + cKXn 
auXx+anX2+... + ahlXn<bx 
amXXx+am2X2+... + amnXn=bn 
Xj>0 forj = l,2 ...n 
Where: 
c,.   = coefficients of the objective function (such as dollars) 
Xj = decision variables (alternatives to be changed) 
dy = numeric coefficient in the rth constraint for variable Xj 
b,   = constraints 
Figure 9: Basic linear program formula 
For single overriding objectives, computer programs such as Excel Solver can 
utilize formulas like that shown above to generate optimal solutions to the decision 
problem. Since linear optimization models assume that the "values of all the relevant 
parameters are known with certainty," the DA problem solving efforts concerning this 
technique are prominently focused on finding the most efficient search technique [Joshi, 
1980:311]. 
MOLP eliminates the limitation that a decision situation have just one overriding 
objective; it provides a realistic and robust approach to dealing with multiple competing 
objectives so long as linearity of the attributes of the situation is maintained [Anderson et 
al, 1974; Joshi, 1980; Lee, 1972; Ragsdale, 1998]. 
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The difference with MOLP is that multiple objective functions (such as the MAX 
or MIN function in Figure 9) can be used to generate a new overall objective function. 
For example, if a decision maker desired three competing successful outcomes, each of 
these outcomes (objectives) would be solved independently of the other two but within 
the same model, with all constraints enforced for each iteration, providing three separate 
optimal solutions. These would serve as the best known possible outcomes for each 
objective, giving the decision maker valuable reference points for his or her judgement of 
the final solution. More importantly, these three optimal solutions would then become 
target values in the formulation of the new overall objective function. 
With target values, the decision maker need only minimize the maximum percent 
deviation ("MINIMAX") of each objective from its target value [Ragsdale, 1998: 276- 
286]. This method also allows for weighting the percent deviations to reflect the decision 
maker's preferences with regards to each objective's importance. The formula to 
generate target values would look much like that in Figure 9 but with three objective 
functions rather than one. The final formula's objective function, using target values, 
would look similar to Figure 10. 
In Figure 10, the wt 's refer to the individual weights assigned as the measure of 
importance the decision maker gives each objective, and the Ti 's refer to the target values 
obtained by optimizing each objective separately as mentioned in the previous paragraph. 
By implementing a computer-generated search technique (such as branch and bound) to 
generate the lowest possible maximum weighted percent deviation among the three 
objectives, MOLP presents a remarkable approach to solving multi-criteria problems that 
far exceeds the cognitively-generated solutions of human decision makers. 
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( 
MIN:  w. 
(aiX} + a2X2)-T] + w, 
(a3X] + a4X2)-T2 ( 
+ W-, 
(ö5X1+a6X2)-r3 
OR, to produce the lowest maximum deviation, use the MINIMAX 
variable Q such that: 
MIN: Q 




(a]Xl + a2X2)-Tx 
\a3Xx+a4X2)-T2 
V T2 J 
r(a5Xx+a6X2)-T^ 
each < Q 
V J 
Figure 10: MOLP objective functions 
In using MOLP, a decision maker can be assured that no better feasible solution 
exists, given that the constraints are sound and accurate, the weights for the objectives are 
accurate representations of the decision maker's values, and all of the attributes are linear 
[Joshi, 1980; Keeney and Raiffa, 1976]. 
However, the development of weights for each objective could become an 
exhaustively iterative process for the decision maker as he or she adjusts the weights to 
explore solutions that do not necessarily occur at the corner points of the feasible region 
[Ragsdale, 1998: 287]. 
Another approach to MOLP is offered by Madhukar Joshi, and provides for the 
computer's search technique to generate the weights [Joshi, 1980, 341]. In his approach, 
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each of K objective functions is given a weighting coefficient without an expressed 
aspiration level, such that: 
Z*=Z<Vryfork=l,2,...,K 
With nonnegative weights, Wl,W2,..Wk, such that: 
Wl+W2+... + Wk=l 
Then the MOLP is formulated as: 
K n 
MAX: Z = YWkZk = YJV^C.JXJ) 
k=\ i=l 7=1 
Subject to:       IX*,- - <= or ~^{ = l>2>- • •'m 
Xy>0,j = l,2,...,n 
Wk>0, k=l,2,...,K 
*=i 
With this formulation, the user or decision maker does not specify the objective 
weights, this is left to the computer [Joshi, 1980: 341]. Therefore, decision maker input 
as to the relative importance of the competing objectives is nonexistent! It would seem 
that MOLP gives us a situation whereby the decision maker either manipulates weights in 
the search for solutions or leaves the importance of each objective up to the optimization 
of the computer. However, this statement is only partially true. 
According to Robert Fuller and Christer Carlsson, a number of MOLP models 
involve utility theory-based tradeoffs between objectives and include integer and 
stochastic variables, as well as methods using "ideal" and "reference" points [Fuller and 
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Carlsson, 1996: 140]. These would seem to better capture human subjectivity without the 
measure of interactive play required of traditional MOLP. This research posits that such 
models blur the distinction between MOLP and more developed multi-criteria decision 
making (MCDM) techniques such as MAUT and VFT. In fact, Fuller and Carlsson 
group both MAUT and MOLP under the MCDM umbrella and imply that MOLP 
becomes a true MCDM technique when it is interactive and involves utility functions 
[Fuller and Carlsson, 1996: 139-140]. This crosses the threshold of linearity of attributes 
and addresses non-linear criteria, more closely approximating MAUT. MAUT (using 
VFT) is discussed later as the fifth candidate approach to this decision situation. 
Horn et al address MOLP: "Historically, multiple objectives (i.e., attributes or 
criteria) have been combined ad hoc to form a scalar objective function, usually through a 
linear combination (weighted sum) of the multiple attributes, or by turning objectives into 
constraints" [Horn et al, 1993: 1]. Such would tend the model toward the requirement for 
linearity of its attributes. 
Some of the problems associated with linearity requirements are presented by 
Madhukar Joshi: 
.. .let us pause to discuss the meaning of linearity. An LP problem has 
three properties: proportionality, additivity, and divisibility. Proportionality 
implies that the amount of resources used up in performing an activity is 
proportional to the value of the corresponding action variable. It also implies that 
the payoff associated with that activity is proportional to the level ofthat activity. 
.. .The [linear] model does not allow for possible fatigue [for example] at the end 
of the day, nor does it consider the increase in workers' speed due to familiarity. 
[Joshi, 1980: 321-322] 
Additivity, another condition of linearity, necessitates that the objective function's 
value is obtained by adding the contributions of each activity. This implies that sales of 
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one item, for example, do not compete with the sales of another. If this is not true, then 
the additivity and thus linearity assumptions are violated [Joshi, 1980: 322]. 
Ralph Keeney and Howard Raiffa add "it is not always appropriate to condense 
an r-tuple of benefits {b^,...,br) by means of a simple linear weighting rule" such as: 
wfy +... + wibi +... + wrbr 
Nor is it always appropriate to use suitably chosen nonlinear transformations such as: 
™igM + - + W/g/(*,-) +... + wrgr(br) 
[Keeney and Raiffa, 1976: 22] 
Although MOLP is an admittedly sound technique in many respects, it does not 
meet the requirements of this decision situation. The need for attribute linearity is 
unrealistic in the arena of extrinsic factors affecting force mix selection. The assemblage 
of attributes into linear objective functions and constraints, as described by Horn et al, 
poses a threat to any MOLP model's accurate representation of the subjective values 
offered by campaign planning experts. Perhaps Ralph Keeney says it best: 
[Because] the consequences are significant...the amount of time devoted 
to careful study of the appropriate values is miniscule relative to the time used to 
address other aspects of the decision situation. The "objective function" may be 
chosen in an hour with very little thought, while several person-years of effort and 
millions of dollars may be used to model the relationships between the 
alternatives and the consequences and to gather information about those 
relationships. Since values are the entire reason for caring about the problem, it 
would seem reasonable to use a portion of those resources to structure, quantify, 
and understand the relevant values. [Keeney, 1992: 130]. 
Surely, any quantification of extrinsic decision factors into a decision support 
tool, if optimization is a goal, should allow for accurate transformations of subjectivity as 
well as for an objective function. As mentioned earlier, MOLP only approaches this once 
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it blurs the line into becoming a MAUT technique. Says Keeney, "the objective function 
should be a measurable value function constructed so that the differences in value derived 
for the consequences have a meaning in addition to the fact that larger numbers indicate 
preferred consequences" [Keeney, 1992: 132]. 
The Analytic Hierarchy Process 
Thomas L. Saaty's Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) is a technique that enables 
managers to make decisions concerning complex issues by simplifying and expediting 
their natural cognitive decision making processes [Saaty, 1982: 5]. Like many DA 
methods, AHP breaks down a complex and largely unstructured decision situation into its 
component parts. AHP then differentiates itself, as explained by Saaty: 
.. .arranging these [component] parts, or variables, into a hierarchic order; 
assigning numerical values to subjective judgements on the relative importance of 
each variable; and synthesizing the judgements to determine which variables have 
the highest priority and should be acted upon to influence the outcome of the 
situation. [Saaty, 1982: 5]. 
More important to the decision situation of this research, AHP presents a highly 
effective structure for group decision making by imposing discipline upon the thought 
processes of the group [Saaty, 1982: 5]. 
AHP's two foundational constructs are pairwise comparison among multiple 
attributes and a hierarchic representation of attributes. It is based on three fundamental 
theories: 1) The human mind is quite capable of making accurate comparisons between 
two attributes 2) All important problems are essentially multi-criteria with an inherent 
hierarchical structure 3) The pairwise comparisons can be consistently combined within 
the hierarchical structure to yield the best alternative [Kloeber, 1992: 3]. 
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The AHP process is carried out in four steps. First, the problem is set-up into a 
hierarchy with the decision objective at the top, attributes of the decision that affect its 
quality in the middle, and the alternatives at the bottom [Darko, 1987: 8]. The second 
step is the pairwise comparison of the middle decision attributes. This is a highly 
subjective process that involves the use of a constructed value scale that will be discussed 
shortly [Darko, 1987: 9; Kloeber, 1992: 8]. AHP's third step is the development of 
priorities, or weights, for the individual elements of the hierarchy. Again, this is rather 
subjective—which is desirable for this decision situation as well as many others. Finally, 
the fourth step aggregates these weights into a "vector of composite weights which serve 
as ratings of [the] decision alternatives... in achieving the most general objective of the 
problem" [Zahedi, 1986: 99]. Simply put, step four ranks the alternatives from best to 
worst [Darko, 1987:9]. 
A scaling technique devised by Saaty generates consistency and flexibility in 
quantifying the qualitative attributes or criteria. Numerical ratios for qualitative data are 
made possible by Saaty's Pairwise Comparison/Importance Intensity Scale, reproduced in 
abbreviated form in Table 2. In AHP, even numbers are used for intermediate values. 
Table 2: Saaty's Pairwise Comparison Scale 






Equal importance of both objectives 
Weak importance of one element over another 
Essential or strong importance of one element over another 
Demonstrated importance of one element over another 
Absolute importance of one element over another 
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Saaty's scale is sufficiently robust from a social research standpoint [Saaty and 
Vargas, 1982: 24], and provides a method for combining pairwise comparisons in a 
hierarchical manner that allows for different scales to be used for different attributes— 
generating sufficient flexibility for both quantitative and qualitative comparisons 
[Kloeber, 1992: 8]. 
Two considerations in evaluating AHP for this decision problem are consistency 
and coherence. Coherence is addressed shortly. Consistency for a decision model means 
that it must capture and quantify highly subjective criteria, and is a significant 
consideration. 
The concept of consistency is best shown by equation. 
IfA = 2B 
and B = 2C 
then A = 4C 
As the equation shows, if A is valued or preferred twice as much as B, and B is 
preferred twice as much as C, then A should be four times as valuable as C. If A were 
not preferred four times as much as C, then that comparison would be considered 
inconsistent [Luethke, 1987: 16]. 
AHP provides for consistency within the model through the use of reciprocal 
matrices and calculating the weights with the proper eigenvector (where X is the largest) 
which is approximated by the geometric mean of the ratios in the row [Kloeber, 1992: 8- 
9]. Saaty uses the consistency ratio: 
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m 
(n - 1) (1) 
The consistency ratio developed by equation (1) can be compared to the matrix 
value of randomly generated numerical judgements (along the scale of 1-9), and used as 
the indicator of consistency of the decision maker in preparing the pairwise matrix 
[Kloeber, 1992: 8-9]. Consistency, then, is properly addressed by AHP. However, if 
many criteria affect the attributes in a decision situation, or if there are many attributes 
themselves, then the pairwise comparisons become intractable due to the number (and the 
size of the matrix) and not due to the complexity of the decision [Kloeber, 1992: 17]. 
Coherence is yet another matter. Coherence here refers to the rationality of the 
decision support tool, best expressed by the popular perpetual money-making machine 
example. 
In this example, an incoherent person claims that X is less likely than Y and that 
Y is in turn less likely than Z. However, he then claims that Z is less likely than X. 
Considering that he would be rewarded for the occurrence of X, he would prefer the 
greater chance of Y and so pays the rational person to substitute Y for X. The argument 
is of course repeated, this time with a paid substitution of Z for Y because the incoherent 
person thought Z more likely. Having been paid twice, the rational person then makes a 
third sum of money by substituting X for Z because the incoherent person thought X 
more likely. This leaves the incoherent person where he started, and the rational person 
stands to make money perpetually unless the incoherent person changes his uncertainty 
evaluations [Bunn, 1984: 11]. 
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This example of an irrational approach is important because rank reversal of 
alternatives, when other alternatives are added to or subtracted from the AHP model, is a 
common complaint [Kloeber, 1992: 2]. 
Rank reversal here refers not to the ranks and weights of the criteria, rather it 
refers to the reversal of the rankings of the alternatives. In some situations in which AHP 
is accomplished—with the results computed and a final ranking of alternatives given— 
the addition or removal of a well-chosen alternative and subsequent re-implementation of 
the AHP process results in two or more alternatives changing relative ranking [Kloeber, 
1992: 13]. Such occurs with absolutely no changes in the attributes of either alternative 
(i.e., changing of weights during sensitivity analysis) [Kloeber, 1992: 13]. This is 
circular, incoherent reasoning in which the addition of Z changes one's preference 
between X and Y. 
How does this happen? The geometric means are dependent upon all of the 
pairwise comparisons. If any are deleted or added, it is very possible that the mean will 
change as will the weight assigned to that attribute [Kloeber, 1992: 13]. More 
importantly, this will occur in every criteria matrix ofthat model [Kloeber, 1992: 13]. 
Rank reversal does not make AHP invalid. The method could work in many 
situations and probably holds as a "descriptive model" [Kloeber, 1992: 13]. However, 
rank reversal in contingency planning could be detrimental. Campaign planners need 
best force mixes, and rank reversals place in serious doubt the ability of AHP to deliver. 
It is therefore disqualified as a candidate approach. 
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Multi-Attribute Utility Theory and Value Focused Thinking 
MAUT has become a prominent recent contributor to decision analysis, yielding a 
"rigorous technique for combining attributes multiplicatively (thereby incorporating 
nonlinearity), and for handling uncertainty in the attribute values" [Horn et al, 1994: 1]. 
Value Focused Thinking (VFT) is a modification of MAUT [Klimack, 2000] 
developed by Ralph Keeney that differs in two primary ways: its treatment of 
nonlinearity of model inputs (discussed later), and its focus on a problem's values 
(objectives) rather than its candidate alternatives. 
Stanley Stafira claims that DA has but two main modeling techniques: alternative- 
focused thinking and value-focused thinking [Stafira, 1995: 2-3 to 2-4]. Perhaps a better 
way to state this is that the chosen methodologies of any DA technique can be either 
alternatives driven or values (objectives) driven [Paraell et al, 1998: 1338]. The 
objectives driven approach starts with fundamental objectives and underlying sub- 
objectives and develops quantifiable attributes for the lowest level objectives up through 
the model, while the alternatives driven approach finds the alternatives first and seeks 
identifiable attributes to then differentiate these alternatives [Parnell et al, 1998: 1336]. 
Of the two approaches, the objectives driven approach is more appropriate for strategic 
situations [Parnell et al, 1998: 1336]. Table 3 illustrates the differences in the problem 
solving steps between the two approaches [Parnell et al, 1997: 7]. 
A constructed value hierarchy is the cornerstone of the VFT technique [Buzo, 
2000: 21]. Value hierarchies serve as graphical representations of all of the relevant 
issues needed in order to determine an overall relative value for each candidate 
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Table 3: Alternatives-driven vs. values-driven models 
Step Alternative-Focused Thinking Value-Focused Thinking 
1 Recognize decision problem Recognize decision problem 
2 Identify alternatives Specify values 
3 Specify values Create alternatives 
4 Evaluate alternatives Evaluate alternatives 
5 Select an alternative Select an alternative 
alternative [Buzo, 2000: 21]. A hierarchy provides for information collection, 
identification of alternatives, facilitation of communication, and the evaluation of 
alternatives [Kirkwood, 1997: 19-23]. 
A value hierarchy can be constructed from the bottom up by identifying 
individual organizational tasks or sub-objectives, grouping them together with the use of 
affinity diagrams, and then structuring the hierarchy into appropriate tiers [Parnell et al, 
1998: 1340]. 
Value hierarchies constructed from the top down are referred to as the "gold 
standard" [Parnell et al, 1998: 1338]. Top down constructions are based upon an 
organization's mission, vision, or strategy, with the objectives and tasks broken into 
progressively lower tiers until the situation is wholly encompassed. These constructions 
necessarily involve the expertise of an organization's top decision makers and/or ample 
organizational guidance as to the factors. 
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Whichever method is used to build the hierarchy, Kirkwood emphasizes the "test 
of importance" for any factor whose value consideration is to be included. The test is 
that a factor should be included only if potential variations among the candidate 
alternatives—with respect to the factor under consideration—could change the preferred 
alternative [Keeney, 1997: 19]. 
Once a hierarchy is constructed to model the decision situation, an evaluation 
measure is assigned to each objective to measure its degree of attainment, such as "higher 
salary (the evaluation measure) for a job seeker" [Kirkwood, 1997: 12]. Evaluation 
measures serve to quantify the decision maker's subjective values. VFT requires the 
normalizing of respective evaluation measures whereby the analyst does not use (as the 
measure of performance) the actual evaluation measure score, but rather the "proportion 
of the way along the allowed range ofthat evaluation measure scale where the score for 
the alternative lies" [Kirkwood, 1997: 57]. The evaluation measure, then, converts a 
factor's scored quantity from its respective units into a common set of units, allowing 
many criteria to be combined into a single measure. 
VFT incorporates nonlinearity through the functions of its evaluation measures, 
rather than through a model-wide multiplicative process. Each evaluation measure, upon 
elicitation of values from the expert decision maker, becomes a single-dimension value 
function. These single-dimension values are typically exponential, piecewise linear, or 
discrete functions [Clemen, 1996: 80; Kirkwood, 1997: 62-68]. 
VFT single-dimension value functions convert the raw graphical representations 
of candidate alternatives to values via inverse transformation upon the value graphs of the 
objectives (i.e., an exponential curve). Whichever scale is used for the values (0 to 1, 0 to 
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10, or 0 to 100) must be used consistently for all values within the model [Kirkwood, 
1997:61]. 
VFT models incorporate relative weights for the single dimension value 
functions. The weighting method is arguably more precise than that of the Kepner- 
Tregoe method or AHP. A number of weighting methods can be applied [Kirkwood, 
1997: 68-70; Clemen, 1996: 546-552], of which the "swing weight" method advocated by 
both Kirkwood and Clemen is discussed. 
The swing weight method first has the decision maker rank-order all of the 
measures and then study the ranges of each of the measures separately. After identifying 
the ranges of swings for the measures, the decision maker then begins pairwise 
comparisons between measures. This involves the decision maker determining how 
much swing measure A must have in order to match the value of B when B is swung 
from its lowest to its highest value [Kirkwood, 1997: 71-72; Clemen, 1996: 547]. 
Equation (2) shows that A need swing only 75 percent of its range to equal the swing of 
B through its full range. 
0.75A - B (2) 
The process of pairwise comparisons continues until there is one less equation 
than the number of objectives [Buzo, 2000: 26]. Once all of the comparisons are 
complete, the weights are normalized to sum to 1. The analyst now has a nearly complete 
VFT model lacking just one component—the multi-objective value function. The most 
common multi-objective value function used with VFT is the additive form: 
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v(*„) = Zw,.*v,.*o,.) 
1=1 
Where x is the overall value objective, xt is the raw score of attribute i, v,. is the 
single-dimension value function, wi is the weight of importance on attribute /, and n is 
the total number of evaluation measures. 
The appropriateness of additivity in a VFT model is thoroughly addressed by 
Clemen, Keeney, andKirkwood [Clemen, 1996: 579-580; Keeney, 1992: 132-138; 
Kirkwood, 1997: 238-239]. The requirement for an additive value function is for mutual 
preferential independence among attributes. One should note that careful, proper 
selection and arrangement of objectives within a value hierarchy can almost assure 
mutual preferential independence. However, formal testing should be accomplished. 
The reader is encouraged to reference Kirkwood's Theorems 9.19 and 9.20 in addition to 
Theorem 3.7 of Keeney and Raiffa [Kirkwood, 1997: 238-239; Keeney and Raiffa, 
1976]. Clemen also offers formal testing procedures [Clemen, 1996: 580-582]. 
VFT is certainly a viable candidate DA method for this highly subjective decision 
situation. It has the potential of accurately converting multiple subjective judgements 
into quantifiable value measures and combining them in a manner that accounts for the 
nonlinearity of responses. More importantly, it does so with a focus on the values or 
objectives of the decision maker as the driving force. This is important because an 
alternatives-focused method would limit potential solutions to a pre-determined and 
possibly finite set of choices. VFT leaves the decision maker free to create or select any 
alternative that meets the requirements generated by his or her value model. 
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The Preferred Method for this Decision Problem 
Following a background review of DA theories and methodologies, and a 
comparison of five qualifying candidate approaches, VFT was selected as the method for 
modeling this decision situation. The efforts of this research validate Buzo's selection of 
VFT for the original modeling of this subject [Buzo, 2000]. 
In his model, Buzo incorporated go/no go constraints for a number of the extrinsic 
decision factors, such as "Host Nation: Allow Assets In? " [Buzo, 2000: 25]. This is 
common for many VFT models [Keeney, 1992; Kirkwood, 1997]. However, for 
inclusion of such constraints into an additive hierarchy, some modification within the 
model's functions is necessary, most commonly the IF statements provided by most 
spreadsheet applications. 
This research considers the possibility of creating a filter model for the VFT 
approach used; the discussion of this application is reserved for Chapter IV. A filter 
serves the Go/No Go and Go/No Go with Optimization rules identified by Allan Easton 
[Easton, 1980: 183-189]. The Go/No Go Rule provides for a pre-testing of alternatives 
that can only result in one of the following conclusions: 1) one alternative will survive 
the test, 2) no alternative will survive, 3) two or more may survive [Easton, 1980: 183]. 
This rule provides for pre-selection of only those alternatives that need to be subjected to 
further evaluation by other means [Easton, 1980: 185]. 
Easton also provides for single attribute optimization following a comprehensive 
go/no go test that incorporates all of the other attributes—the Go/No Go with 
Optimization [Easton, 1980: 187]. This researcher posits that a filter using this rule could 
still be appropriate in the case of VFT because the VFT model's multi-objective value 
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function could serve as the single attribute following the go/no go phase of other 
attributes. Regardless, Kepner-Tregoe and other DA techniques (including heuristic, 
cognitive approaches) allow and encourage the use of go/no go filters. The methodology 
of the research, discussed at length in Chapter IV, outlines the process for considering use 
of a go/no go filter with VFT. 
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IV. Methodology 
Overview of the Research: The Questions and Phases 
This research was comprised of an extensive literature review and multiple 
interviews (in person and via email) with subject matter experts in an effort to elicit and 
extract information to create a decision support tool for force mix selection during crisis 
action planning. 
The research was designed to answer the six primary research questions listed in 
Table 4, where they are linked to their respective research phases. This research 
addressed the questions out of turn because research question 5 pertained initially to the 
selection of the interview participants, and research question 3 was best addressed—via 
the modified Delphi study—only after the selection of the most appropriate DA method. 
The four research phases were: I) CDM interviews and content analysis, II) 
literature review to determine the best DA technique, III) modified Delphi interviews, 
and IV) development of the final decision support tool. Table 4 shows the phases and 
their corresponding research questions. 
Table 4: The four phases of research 
PHASE I CDM / CONTENT ANALYSIS QUESTIONS 1, 2, 5 
PHASE II LITERATURE REVIEW QUESTION 4 
PHASE III ITERATIVE INTERVIEWS (DELPHI) QUESTIONS 3, 4, 5, 6 
PHASE IV DEVELOPMENT OF MODEL QUESTIONS 3, 4, 5, 6 
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Phase I: CDM Interviews and Content Analysis 
The first phase addressed research questions 1, 2, and 5. The first research 
question was: Can the factors affecting force mix selection in response to theater crises 
be clearly categorized as extrinsic and intrinsic, and can these categories be clearly 
defined? The second question was: What extrinsic factors are important to campaign 
planners when selecting aircraft force mixes in response to theater crises? And the fifth 
research question was: Can the research results be applied USAF-wide? 
In addressing the research questions, four objectives were established for Phase I. 
The first objective was to clearly distinguish, if possible, what constitutes extrinsic and 
intrinsic force mix selection decision factors in the eyes of the subject matter experts— 
which would lead to definitions for each type. The second objective was to identify all of 
the extrinsic factors so that they could be evaluated as contributors to the decision support 
tool. The factors, to lend value to this research, would necessarily have to be mutually 
exclusive and collectively exhaustive (MECE). Establishing factors to meet these criteria 
was the third objective. The fourth and final objective of this phase was to develop and 
refine an accurate definition for every factor identified. Achievement of these four 
objectives assured the generation of sound answers to questions 1 and 2. 
Content analysis of the appropriate literature was the first step. The intent during 
this early literature review was to include every factor identified and then to add any 
other factors identified later via interviews. Thus, a factor would be included if either 
extracted from content analysis or elicited via interview, or both—with the exception of 
those factors identified in Buzo's thesis, which were to be validated [Buzo, 2000]. This 
provided the best avenue to meeting the objective that all extrinsic factors be identified. 
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The appropriate literature from which to glean decision factors on this subject was 
the official guidance that is provided to campaign planners throughout the USAF—the 
DoD and USAF instruction manuals on joint planning previously discussed. Buzo's 
thesis, being a compilation of extrinsic decision factors into a single decision support 
tool, contained 25 such factors. However, because this research sought to independently 
investigate the validity of those factors, they were not included in the results of the 
content analysis. 
In order to distinguish between extrinsic and intrinsic factors, examples of both 
were extracted. This was done to explain the differences between the two types in the 
minds of the subject matter experts who were to be interviewed later. This in turn helped 
to define the two types of factors. The factors extracted via content analysis are shown in 
Figure 1. 
Once the collection of extrinsic and intrinsic decision factors were in hand, 
interviews with the experts, using the Critical Decision Method (CDM), could begin. 
CDM is an interviewing approach, discussed at length in Chapter II, that puts the focus 
on those most critical cognitive points or tasks of a job. With CDM, "issues can be 
described as points in the campaign planning process where critical decisions, decisions 
that a novice would have sufficient difficulty overcoming, may be required" [Buzo, 2000: 
45]. It is these critical issues that could hinder timely selection of the best force mix. 
Selection of the participating experts was crucial to properly addressing research 
question 5, Can the research results be applied USAF-wide? Later efforts would answer 
this question fully but this was the necessary first step. 
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Included as interview subjects were 34 campaign planning experts from the Air 
Staff (HQ USAF), Air Combat Command (ACC), Air Force Southern Command 
(SouthAF), Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC), Air Force Central 
Command (CentAF), Joint Forces Command (JFCom), USAF Fighter Weapons School, 
RED FLAG, USAF Air Expeditionary Forces Center (AEFC), USAF College of 
Aerospace Doctrine (CADRE), and the AFSOC Command and Control schoolhouse 
(C2TIG). Even the USAF Reserves were included, as representatives within the AEFC. 
This highly diversified subject pool was required to provide a broad range of perspectives 
necessary for validity. Scarcity of resources precluded interviews with expert 
representatives from overseas commands. However, such interviews were unnecessary 
because those commands predominantly employ forces during conflict rather than 
selecting which force mixes to deploy. 
Aside from the necessary representation of all appropriate organizations, this 
research required a wide diversity of expertise relating to operations. The subject pool 
had 26 members with in-the-cockpit operational experience with a wide array of military 
aircraft including: F-15, F-16, F-4, F-lll, A-10, C-130, KC-10, KC-135, andB-52. Of 
the 34, eight were career logisticians. Finally, the subjects had to pass the following base 
requirements: minimum grade of 0-4 (or civilian equivalent), minimum of 12 years 
USAF operational experience, minimum of two years of campaign planning experience. 
All subject matter experts met these requirements. 
The materials used for the CDM interviews were borrowed in large part from 
Buzo's appendices [Buzo, 2000: 100-112]. His "bullet background paper" was modified 
to meet the objectives of this research and sent via email to all participants prior to the 
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interviews. The paper, presented in Appendix A, provided sufficient background to 
prepare each expert for the task at hand. 
The CDM process is largely unstructured to allow experts to relay completely 
their own personal experiences. However, the four objectives identified earlier 
necessitated a semi-structured approach to ensure elicitation of only appropriate material. 
Buzo's original interview script [Buzo, 2000: 102-104] provided the necessary structure. 
Again, this was modified (extensively) to meet the objectives specific to this research. 
The modified script, seen in Appendix B, added questions pertaining to the distinction 
between extrinsic and intrinsic factors, the assurance of MECE among factors, and the 
potential definitions for extrinsic, intrinsic, and each of the individual factors. A key 
difference between this script and Buzo's is that this script aimed to elicit all of the 
campaign planning factors rather than just the extrinsic. 
The materials used also included Buzo's list of extrinsic factor definitions [Buzo, 
2000: 105-112] and a listing of factors extracted via content analysis. 
The procedure for conducting a CDM interview is to use verbal "probes" 
(questions) to elicit critical decision points from the subject [Klein et al, 1997: 2; 
Militello, 1998: 1622]. The probes for this research were the questions (and interviewer 
reminders) printed on the script. 
This research modified the CDM procedure used by Buzo in two ways. First, 
each participant was asked to apply any scenario with which he or she felt most familiar. 
This ensured the greatest possible diversity, significantly enhancing the applicability of 
this research USAF-wide. In Buzo's research, participants were limited to a Southwest 
Asia Theater scenario [Buzo, 2000: 51]. The second modification was to introduce each 
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participant to all of the extrinsic factors that had been extracted via content analysis—but 
only once each participant had exhausted his or her personal list of factors. 
Definitions were elicited for each factor identified by each participant. Following 
this, definitions for the newly-introduced factors provided by the researcher—and agreed 
upon by the participant—were elicited. Finally, the participants compared Buzo's factors 
and definitions to those that had been elicited, with appropriate adjustments made. 
Phase I of the research met all of its objectives, properly addressing research 
questions 1 and 2, and providing the foundation for answering research question 5. Pages 
15-19 of Chapter II discuss the distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic decision 
factors, with definitions for both categories presented on page 16. The final set of 
mutually exclusive, collectively exhaustive extrinsic decision factors is shown in 
Appendix C, and is very similar to Buzo's with the exception of the factor definitions. 
The updated definitions are presented in Appendix D. Further discussion of the results of 
Phase I is reserved for Chapter V. 
Phase II: Literature Review to Determine the Best DA Method 
The objective of this phase was to determine the most appropriate DA method for 
modeling the decision situation and creating a requisite decision support tool. 
Accomplishment of this single objective would answer research question 4, How should 
these factors and the relationships between them be modeled? 
To determine the most appropriate DA technique, it was necessary to first 
investigate the background and progression of DA in order to provide for the selection of 
a method based on a foundation of knowledge rather than just simple preference or 
convenience. Once the comprehensive background was established, separation and 
categorization of methods into families of techniques and schools of thought could be 
accomplished. 
After categorizing the general groups of DA techniques, an analysis of the 
requirements for this decision situation was required in order to determine which 
technique(s) would be most appropriate. This decision situation involves multiple 
attributes, severe time constraints, critical consequences, non-sequentiality, and highly 
subjective attribute comparisons. Discussion of this was presented in Chapter III. 
The characteristics of this decision situation dictated a class of DA techniques 
capable of measuring multiple attributes and quantifying otherwise subjective criteria, 
among other considerations. This realization narrowed the search to the multi-criteria 
decision making (MCDM) class of models under the Operations Research umbrella. 
After comparing the characteristics of this smaller set of candidate techniques to 
the requirements of the decision situation, Value Focused Thinking (VFT) was selected 
as the most appropriate model. This in effect validated the work of Buzo in establishing 
his decision support tool [Buzo, 2000]. 
VFT requires the assembling of criteria into a value hierarchy. Therefore, Buzo's 
original value hierarchy was reproduced exactly, for use in Phase III of the research 
[Buzo, 2000: 80]. In addition, another candidate hierarchy was constructed and used 
alongside Buzo's in the next phase. This hierarchy resembled Buzo's, but with a go/no 
go component advocated by Easton, Kepner, and Tregoe [Easton, 1980; Kepner and 
Tregoe, 1965]. This second hierarchy is shown in Figure 11. 
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Figure 11: Candidate VFT hierarchy 
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Phase III: Iterative Interviews (Modified Delphi) to Attain Consensus 
Phase III was structured to answer research question 3, How are these factors 
quantified and what are the relationships between them? In addition, it laid the 
groundwork for addressing research question 6, How can the now-quantified extrinsic 
factors be effectively combined with the intrinsic factors to develop an overall asset set 
utility or value? 
Four objectives were established for this phase. The primary objective was to 
elicit single-dimension value functions for each of the extrinsic factors, in accordance 
with VFT methodology. The second objective was to elicit initial relative rankings of 
importance among the factors in order to seed the final two rounds of modified Delphi, 
which would provide the weights for the factors. Evaluation of the two candidate value 
hierarchies was the third objective. And the fourth objective, perhaps most important to 
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force mix selection, was to begin development of a preliminary theory for the relationship 
between extrinsic value and intrinsic value—in the eyes of the experts—so that a 
mathematical representation of such could be developed. 
Phase III was comprised of an iterative interviewing and email questionnaire 
process referred to here as a modified Delphi study. The methodology included a 
comprehensive first round of face-to-face interviews that focused on all four Phase III 
objectives. The process exhibited Delphi characteristics in that all participants were 
guaranteed anonymity, the process involved more than one round, and the results were 
summarized and resubmitted to participants between rounds. It cannot be called a proper 
Delphi because one could argue an insufficient number of rounds and because the 
specific summarization techniques advocated by Dalkey and others were not incorporated 
[Dalkey, 1968]. The second and third rounds of the modified Delphi were in the form of 
email questionnaires to elicit final weights for the factors. 
The participant selection process of Phase III differed from that of Phase I. For 
the iterative interviews, only campaign planning experts from CADRE, ACC, AEFC, and 
SouthAF were included. ACC and AEFC are the primary brokers of asset sets in support 
of contingency operations from the continental United States [Brown, 2000; Broardt, 
2000], and CADRE personnel are the teachers and developers of basic aerospace doctrine 
for the 21st century. Additionally, because Buzo's factors and model had thus far been 
validated, his CentAF-elicited single-dimension value functions and factor weights were 
accepted as valid, leaving SouthAF as the potentially opposing opinion to CentAF. With 
proper sensitivity analysis (discussed later), one could be confident that value functions 
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and weights elicited from these four agencies, along with CentAF, would generate a 
decision support tool with USAF-wide applicability. 
The inventory of materials used for Phase III begins with the list of extrinsic 
factors constructed during Phase I along with Buzo's original list of extrinsic factors 
[Buzo, 2000]. Buzo's list had been validated, but his hierarchy stood unchallenged. 
Therefore, the shorter list compiled during Phase I—which had some of the factors 
combined and set aside as a go/no go filter within the candidate hierarchy—was also 
evaluated by the experts during the iterative interviews. The list of factor definitions 
(Appendix D) was an integral part of the interview materials. Additionally, both 
hierarchies were included for evaluation. 
The materials for Phase III also included the email questionnaires used to 
determine the relative weights, discussed later, and complete sets of blank single- 
dimension value function elicitation graphs, discussed here. 
Each extrinsic factor has its own single-dimension value function within a VFT 
model, therefore each extrinsic factor was represented by a blank value function 
elicitation graph. Figure 12 shows such an example graph with a linear value function, as 
might be elicited from a decision maker. Notice that the X-axis is reserved for the range 
of real values that a particular factor can produce. The Y-axis reflects the decision 
maker's transformed value given that a factor's real score lies at some point along the X- 
axis. This Y-axis value's range is from 0 to 1, providing for the normalization of all such 
values into like units of measurement and enhancing the objective value function's 
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Figure 12: Sample single-dimension value function graph 
The procedure was identical in each iterative interview. Each interview began 
with participants subjectively evaluating the two candidate value hierarchies. These 
evaluations were unstructured and exploratory, whereby participants were free to sketch 
proposals and discuss at length any concerns or ideas. Integral to the development of 
value hierarchies is the determination of parent issues and sub-issues. Note that parent 
issues are not decision factors, but rather categories of decision factors. The sub-issues 
within a parent issue constitute the factors. As discussed later, VFT calls for factors to be 
weighted so that the weights are additive to 1 within each parent issue. The parent issue 
weights are then additive to 1. The weighting process is discussed at the end of the Phase 
III section. 
Next came participant evaluation of the definitions and proposed ranges of real 
values for each of the extrinsic factors. Elicitation of the X-axis ranges from experts, 
such as 0-100 percent for mission capability of assets or 0-3000 miles for the range of 
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fighter aircraft (refueled), was vitally important to the process. Only with realistic value 
ranges, having the correct upper and lower bounds, could realistic value transformations 
occur. 
Once the factor definitions and ranges—along with one or both of the 
hierarchies—were deemed correct, the painstaking process of single-dimension value 
function elicitation could begin. 
Each extrinsic factor's blank elicitation graph was presented to the experts one at 
a time. Each expert was asked to identify as closely as possible the point along the X- 
axis (the factor's real range) that his or her transformed value began to drop from its high 
of 1. The expert was then asked to identify at which point the transformed value began to 
increase from its low of 0. Both points were marked in pencil directly on the particular 
graph. These values did not necessarily coincide with the extreme points of the factor's 
pre-determined real range. 
Once the extreme points of zero value and full value were identified, the expert 
was asked to identify the transformed (Y-axis) value that the values within the real range 
represented for him or her. This was accomplished via the drawing or sketching of a line 
or curve from one extreme to the other. This line could take any form the decision maker 
deemed appropriate. The process was repeated for every extrinsic factor with the 
exception of all go/no go constraints, for which transformed values are necessarily 1 or 0. 
Once all of the graphical representations of value had been elicited from all of the 
participating experts, that portion of the interview sessions was complete. Mathematical 
transformation of each curve or line into a single-dimension value function was held for 
later, upon completion of all interviews. This was done using Microsoft Excel 
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spreadsheet applications to create linear, piecewise linear, and exponential functions that 
would be used to convert candidate force mix scores to values between 1 and 0 for each 
factor. 
Upon completion of the last graphical factor value representation, each participant 
was asked to provide a rank ordering for all 26 extrinsic factors. These rank ordering 
sheets, an example of which can be found in Appendix E, provided a grouping according 
to relative importance that enhanced the development of the factor weighting 
questionnaires used in the final rounds of modified Delphi, the last step of Phase III. 
However, the in-person interviews did not end with elicitation of the relative 
rankings. At the end of each interview, every participant was asked his or her opinion on 
the relationship between extrinsic and intrinsic factors; such as which, if any, should be 
weighted more than the other. Particularly, participants were asked, "If the extrinsic 
value of candidate mix A were .7 and the intrinsic value were .3, how would that rate 
against mix B, of which the sum is equal but the values are reversed?" These discussions 
were almost completely unstructured and sometimes lengthy. This was desirable because 
the intent was to develop a theory of the relationship that could be accurately modeled 
mathematically and would subsequently answer research question 6. 
The final step of Phase III was the final round of modified Delphi study— 
administering of the questionnaires that developed the relative weights for the factors. 
Each participant in this phase was first emailed an instructional talking paper on the 
characteristics of performing swing weight analyses. This was done three days prior to 
the emailing of the actual questionnaires to ensure that each participant thoroughly 
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understood the process. The talking paper was a modified version ofthat used by Buzo 
[Buzo, 2000: 174-176], and can be viewed in Appendix F. 
Having given the participants three days to digest the process, the modified 
Delphi round two questionnaires were emailed. The rank ordering of factors 
accomplished earlier during the in-person interviews provided for the structure of the 
questionnaire, allowing for the order by which sub-issues (the factors) would be weighted 
against each other. Hence, the highest-ranking sub-issue within each parent issue could 
be compared to every other sub-issue within the same parent issue. 
Within the questionnaire, all of the necessary comparisons were put in table form. 
A narrative explained the process and provided yet another swing weight example to 
ensure participant understanding. The questionnaire elicited only one task, worded as 
follows: For each of the factors or parent issues presented, "state how many times more 
important the swing from best score to worst score for the issue in Column A is than the 
swing from best score to worst score for the issue in Column B " [Buzo, 2000: 59]. This 
wording from Buzo's work was left completely as is, to ensure reasonable duplication of 
his weighting elicitation process. The questionnaire also asked for any comments the 
participant might want to provide as justification for his or her weightings. 
Swing weight analysis calls for the comparison between two factors' loss of value 
along their entire ranges, from highest possible scores to lowest possible scores. The 
decision maker then need only determine which loss of value is more important to him or 
her and by how much (or how many times). Analyzing the swing in value, the decision 
maker might determine that A's complete loss in value is twice as important as B's. 
Therefore, A would have twice the weight of B, or by equation, A = 2B . 
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Within its response table, the questionnaire also provided for such comparisons 
between parent issues, the ordering of which was also determined by the earlier in-person 
rank ordering of all factors. Those factors that had been ranked higher by the round 1 
participants implied that their parent issues were of greater importance. Of course, this 
was not accepted as fact but stood only for the development of the questionnaire in order 
to provide for the comparisons. The questionnaire used for the study is exhibited in 
Appendix G. 
Once all of the questionnaires were completed and returned, each factor's highest 
and lowest weights, along with their respective average weights, were tabulated. The 
same was done for parent issues. The summarized results, along with the anonymous 
comments of the participants, were attached to a second questionnaire and emailed to the 
participants. The omission of swing weight process instructions notwithstanding, this 
second questionnaire was a duplicate of the first. Participants were asked to evaluate the 
intermediate results and anonymous comments, re-evaluate their own judgements, and 
return their updated questionnaires. The results of this third and final round of modified 
Delphi were then averaged for every factor and parent issue, and these were normalized 
to sum to 1 within parent issues and again among parent issues. 
Phase IV: Development of the Decision Support Tool 
Phases I-III of research provided a step-by-step approach to: First, gathering the 
necessary subjective information; then, choosing the most appropriate DA methodology 
for modeling and constructing the decision support tool; and finally, converting 
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subjective inputs into quantitative values and relative weights with which to formulate an 
objective value function for scoring any candidate force mix. 
The two objectives for Phase IV were to develop the final decision support tool 
and to develop a mathematical formula to represent the relationship between this tool and 
the intrinsic value of a force mix. 
To develop the VFT decision support tool, all of the individual graphical 
representations of value for each of the factors had to be converted into single-dimension 
value functions. Additionally, the factor weights had to be converted into global weights 
to represent each factor's importance within the overall model. More on global weights 
is presented later. 
To convert raw graphical representations into single-dimension value functions, 
Kirkwood provides piecewise linear and exponential function formulations (written in 
Visual Basic) for Microsoft Excel spreadsheets [Kirkwood, 1997; 62-68] of which both 
Buzo and this researcher made extensive use [Buzo, 2000: 24]. These formulas provide 
for relatively simple inverse transformation of a decision maker's line or curve into a 
corresponding value between 0 and 1. Creating single-dimension value functions, 
however, is just the beginning. 
Each value function must have the appropriate level of importance, or weight, 
within the model. This then becomes its global weight. Phase Ill's modified Delphi 
process provided the foundation for this with its comparisons between factors. 
To begin, all of the weights for the sub-factors within a parent issue must sum to 1. For 
example, if X and Y are the only two factors within parent issue P, and X = 2Y , then the 
weight for X is .67 and the weight for Y is .33 (rounded here). But these are only relative 
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weights within the parent issue. To become global weights that reflect each factor's 
importance to the model, each of the factor weights must be multiplied by the weight of 
the parent issue (which is relative to the other parent issues and of which all must also 
sum to 1). If the weight of P is .4, then the global weights for X and Y are .27 and .13 
(rounded), respectfully. Global weights were calculated for all of the factors. 
Because the goal of this research is to create a decision support tool with USAF- 
wide applicability, single-dimension value functions had been elicited from multiple 
groups of experts. Buzo had elicited just one value function for each factor [Buzo, 2000]. 
This research elicited/our separate and distinct functions for each. Although simple 
averaging of these functions is advocated by some [Miller, 1970; Joshi, 1980], specific 
guidance on how to do so was not provided, and such should not be done in this case 
without justification. Given that averaging of value functions could be accomplished, 
sensitivity analysis on each factor's impact on the rankings of candidate force mixes 
would either provide justification for averaging the value functions or necessitate a 
feedback loop with the experts to modify those functions. However, before sensitivity 
analysis could be accomplished, a set of candidate force mixes had to be found. 
A straw model of candidate force mixes was developed based on a notional level 
of capability to be met, matched to notional suitability ratings for individual aircraft. 
Five aircraft types, three fighters and two bombers, were included in the model. They 
were each given notional suitability ratings for each of three mock aerospace missions 
(AA, AG, PB). These aircraft types were then combined into 51 distinct force mixes—all 
sufficient to attain a basic capability of 10 "AA", 20 "AG", and 2 "PB" aerospace 
missions, respectively. This model provides for multiple force mix combinations that 
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each present an intrinsic value to accomplish specified aerospace missions. These 
combinations can then be evaluated within the VFT extrinsic factor decision support tool 
to generate an overall extrinsic value. With such a straw model, sensitivity analyses of 
the individual single-dimension value functions could progress. 
For the sensitivity analysis, the value functions that Buzo had elicited from 
CentAF were considered valid groundwork to be included in the averaging of the newly 
attained value functions of this research. Therefore, each factor had^zve single- 
dimension value functions. These value functions were averaged for each factor, and the 
model assembled using these aggregated values. Using the developed straw model, 
candidate force mixes were entered. This produced scores that resulted in a rank ordering 
of force mixes from most desirable to least desirable. 
Using this rank order of candidate force mixes as the baseline, the single- 
dimension value function of one factor at a time was altered to represent a single 
agency's value function (for example, AEFC's value function for Resupply)—and the 
model was run again. In each case, the single agency value function that was most 
dissimilar to the USAF-wide function was selected. This produced subsequent sets of 
rank-ordered candidate force mixes. The process was repeated for all of the 16 extrinsic 
decision factors. 
If an agency's single-dimension value function produced a different rank order 
among any of the top three alternatives—with all of the remaining averaged value 
functions remaining constant—then that elicited value function failed the sensitivity 
analysis and feedback with the originating expert was in order. If the agency's value 
function for a single factor did not change the rank order, then that factor's averaged 
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function was deemed an appropriate representation of the expert group's judgement. A 
second decision rule was that, if a participating expert was unwilling to alter his or her 
value function in light of having failed the sensitivity analysis, then all of his or her value 
functions would be removed from the model, with appropriate documentation of the 
anonymous dissenting opinion. The underlying reasons for the dissenting perspective 
would then be investigated. 
Sensitivity analyses was also necessary for the parent weights within the decision 
support tool. This was accomplished by altering one parent weight at a time, but only as 
far as its minimum and maximum weights as had been elicited by the experts. When a 
weight was altered, the tool was run with the resultant rank ordering of candidate force 
mixes observed. This provided valuable insights as to both the factors and the weights of 
those factors within the model. Sensitivity analyses of the value functions and parent 
weights constituted tests internal to the model. 
Testing the external sensitivity of the model required investigation as to its affect 
on an intrinsically scored and ranked set of force mixes (using notional suitability scores 
attained via the straw model). Discussion of this sensitivity analysis is reserved for 
Chapter V. 
This fourth phase of research also involved an effort to generate a formula that 
accurately represents the relationship between the extrinsic value and intrinsic value of 
force mixes. Overall force mix value would be a combination of both. While research 
into the intrinsic value of force mixes is beyond the scope of this effort, it stands to 
reason that a quantified intrinsic value, once known, can be mated with a quantified 
extrinsic value. The challenge was to develop a working theory of the possible group 
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preference of one over the other as discussed earlier. If no preference exists, simply 
summing or multiplying the two values could produce a sound result. However, if global 
preference of one over the other existed, however slight, it must be reflected in the 
mathematical relationship in order to ensure maximum representation of the subject 
matter expert's group judgement. Feedback from the expert participants showed just 
such global preference for intrinsic over extrinsic. 
Phase IV concluded with an investigation of how to mathematically reflect a 
slight preference for intrinsic value over extrinsic value. This centered around the 
insightful concept that intrinsic value is a combination of capability and suitability, and 
that only one of the two required preferential status in force mix scoring. 
Summary 
This chapter presented a step-by-step explanation of the four phases of research 
used to develop an extrinsically-oriented decision support tool to aid campaign planners 
in selecting the most appropriate force mixes during crisis action planning. Numerous 
objectives were established to properly address the six research questions. All of these 
objectives were met. 
The Phase I section discussed the separation of extrinsic and intrinsic factors and 
elicitation of the definitions for each category; elicitation and extraction of the relevant 
decision factors; subjective expert evaluation of the independence and mutual exclusivity 
of each; and definitions for each. 
The Phase II section discussed the conduct of the literature review to determine 
the most appropriate DA technique for this research situation. 
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The three-round modified Delphi study was addressed in the Phase III section, 
with the focus on eliciting quantified single-dimension value functions and determining 
relative weights of factors within the model. Also discussed were the subjective expert 
evaluations of candidate hierarchies and the preliminary formulation of a theory 
pertaining to the relationship between extrinsic value and intrinsic value. 
Finally, the Phase IV section outlined the decision tool development including 
comprehensive sensitivity analyses on both value functions and global weights. It also 
addressed the trial and error mathematical investigation to reflect slight preference for 
intrinsic force mix value over extrinsic value. 
The next chapter presents the results of the overall research effort. 
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V. Results 
Phase I: The CDMInterviews and Content Analysis 
CDM interviews and content analysis addressed research questions 1 and 2, while 
the selection of the participating subject matter experts provided the first step for 
addressing question 5. 
All of the 34 study participants agreed on the existence of both extrinsic and 
intrinsic campaign planning decision factors, and on the clear separation between the two 
types. This unanimous agreement was important to the basic premise of this research— 
that a decision support model could focus solely on extrinsic factors not pertaining to the 
mission-specific or absolute capabilities of candidate force mixes. 
Many potential definitions surfaced for what constitutes an extrinsic factor, and 
most could prove suitable. Definition 2 incorporates the relevant inputs from the subject 
matter experts: Extrinsic decision factors are situational considerations, external to and 
independent of a weapons platform's design, that affect determination of the 
appropriateness and subsequent goodness ofthat weapons platform for a specified 
mission—given a specific contextual environment that requires evaluation. 
Likewise, there were many definitions presented for what constitutes an intrinsic 
decision factor, and the relevant inputs have been incorporated. Definition 1 is: Intrinsic 
factors represent a weapons platform's fundamental ability to accomplish a specified 
aerospace mission or tasking, and are limited to determinations of efficacy in a given 
situation related only to the designated purpose of its design. 
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In addition to defining extrinsic and intrinsic factor types, this phase elicited an 
exhaustive list of 22 mutually independent, specific extrinsic factors. The final factors 
included in the decision support model can be viewed in Appendix C, with their 
associated descriptions in Appendix D. These are the extrinsic decision factors important 
to campaign planners in selecting force mixes in response to theater crises. The claim of 
an exhaustive list is based on the 34 interviews with experts and the content analysis of 
USAF and Joint guidance, all of which combined to produce just these factors. Tests for 
independence were comprised of conceptual implementations of Kirkwood's Theorems 
9.19 and 9.20 in discussions with subject matter experts, sans the graphical and formula 
representations [Kirkwood, 1997: 238-239]. 
Can the factors affecting force mix selection in response to theater crises be 
clearly categorized as extrinsic and intrinsic, and can these categories be clearly defined? 
This was the first research question, and it has been satisfactorily answered. All of the 
subject matter experts agreed on the separation, and all of the experts helped to enhance 
the development of Definitions 1 and 2. 
The second research question has also been answered. What extrinsic factors are 
important to campaign planners when selecting aircraft force mixes in response to theater 
crises? The 22 factors identified by Phase II of this research, and presented in 
Appendices C and D, are those that are important to campaign planners. 
Phase II: literature Review to Determine the Best DA Method 
The purpose of the second phase of research was to address research question 4, 
which involved selection of the most appropriate Decision Analysis (DA) technique to 
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model the decision situation at hand. A search of DA literature provided the foundational 
information necessary to properly compare DA methodologies. With background on 
various techniques and advancements, along with an understanding of the decision 
situation at hand, comparisons could be made on the basis of knowledge and applicability 
rather than on the basis of convenience or the specific competencies of the researcher. 
In order to ascertain the most appropriate DA technique, research question 4 
asked: How should these factors and the relationships between them be modeled? This 
question has been satisfied with the selection of Multi-Attribute Utility Theory using 
Value Focused Thinking (VFT). The selection criteria can be reviewed in Chapter III. 
Selection of VFT as the method of choice necessitated development of a value 
hierarchy with which to model the relationship among extrinsic decision factors. Such a 
hierarchy was developed. This intermediate hierarchy was introduced to experts during 
Phase III of the study (see Figure 11), along with the hierarchy developed by Buzo 
[Buzo, 2000: 67]. The final hierarchy is based on the feedback provided by the subject 
matter experts and is presented in the Phase III section of this chapter. 
Phase III: Iterative Interviews (Modified Delphi) to Attain Consensus 
While this phase of research addressed all of the six research questions, its 
purpose was to lay the groundwork in answering question 3—quantifying the extrinsic 
decision factors. 
The in-person, first round of modified Delphi study established the single- 
dimension value functions (SDVF's) for each of the 16 scored extrinsic decision factors 
(six of the factors are go/no go constraints that are not given SDVF's). Individual sets of 
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SDVF's were elicited from AEFC, CADRE, SouthAF, and ACC, for a total of 64 
SDVF's. 
Each SDVF was transformed from its hand-drawn representation into a Microsoft 
Excel-based value curve using "ValueE" and "ValuePL" functions [Kirkwood, 1997: 81]. 
Coding of these functions was through Microsoft's Visual Basic programming and can be 
viewed in Appendix M. Initial quantification of the extrinsic factors was complete. This 
involved quantification relative to each agency independently. The final quantification of 
factors, combining all into USAF-Wide representations, was reserved for the final phase 
of research. 
Phase III also allowed for expert feedback on the two candidate VFT hierarchies, 
which was crucial to the establishment of parent issues and the development of a go/no 
go filter for the hierarchy. Of the eight experts who claimed preference for one hierarchy 
over the other, six selected the version established by this research. Aside from their 
assertions that it presents a better conceptual representation of the decision situation, all 
six experts showed preference for a model that separates feasible force mixes from 
infeasible mixes prior to the scoring. Such separation allows decision makers to accept a 
group of feasible mixes and bypass the extrinsic scoring function of the decision support 
tool if they so choose. The final value hierarchy representing this decision situation is 
presented in Figure 13. 
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Figure 13: Final VFT value hierarchy 
As Figure 13 shows, the four parent issues are Host Nation/Base, Operating 
Location, Force Mix Usage, and Enemy Considerations. Establishment of these parent 
issues was important to the weighting of individual factors within the model, and to the 
sensitivity analysis on the model weights which is discussed later. The go/no go filter 
was placed above the scored factors in the hierarchy to represent its importance as a 
determinant of which force mixes will be scored. 
The second and third rounds of modified Delphi study established the parent issue 
weights and global weights for the factors within the model. These rounds were in the 
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form of email questionnaires. Instructions for the questionnaires were provided and can 
be viewed in Appendix F. A sample of the questionnaire is shown in Appendix G. 
Elicitation of pairwise comparisons of relative importance among all of the scored 
factors generated one complete set of weights for each of the four agencies (ACC, AEFC, 
CADRE, SouthAF). These weights were averaged and re-submitted to the experts, who 
were given an opportunity to revise or defend their previous inputs. The result is a set of 
global weights representing the relative importance of each scored factor within the 
model. It is important to note that, just as the CentAF value functions (elicited from 
previous research) are included in the model, the CentAF global weights are likewise 
included, averaged into the total. 
The complete set of global weights and parent issue weights, along with the 
lowest and highest weights elicited, are presented in Table 5. 
Research Question 3 asked: How are these factors quantified, and what 
are the relationships between them? This research question has been satisfied. Extrinsic 
factors are best quantified by placement into a VFT value hierarchy, with the assignment 
of individual single-dimension value functions (SDVF's) and global weights to each. 
The hierarchy is presented in Figure 13, and the global weights are provided in Table 5. 
However, individual agency SDVF's, while specific quantifications of each factor, are 
not considered the final quantifications of each. It is the USAF-wide SDVF's discussed 
in the next section that are the driving force behind the model. 
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Table 5: VFT model weights 
AVERAGE WEIGHTS LOW AVG HIGH ROUNDED 
MN Compatibility 0.018786 0.049763 0.090226 0.049 
Ability to Resupply 0.00738 0.049823 0.174 0.048 
POL Storage 0.067007 0.080772 0.098626 0.08 
Fighter Distance 0.019145 0.030507 0.049313 0.03 
Bomber Distance 0.006382 0.026225 0.03 0.026 
MSA: Fighter 0.024657 0.06328 0.179999 0.063 
MSA: Bomber 0.012328 0.056241 0.179999 0.056 
Climate 0.003522 0.018234 0.03 0.018 
Topography 0.015 0.031175 0.067 0.031 
Tanker Support 0.022336 0.062375 0.090226 0.062 
Force Mix Flexibility 0.011272 0.036324 0.067 0.035 
Force Mix Utilization 0.011272 0.031337 0.051 0.03 
MC Rate 0.045 0.072559 0.107211 0.072 
Enemy vs USAF Capability 0.09 0.210197 0.394505 0.209 
Enemy ISR 0.03 0.095283 0.178685 0.095 
Enemy Interference 











Host Nation 0.025831 
Basing 0.215061 0.366 0.625002 
Usage 0.078901 0.137 0.180451 
Enemy 0.209999 0.4 
1 
0.624633 
Phase IV: Development of the Decision Support Tool 
Phase I confirmed the separation between extrinsic and intrinsic factor types and 
developed their definitions. It also established which specific extrinsic factors are 
important. Phase II established the most appropriate method for modeling the problem. 
Phase III confirmed the final value hierarchy, final parent issue weights and global 
weights, and the agency-specific SDVF's for each of the scored factors. Phase IV of the 
research integrated all of the results into a viable decision support model. 
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The primary purpose of Phase IV was two-fold: to develop an actual decision 
support tool that provides USAF-wide applicability (research question 5), and to provide 
an accurate mathematical representation of the relationship between intrinsic value and 
extrinsic value (research question 6). 
The developed single-dimension value functions (SDVF's) are the heart of the 
VFT decision support tool. It is these values that reflect the subjective judgements of the 
participating experts in a quantitative fashion, allowing for quantification of the entire 
decision situation. 
Single dimension value functions were elicited from AEFC, ACC, CADRE, 
SouthAF, and CentAF (the last via prior research). This produced five SDVF's for each 
extrinsic factor—a contribution of 80 for the model. Note that the previous research had 
established only 16 such SDVF's [Buzo, 2000]. Successfully combining these 80 
SDVF's (five per factor) into 16 (one per factor) was important to establishing USAF- 
wide applicability for the model. 
For each factor, the individual SDVF's were analyzed to determine which 
involved the highest number of functions in its makeup. For example, one SDVF might 
have a piecewise linear function for the first third of its range, then an exponential 
function for the next third, and finally either full (1) or zero value for the final third, with 
no function. If this SDVF had more of these components than any of the others (for this 
factor) then the final USAF-wide SDVF must possess at least that many components. 
Once the number of required components had been established, average midpoints among 
all five SDVF's—for each of the component ranges—were determined. Finally, the 
appropriate functions, either exponential or piecewise linear, were input for each 
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component range, producing an overall US AF-wide SDVF that accurately represents the 
preferences of the decision makers. This was repeated for all 16 factors. That done, the 
model contains a total of 96 SDVF's. The 16 USAF-Wide SDVF's produced by this 
process can be used in computing the extrinsic values of force mixes—with US AF-wide 
applicability. However, any of the original sets of agency-specific SDVF's can also 
compute the extrinsic value of a candidate force mix. 
Research questions 3 and 5 have been satisfied. How are these factors quantified 
and what are the relationships between them? They are quantified via single-dimension 
value functions within an additively-independent VFT value hierarchy with global 
weights determining relative importance. Can the research results be applied USAF- 
wide? The extrinsic factors have been quantified with US AF-wide applicability through 
the averaging of their SDVF's (and the keeping of all single agency SDVF sets within the 
model), and the global weights have USAF-wide applicability because the three-round 
modified Delphi study produced weights that proved robust during sensitivity analyses. 
Each of the USAF-wide single-dimension value functions, along with the values 
for the components of the individual SDVF's that generated them, can be seen in 
Appendix H. An important consideration is that all of the 96 SDVF's and all of the 
single-agency parent issue and global weights remain within the model. This gives future 
analysts or decision makers an opportunity to choose the group of experts whose SDVF's 
and weights they might prefer, if they disagree with the USAF-wide composition or if 
they just want a more theater-specific slant on decision making (such as CentAF SDVF's 
for a Southwest Asia engagement). This establishes a. family of VFT models in one, 
further enhancing the claims of applicability throughout the entire Air Force. 
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The entire VFT decision support tool is in Microsoft Excel spreadsheet form. The 
"Scored Forces" sheet contains the formulas for translating straw model, SDVF, and 
constraint (go/no go filter) inputs into overall force mix extrinsic scores. Each SDVF is a 
combination of IF statements incorporating all of its value curve components. The 
"Scored Forces" sheet multiplies the SDVF's by their respective go/no go filter scores 
and their global weights for all 16 factors, for all the candidate force mixes. The 
individual Excel formulas for each of the 16 extrinsic decision factors can be seen in 
Appendix N. 
Linked to both the "Scored Forces" sheet and the "Straw Model" sheet is the 
"Constraint Filter" sheet (the go /no go filter). This filter improves upon previous 
research in that it calculates the model constraints based upon each aircraft type within a 
force mix, rather than just on the force mix as a whole. Therefore, if one aircraft type is 
infeasible (i.e., not allowed for political reasons), then the entire force mix is infeasible. 
This does not omit from consideration the otherwise qualified aircraft within the force 
mix because they are scored as parts of other candidate force mixes. Another 
improvement is that some of the constraints, such as unrefueled distance from targets, are 
linked to and derived from the straw model. 
The "Straw Model" sheet is a necessary component of the decision model because 
it provides the avenue for testing. The straw model developed for this research 
incorporates a matrix of five weapons platform types and three required aerospace 
missions. Capability can be set as a requirement and combinations of forces that meet the 
requirements can be tabled and their intrinsic suitability computed (with notional data). 
This construction parallels the makeup of concurrent AFIT research into the scoring of 
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intrinsic value and allows for continuity of future ALP research. Also, its format is 
appropriate for the introduction of real world, campaign-specific data by decision makers. 
The previous straw model was comprised essentially of a single, escalating force mix, 
with random individual scores for each force mix as inputs into the extrinsic scoring 
sheet. 
Another advantage of the straw model is that the candidate operating location 
determines many of the values. This set-up allows for more than just greater realism, it 
allows for decision makers to score potential operating locations against force mixes. 
This was not a goal of the research, but goes far in enhancing ALP and M-R VAT 
development. With the ALP capability of generating real-time logistics information for 
all operating locations worldwide, any such location could be instantaneously scored by 
entering its information into the model. 
The model also contains individual sheets for each of the 16 extrinsic decision 
factors. Graphs are provided for all individual agency SDVF's as well as each USAF- 
wide SDVF. Again, Appendix H shows the graphical representations for the USAF-wide 
functions. The model contains a number of additional sheets pertaining to the hierarchy 
and various sensitivity analyses, but only one more is mentioned here. 
The parent issue weights and global weights are calculated on the "Computing 
Weights" sheet, which is linked by formula to the "Scored Forces" sheet. One can alter 
the weight of any parent issue and the others will adjust automatically in proportion to 
each other. Any change in the parent issue weights is immediately reflected in the 
"Scored Forces" sheet, as is any change in the straw model inputs, operating location 
inputs, USAF-wide SDVF's, or the constraints. This complete linkage makes this 
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decision support tool ready now for graphical user interface development. Moreover, the 
tool is ready now for input of real-world data on operating locations and candidate force 
mixes that will instantaneously generate real-world extrinsic value of those force mixes. 
Three sample sheets from within the VFT decision support tool are presented, 
without formulas due to space limitations, in Appendix K. 
The sixth and final research question called for an accurate mathematical 
representation of the relationship between extrinsic value and intrinsic value. While this 
research effort focused on determining the extrinsic value of force mixes only, parallel 
AFIT research was being conducted on the intrinsic factors [Wakefield, 2001]. However, 
it was the responsibility of this research to attempt an integration of the two types of 
value. That said, three related measures of value apply to the overall effort: capability, 
suitability, and extrinsic value. 
Capability is defined under this research as the number of sorties required within 
each aerospace mission type that is required by the joint or theater commander at a 
specific point in time. For example, on day six of a particular campaign, the commander 
may require 10 air interdiction sorties, 20 air-to-ground sorties, 5 strategic bombing 
sorties, and 1 combat search and rescue sortie. This is the capability requirement. 
Suitability then measures each aircraft type's relative ability to accomplish the required 
aerospace missions. For example, Fighter X may have suitability scores of .8 for air 
interdiction, .5 for air-to-ground, and .1 each for strategic bombing and combat search 
and rescue. These numbers are notional because research into determination of these 
actual values is beyond the scope of this research. 
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Capability and suitability are both considered independent dimensions of intrinsic 
value. The remaining research question (question 6) required investigation of how all 
three dimensions of value can be combined into a single analytical approach. 
In-person interviews had determined that participating experts preferred, slightly, 
intrinsic value to extrinsic value. With the development of the straw model (under the 
premise of intrinsic value resulting from suitability and capability), preference for 
intrinsic value is straightforward—force mixes that do not first meet the capability 
requirements are not scored. Using attainment of required capability as a qualifier, the 
task remaining was to address how to best combine a weapons platform's suitability with 
its extrinsic (situational) value. 
As a notional starting point for this investigation, it was decided to follow up on 
the relationship initially proposed as a default approach by Buzo, a straight multiplicative 
relationship [Buzo, 2000] where the intrinsic score is just multiplied by the extrinsic 
value (as determined by the VFT model). 
A multiplicative relationship is superior to an additive relationship—in this 
situation—for two reasons. First, suitability scores and extrinsic values will most 
probably be in different units of measurement. Second, the go/no go filter of the extrinsic 
model disqualifies some force mixes from consideration, giving those mixes overall 
scores of zero. An additive relationship could result in disqualified force mixes holding 
considerable value when combined with the suitability score, which would be 
undesirable. A multiplicative relationship yields an overall, combined score of zero for 
those disqualified mixes. 
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The utility of this proposed multiplicative relationship was tested during the 
sensitivity analysis (internal and external) discussed next. Research question 6, 
concerning the intrinsic/extrinsic relationship, will be revisited after presentation and 
discussion of the sensitivity analysis results. 
The following section discusses internal sensitivity analysis (on the global 
weights and the averaged, USAF-wide SDVF's), and external sensitivity analysis (on the 
impact of the VFT model on intrinsically scored and ranked force packages). 
Internal Sensitivity Analysis 
The first area of internal sensitivity analysis was the testing of the impact that a 
single agency SDVF for a single factor would have on the results of the VFT decision 
support tool. The purpose was to validate the averaged USAF-wide SDVF's as accurate 
representations of the group's point of view. 
The decision support model was run 16 times, once each for every scored 
extrinsic factor. For each running, a different factor was selected, with the most 
dissimilar single agency SDVF replacing the USAF-wide SDVF. Each running of the 
model produced its own ranking of force mixes. The top four ranked force mixes from 
the initial model results (with all of the USAF-wide SDVF's) were tracked throughout 
the process. 
The results of this sensitivity analysis validated the use of USAF-wide SDVF's. 
None of the top four ranked force mixes changed their rankings for any of the 16 model 
runs. Graphical representation of the sensitivity analysis, with narrative, can be found in 
Appendix J. Extending the analysis to all of the ranked force mixes, there were 512 
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opportunities for force mixes to change their rankings (32 mixes scored 16 times each). 
Of the 512 chances, only four changes in rank occurred. These changes were among 
force mixes that were quite similar in basic makeup—almost identical. Therefore, the 
conclusion is that the USAF-wide SDVF's are robust representations of the values of the 
individual agencies involved. 
The second internal sensitivity analysis had the purpose of validating the parent 
issue weights within the decision support tool. Each parent issue weight was changed, 
one at a time, incrementally between a value considerably lower than the lowest weight 
received by any expert and a value considerably higher than the highest weight received. 
With each change in a particular parent issue weight, the other three weights were 
formulated to change in proportion to each other, keeping the sum of all weights equal to 
1. This effort mirrored the sensitivity analysis conducted in prior research [Buzo, 2000], 
whereby the top three ranked force mixes were tracked throughout the process. 
Within the range of weights received, the parent issue Operating Location had just 
one change in the most preferred among the top three ranked force mixes. This change in 
rank, force mix #18 overtaking force mix #19 as the most preferred, occurred very near 
the value of the final weight used within the final model (.366). 
The Host Nation parent issue showed no change in ranks among the top three 
force mixes within the range of weights received. This also occurred for the other two 
parent issues, Force Mix Usage and Enemy Considerations. 
Changes in ranks did occur among some force mixes that had been ranked lower, 
and among the top three force mixes outside the range of weights received. This lends 
evidence as to the robustness of the averaged weights used for the model, as 
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representations of the expert participants' group judgements. It also lends support to the 
position that the weights are not unimportant if taken to extreme ranges outside the range 
of weights received or if the force mixes are otherwise valued similarly. 
The four graphical representations of this sensitivity analysis are presented in 
Appendix I. 
In summary, the internal sensitivity analysis showed both the averaged parent 
issue weights and the averaged USAF-wide SDVF's to be satisfactorily robust. This is 
reassuring, particularly for the SDVF's, because the averaging of such functions could be 
controversial. In this case, both averaging methods meet the requirements of the decision 
situation. 
External Sensitivity Analysis 
The external sensitivity analysis had the purpose of determining whether the VFT 
decision support tool has practical significance for the ALP and the M-R VAT. 
Specifically, this sensitivity analysis set out to determine the impact that extrinsic scoring 
provided by the VFT model has on an intrinsically scored and ranked set of force mixes, 
using the multiplicative relationship proposed earlier. 
In line with the premise that only those force mixes that meet basic capability 
requirements are scored intrinsically (suitability scores), the straw model was set up for 
capability requirements of 10 AA, 20 AG, and 2 PB missions, respectively. The five 
aircraft types were then given various notional suitability scores for each mission type. 
Fifty-one combinations of force mixes were tabled, all of which met the basic capability 
requirements. The number of each aircraft, per type, that is assigned to fill a mission 
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capability is multiplied by the suitability score (that type against that mission). A 
notional (but reasonable) matrix of suitability scores was used in conjunction with 
Wakefield's parallel work on intrinsic value [Wakefield, 2001]. A force mix's suitability 
score under this technique is simply the sum of each aircraft type's suitability scores for 
the missions filled. For example, 10 of aircraft FA may be assigned against mission AA. 
With FA given a suitability score of .8, the score for this assignment of forces is 8. All 
such assignments within a force mix are summed to gain a total intrinsic value for the 
force mix. 
With the straw model established, force mixes were scored extrinsically against 
the VFT model. The pre-determined intrinsic value and newly-computed extrinsic value 
were then multiplied to produce an overall value. Three ranks were constructed: 
intrinsic, extrinsic, and combined. Once this baseline was established, the sensitivity 
analysis involved alteration of the straw model and the VFT model to extreme values 
within each, with subsequent comparisons of impact. 
The intrinsic value computed by the straw model was held constant for the first 
set of comparisons. All of the notional extrinsic multipliers within the VFT model were 
set at extreme differences of .9 and .1 for different aircraft types in order to create a 
greater difference in final extrinsic values between force mixes. With greater extrinsic 
differences generated among the force mixes, these extrinsic values were multiplied 
against the intrinsic values, with the new rankings recorded. This process was repeated 
for internal values of .8 and .2, .7 and .3, .6 and .4, and .51 and .49 within the VFT model. 
As the VFT model produced tighter and tighter differences between scored force mixes, 
the impact of each iteration upon the intrinsic rankings (held constant) could be 
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measured. An excerpt of the rank results is presented in Table 6 (complete tabular 
rankings are included in Appendix O). 
Table 6: External Sensitivity Analysis (intrinsic held constant) 
Sensitivity Analysis on Impact of VFT Model 
with INTRINSIC internal values held constant 
Independent 
Intrinsic 
MIX    Rankings 
Combined (overall) 
Rankings with internal 
extrinsic at .51 and .49 
Combined (overall) 
Rankings with internal 
extrinsic at .6 and .4 
Combined (overall) 
Rankings with internal 
extrinsic at .7 and .3 
Combined (overall) 
Rankings with internal 
extrinsic at .8 and 2 
Combined (overall) 
Rankings with internal 
extrinsic at .9 and .1 
Mix 1              1 
Mix 13             2 
Mix 16             3 
Mix 4                4 


























Total rank changes ( ait of 51)  | 18 I   43 |    44 I    47 I    51 
As can be seen in Table 6, as the range of values within the VFT model approach 
their most extreme differences, the model's impact upon intrinsically scored and ranked 
force mixes is profound. Every one of the 51 scored force mixes changes its relative rank 
when combined with its extrinsically scored value. However, even at the tightest internal 
ranges in value, the VFT model has a clear impact, changing none of the top five but 
changing 18 of the 51. 
The second set of comparisons was accomplished with the extrinsic VFT model 
results held constant and the intrinsic values adjusted to their extremes. For the first test, 
the FA and FC aircraft were given .9 suitability for AA missions and the FB aircraft 
given .1. These scores were reversed for the AG mission. The Bl aircraft was given .9 
suitability for the PB mission, with the B2 aircraft given . 1. With these extreme values 
entered, the resultant intrinsic scores for the force mixes were multiplied by the extrinsic 
values that had been held constant. This process was repeated for suitability values of .8 
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and .2, .7 and .3, .6 and .4, and .51 and .49. Again, the impact of each iteration was 
recorded. An excerpt of the rank results is presented in Figure 7 (complete tabular 
rankings are included in Appendix O). 
Table 7: External Sensitivity Analysis (extrinsic held constant) 
Sensitivity Analysis on Impact of VFT Model 
with EXTRINSIC internal values held constant 
Independent 
Intrinsic 
MIX      Rankings 
Combined (overall) 
Rank'ngs with internal 
intrinsic at .51 and .49 
Combined (overall) 
Rank'ngs with internal 
intrinsic at .6 and .4 
Combined (overall) 
Rank'ngs wrth internal 
intrinsic at .7 and .3 
Combined (overall) 
Rankings with internal 
intrinsic at .8 and .2 
Combined (overall) 
Rank'ngs with internal 
intrinsic at .9 and .1 
Mix1                  1 
Mix 9                  1 
Mix 13               3 
Mix 16               3 


























Total rank changes (o Utof51)   |     47 |     39 |     35 |     35 I     35 
Table 7 shows the VFT model's impact when the differences in intrinsic internal 
values are extreme. As can be seen, the VFT model still changes some of the pre- 
determined ranks. As the internal values within the straw model tighten, the impact of 
the VFT model increases substantially. At the tightest internal values of .51 and .49, 47 
of the 51 force mixes change relative ranks. At the loosest internal values of .9 and .1, 
the extrinsic multiplier still results in 35 changes in rank. 
Sensitivity Analysis and the Combined Value Measure 
Given realistic values within each, the VFT decision support tool clearly impacts 
the rankings of intrinsically scored force mixes. Table 8 shows intrinsic ranks and scores, 
extrinsic ranks and scores, and the results of combining the two multiplicatively. This 
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table reflects the impact of the VFT model when both the model and the straw model 
have relatively close internal values (.6 and .4 for intrinsic, closer than .51 and .49 for 
extrinsic). 
Both the internal and external sensitivity analyses provided valuable indicators as 
to the robustness of the weights used and the USAF-wide SDVF's, as well as the impact 
the VFT decision support tool can have on intrinsically-scored candidate force mixes. 
The insights gained by conducting the sensitivity analyses using a multiplicative 
process and a notional, matrix-driven straw model (that produced notional suitability 
scores and ranks) helped to generate the most appropriate answer to research question 6: 
How can the now-quantified extrinsic factors be effectively combined with the intrinsic 
factors to develop an overall asset set utility or value? 
The intrinsic rank structure is linear and scalar, just the opposite of the 
extrinsically-generated scores/ranks that are derived from this research's qualitative 
concept (VFT)—which are nonlinear and non-scalar. The distinction between intrinsic 
value and extrinsic value is more than just conceptual; extrinsic and intrinsic each 
comprise distinct dimensions of value. In line with the dimensional distinction, both the 
straw model of this research and the algorithm under development by Wakefield's 
parallel research [Wakefield, 2001] produce suitability scores in units dissimilar to the 
zero-to-one extrinsic scores produced by the VFT model. 
The main point is that this research produces extrinsically-scored force packages 
but cannot intrinsically score those packages. Conversely, Wakefield's parallel research 
has developed an algorithm that intrinsically scores force packages and establishes a set 
of non-dominated (pareto optimal) force mixes [Wakefield, 2001]. The force mixes 
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within Wakefield's pareto optimal set are all essentially tied, with no means provided for 
the decision maker to select the most appropriate force mix from the set. This is a 
fortuitous situation for the VFT model of this research. 
In this light, the simple multiplicative approach is the most appropriate method for 
integrating intrinsic value and extrinsic value—given that a set of pareto optimal force 
mixes have been designated and the VFT model is used as the lower echelon tie breaker. 
With this relationship, the progression through a force mix selection starts with the 
capability requirements, goes on to determination of the optimal set of most suitable 
force mixes, and finally, has the extrinsic value break the tie among those pareto optimal 
force mixes. 
Research question 6 is satisfied by this multiplicative, tie-breaking relationship 
that lends slight preference to the intrinsic value of force mixes, as desired by the experts. 
Furthermore, this representation generates overall scores of zero for those infeasible force 
mixes and overcomes differences in the units of measurement (as well as dimensional 
differences). 
Table 8 presents the results of a single external sensitivity analysis, and illustrates 
the multiplicative relationship between extrinsic and intrinsic values. Although none of 
the intrinsically scored/ranked force mixes are tied (as would be with a pareto optimal 
set), they nonetheless change relative ranking when multiplied by the VFT model results. 
In summary, this research developed a VFT decision support tool that uses robust 
issue weights and robust averaged SDVF's. The tool contains a family of models 
representing the expertise of five agencies, and incorporates a multiplicative, tie-breaking 
relationship with the intrinsic values generated by parallel AFIT research. 
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Table 8: Extrinsic impact on intrinsic value 
MIX 
(suitability) 
Extrin @ | 
Typical 
Intrin @ [ 
.6 and .4 
Multiplic. [ 
Result Rank Rank Rank 
1 0.713534 15 19.2 1 13.69985 1 
2 0.714978 8 13.2 44 9.437715 44 
3 0.71603 2 12.8 50 9.165182 50 
4 0.714309 9 18.8 7 13.42902 7 
5 0.710151 34 15.2 21 10.7943 23 
6 0.70924 38 13.2 44 9.361965 45 
7 0.711153 25 14.8 37 10.52506 42 
8 0.709751 35 12.8 50 9.084811 51 
9 0.710476 30 19.2 1 13.64113 2 
10 0.712788 16 15.2 21 10.83438" 22 
11 0.711142 26 18.8 7 13.36946 8 
12 0.714035 10 14.8 37 10.56772 37 
13 0.713743 12 19 3 13.56112 4 
14 0.715651 4 13 46 9.303466 46 
15 0.715283 5 13 46 9.298677 i 47 
16 0.71402 11 19 3 13.56638 3 
17 0.710439 31 15 28 10.65658 29 
18 0.709478 36 13 46 9.223216* 48 
19 0.710439 31 15 28 10.65658' 29 
20 0.709478 36 13 46 9.223216* 48 
21 0.710648 27 19 3 13.50231 5 
22 0.713594 13 15 28 10.7039^ 25 
23 0.710648 27 19 3 13.50231; 5 
24 0.713594 13 15 28 10.7039^ 25 
25 0.715222 6 15.2 21 10.87138 21 
26 0.716797 1 14.8 37 10.60859' 35 
27 0.715707 3 15 28 10.7356 24 
28 0.711992 23 17.2 9 12.24627 9 
29 0.712621 20 16.8 13 11.97203 14 
30 0.712379 22 17 11 12.11044 10 
31 0.70073 50 15.2 21 10.65109 31 
32 0.710606 29 14.8 37 10.51697 43 
33 0.70368 45 15 28 10.5552 38 
34 0.71145 24 16 17 11.3832' 16 
35 0.704337 44 16 17 11.2694 19 
36 0.708184 40 15 28 10.62276 34 
37 0.704945 43 16.2 15 11.42011 15 
38 0.701729 49 16.2 15 11.36802 17 
39 0.700554 51 15.2 21 10.64843 32 
40 0.71521 7 15.8 19 11.30033; 18 
41 0.710439 33 15.8 19 11.22494! 20 
42 0.712593 21 14.8 37 10.54638 41 
43 0.705602 41 15 28 10.58403 36 
44 0.70902 39 15 28 10.6353 33 
45 0.705602 41 17 11 11.99523 12 
46 0.702531 46 15.2 21 10.67847 27 
47 0.702531 46 15.2 21 10.67847 27 
48 0.702531 46 17.2 9 12.08353 11 
49 0.712772 17 14.8 37 10.54903 39 
50 0.712772 17 14.8 37 10.54903 39 
51 0.712772 17 16.8 13 11.97457 13 




Chapters I and II discussed the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency's 
Advanced Logistics Project (ALP), stating that the ALP will provide near real-time 
logistics information from Department of Defense and Allied organizations throughout 
the world. Campaign planners will have an opportunity to compare deployment 
scenarios with accurate, up-to-date information and respond to crises with greater 
efficiency than previously possible. 
As a logistics-centered computing architecture, the ALP's overriding focus is on 
reducing both the deployment timeline and the deployment footprint. The Mission- 
Resource Value Assessment Tool (M-R VAT) is designed to be a front-end component to 
the ALP architecture that will reduce both the timeline and the footprint by enabling 
selection of the best value assets at the right time. 
The primary goal of this research was to provide a USAF-wide decision support 
tool in support of the M-R VAT that quickly identifies the best possible force mixes 
based upon their extrinsic values. The secondary goal was to determine the most 
appropriate mathematical relationship in combining extrinsic and intrinsic values into 
overall force mix values. To accomplish these goals, six research questions were 
answered: 
1. Can the factors affecting force mix selection in response to theater crises be 
clearly categorized as extrinsic and intrinsic, and can these categories be clearly 
defined? 
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2. What extrinsic factors are important to campaign planners when selecting 
aircraft force mixes in response to theater crises? 
3. How are these factors quantified, and what are the relationships between them? 
4. How should these factors and the relationships between them be modeled? 
5. Can the research results be applied USAF-wide? 
6. How can the now-quantified extrinsic factors be effectively combined with the 
intrinsic factors to develop an overall asset set utility or value? 
A four-phase methodology was implemented to address these six research 
questions, and is presented in Table 4 of Chapter IV. 
The first phase of research consisted of in-person interviews with campaign 
planning experts throughout the USAF, using the Critical Decision Method, and content 
analysis of relevant USAF and Department of Defense publications on Joint Planning. 
The purpose of this phase was to establish the conceptual separation of extrinsic and 
intrinsic decision factor categories, to define these categories, and to elicit all of the 
extrinsic decision factors necessary for consideration during crisis action campaign 
planning. The experts provided unanimous agreement on the separation of extrinsic and 
intrinsic decision factors, helped to establish definitions for each, and provided 22 
extrinsic factors important to force mix selection. The content analysis likewise 
presented extrinsic decision factors, as well as a set of intrinsic factor parent issues (see 
Figure 1, page 19). Phase I of the research satisfied questions 1 and 2. 
Phase II of the research methodology was comprised solely of a literature review 
of the Decision Analysis (DA) field to determine the most appropriate DA approach with 
which to model this decision situation. Several DA methodologies were investigated and 
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compared to the requirements of this decision situation, resulting in the selection of Value 
Focused Thinking as the most appropriate technique. This effort improves upon previous 
research involving this decision situation, in which no meaningful comparisons of DA 
techniques against each other or against the decision situation were accomplished. Phase 
II results satisfied research question 4. 
The third phase of methodology incorporated a modified Delphi in-person and 
email study, comprising three rounds. The three rounds of the modified Delphi study 
helped to establish the value hierarchy (necessary to creating the VFT decision support 
tool). Additionally, they established definitions and ranges for each of the extrinsic 
decision factors, led to the creation of 64 single-dimension value functions representing 
the expert judgements of the study participants, and generated all of the global and parent 
issue weights for use in the final VFT model. Completion of Phase III satisfied research 
question 3. 
Phase IV of the research methodology was reserved for the building of the VFT 
decision support tool. The successful averaging of individual agency single-dimension 
value functions (SDVF's) into robust USAF-wide SDVF's was the final step in satisfying 
research question 5. Further satisfaction of research question 5 is the inclusion of a 
family of models within the single VFT framework, allowing flexibility in its application. 
Finally, the development of a multiplicative, tie-breaking relationship, between this 
extrinsic VFT model and an intrinsically-scored set of pareto optimal force mixes, 
answers research question 6. 
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Summary of Research Advancements 
The primary advancement provided by this research over previous research is the 
USAF-wide applicability of the decision support tool. The six research questions 
notwithstanding, USAF-wide applicability was the primary goal of this research. It is 
attained via the diversity and breadth of experience of the subject matter expert pool, 
combined with the averaging of individual single-dimension value functions, and the 
inclusion of a family of models representing five agencies and the USAF overall. 
The second advancement is the investigation and evaluation of a large number of 
alternate Decision Analysis (DA) techniques. Previous research had attempted no such 
endeavor. The results of the DA investigation validated VFT as the most appropriate 
technique for modeling and addressing this decision situation. 
The establishment of an accurate mathematical representation of the extrinsic- 
intrinsic value relationship constitutes the third advancement. With intrinsic value 
scored and a set of pareto optimal force mixes established, simple multiplication by the 
respective extrinsic values instantaneously breaks the ties, leading to significantly 
reduced force mix selection timelines and the simplified selection of best overall force 
mixes. 
The fourth significant advancement is the straw model that is driven by both 
capability requirements and operating location characteristics. The capabilities-driven 
aspect allows for the 3x5 matrix of aircraft types and aerospace missions to generate 
candidate force mixes that are relatively equal in number and absolutely equal in basic 
capability, differing only by their suitability scores. The operating location aspect allows 
for operating location-specific data to be input which affects the value of candidate force 
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mixes while also allowing for different operating locations to be scored against constant 
sets of force mixes. As simply a test set, this would not normally warrant consideration 
as an advancement. However, its structure readies the VFT tool now for decision maker 
input of real-world data and subsequent real-world force mix selection. 
Another advancement is the inclusion of 96 single-dimension value functions 
(versus the 16 of previous research) representing the US AF-wide perspective and 
perspectives from AEFC, CADRE, SouthAF, CentAF, and ACC. Combined with the 
inclusion of individual issue weights as determined by each agency, any of the five 
agencies' expertise (or the US AF-wide expertise) can drive the model. 
The go/no go filter is a conceptual and practical improvement that not only 
provides feasible sets of force mixes prior to extrinsic scoring, but is linked by formula to 
operating location characteristics and straw model aircraft type characteristics. 
Finally, this research remedied a flaw in the original VFT decision support tool 
formulation concerning bomber and fighter distances from targets and munitions storage 
(MSA) area decision factors. Because bombers and fighters are scored separately for 
distance from targets and MSA, absence of either fighters or bombers in a given force 
mix could lead to erroneous force mix scoring. For example, if no bombers were 
included in a candidate force mix, its straw model score for that factor would be zero. 
The SDVF formula would then translate that zero to full value for the decision maker 
because bombers would be zero miles from targets. The force mix's value would be 
artificially inflated. This situation is remedied by allowing the global weights for each of 
these factors to be complimentary between fighters and bombers based upon their 
respective percentages (in number of aircraft) of the total force mix. 
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Conclusions 
This research shows that the collective, subjective judgements of subject matter 
experts can be combined into a viable, quantitative decision support tool for the selection 
of best force mixes during crisis action campaign planning. Moreover, it shows that 
dissimilar single-dimension value functions from several sources can be effectively and 
robustly combined into overall single-dimension value functions that accurately represent 
the views of all involved. The technique for combining single-dimension value functions 
was not found in literature during the course of this research, and may be unique in this 
application. 
An important aspect of the developed VFT decision support tool is that it scores 
the extrinsic values of competing force mixes almost instantaneously, in a format that is 
already set up to receive the intrinsically scored and ranked force mixes that result from 
concurrent AFIT research. 
Furthermore, this research shows that the VFT decision support tool has a 
significant impact on the rankings of force mixes that have been previously scored and 
ranked intrinsically. 
The bottom-line value of this VFT decision support tool is that, given a set of 
intrinsically scored force mixes, it can almost instantly produce overall values for each 




The primary limitation of this decision support tool is that it scores only the 
extrinsic value of candidate force mixes. Although it is formatted to produce overall 
force mix values, it must do so with force mixes that have already been scored and 
ranked intrinsically. 
Another limitation is the size of the subject matter expert pool and the number of 
agencies involved in the Phase III portion of study. This research focused on the 
opinions of experts within the continental United States, ignoring expertise that might be 
provided from planners in overseas commands. The possibility exists that inputs from 
overseas commands could change the single-dimension value functions and global 
weights within the VFT model. Although sensitivity analyses might prove such inputs 
inconsequential, the limitation exists nonetheless. 
Recommendations 
It is recommended that this VFT decision support tool be fully incorporated into 
the M-R VAT as a front end force mix value determinant for the Advanced Logistics 
Project. It provides an avenue for campaign planners to quickly evaluate the effects of 
extrinsic considerations on candidate force mixes. Moreover, the model's format and 
formulas are consistent with ongoing AFIT research and qualify it as the template upon 
which the M-R VAT can be based. 
The VFT decision support tool can run now in a real-world environment. 
However, it is built upon notional data, necessitating the introduction of actual extrinsic 
data before it can be applied operationally. 
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Further Research 
The additional research most necessary to the success of this VFT decision 
support tool is the collection of real-world data as it relates to the extrinsic value of 
individual weapons platforms. For example, what is the ratio of consumption to resupply 
for an F-16C assigned to contingency operations at Base X, or what is the Munitions 
Storage Area requirement for an A-10? 
Further research is also necessary to determine the most effective integration of 
this decision support tool into the M-R VAT, including its integrative programming and 
the development of a graphical user interface. 
Finally, further investigation is necessary to determine the relationships among 
individual factors within and between the intrinsic and extrinsic categories. Some may 
not fall entirely within one category or the other. Distinction between the categories (and 
appropriate definitions) has been established. However, there is a possibility that some of 
the individual factors may fall within both categories. 
Summary 
The Value Focused Thinking Decision Support Tool developed by this research 
provides a method to quickly evaluate candidate force mixes for contingency 
deployments based upon factors that are specific to the situation (extrinsic) rather than to 
the basic capabilities of the weapons platforms themselves (intrinsic). It provides a 
means for almost instantaneously computing overall force mix values once those force 
mixes have been valued intrinsically. 
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The support tool was developed with the expertise of campaign planning experts 
from Headquarters US AF, Air University, Air Combat Command, Southern Air Forces 
Command, Central Air Forces Command, the Air Expeditionary Forces Center, Joint 
Forces Command, Air Force Special Operations Command, RED FLAG, and Fighter 
Weapons School. 
The model incorporates combined single-dimension value functions, as well as 
value functions and weights representing/h>e agencies. This combination enhances 
USAF-wide applicability. It was demonstrated and validated using a capabilities and 
operating location driven straw model of 51 candidate force mixes. The validation 
showed all weights, value functions, and the overall model to be robust during internal 
and external sensitivity analyses. 
This research and its resultant VFT decision support tool present a number of 
advancements over previous research in this area, providing a sound building block upon 
which ongoing AFIT research in support of the ALP program can be based. 
This work is a first step in quantifying the art of force selection. Such 
quantification can allow planners, regardless of experience level, to act and decide crisis 
action planning issues in a manner consistent with the best planners in today's USAF. 
This in turn can generate consistency of planning competence across all USAF agencies. 
Furthermore, these consistent, expert-level decisions could be made in fractions of the 
time, reducing deployment timelines and footprints while enhancing the USAF's most 
core competency—warfighting. 
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Appendix A: Bullet Background Paper 
Purpose of this background paper, to provide the respondent with an overview of the 
topics of discussion to be addressed during the interview. 
Purpose of the interview: to obtain knowledge and understanding of the process and 
factors considered when selecting certain combat aircraft asset sets for theater 
deployment. 
- USAF now operates under the expeditionary concept 
~ Deploy small contingent of aircraft, 36 fighter and 2-6 bomber assets per set 
— May be expected to commence aerospace missions immediately upon arrival 
— Campaign will require several types of aerospace missions, defined in AFM 1-1 
- Our purpose is to look ahead beyond current prepackaged forces 
— A tailored force for each scenario 
~ Bring everything you need but only what you need 
~ Calculate time-phase requirements, spin up to fight from day zero.. .no more 
"closure" of forces 
- Please walk through a complete planning process for expeditionary force contingency 
- Realizing there are several layers of planning and decision-making, your views at 
your level are of prime importance in this study 
— What is the fundamental process of selecting aircraft types to support a campaign? 
— In determining the proper aircraft mix to be deployed and in planning for their 
deployment, what factors do you look at? 
- Focus on identified factors 
— What makes these important? 
~ Is there anything that may affect this factor.. .underlying sub-factors? 
— How do these factors relate to each other and the overall process? 
- Conclusion 
— Any other factors that have not been identified that you feel are important, no matter 
level 
~ Any important topics we did not discuss? 
— Any contacts you know ofthat I should talk to regarding this research? 
~ Soon, a second phase of research will begin. Your continued support will be greatly 
appreciated 
— Second phase will be quickly-accomplished email questionnaires to determine 
values and relative weights of the factors we have identified today—your support 
will be crucial 
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• Points of contact for this research 
-- 1st Lt Paul Filcek, AFIT (Paul.Filcek@afit.af.mir) 
-- Lt Col Alan Johnson, AFIT (Alan.Johnson@afit.af.mil), DSN 255-3636 ext 4284 
~ Maj Stephen Swartz, AFIT (Stephen.Swartz@afit.af.mil) 
- Advanced Logistics Project (ALP) Website (www.darpa.mil/iso/alp) 
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Appendix B: Interview Script 
INTRODUCTION 
Good afternoon, Sir. Thank you for taking the time to meet with me today. I am 
conducting research into the critical factors, or issues, that influence the selection and use 
of combat aircraft types for contingency deployments. The purpose of this interview is to 
elicit your knowledge and understanding of the overall process as an expert in the field. 
The information you provide will be combined with that of other experts and 
reported in aggregate. Your information will be confidential in that it will not be traced 
specifically to you. Only my observers and myself will have access to any identifiable 
information. 
Understanding this obligation of confidentiality, I would like to ask your 
permission to record this interview. The sole purpose of the recording is to overcome my 
own lack of shorthand skills. Furthermore, the tape will be reused for subsequent 
interviews. 
I am concerned with not taking more than 45 minutes of your time, so please 
excuse me in advance for watching the clock and for pushing the pace if we slow down. 
However, I must stress that the interview is largely unstructured, and any discussions 
within the context of the interview are encouraged. Do you have any questions before we 
star? 
BACKGROUND 
To begin our discussion of the process and the factors, I would like to first set the 
deployment stage. As you know, we've moved to the expeditionary concept in which the 
plan is to deploy about 36 fighter and 2-6 bomber assets and their necessary support 
equipment. These newly-arrived forces will be expected to commence engagement 
immediately upon arrival, and such engagement of the enemy may require several types 
of aerospace missions as defined in AFM 1-1 and determined by the theater commander. 
Research is currently being conducted in an effort to assist theater commanders 
and campaign planners in selecting sets of aircraft assets that will provide the best utility 
to the commander, based upon the theater commander's time-phased aerospace mission 
requirements. The research scenario is that, using a developed mathematical program, 
asset sets will be identified to provide the commander with the best match-up of aircraft 
assets to the required missions. Today, these match-ups are based upon a "prepackaged 
set" of forces, with the capabilities of each individual aircraft matched to specific 
aerospace missions. Of course, we know that we look at more than just these absolute 
mission capabilities when planning a deployment. There are many factors of a 
deployment scenario that may make the selection of one aircraft type preferred over 
another type, or may negate the possibility of selecting one or more types. Understanding 
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of the overall process is the focus of today's interview. I am going to ask you a series of 
questions aimed at obtaining your views and insights. 
I must finish the introduction by asking you not to hold back; have confidence in 
your thoughts and feelings on these issues. I am going to many offices in search of a 
model that applies AF-wide and your experience is very important in the intended scope 






1. How many years of experience do you have in the Air Force? 
2. With which MDSs do you have operational experience? How many years for each? 
3. For which theaters or commands have you done campaign or contingency planning? 
4. How many years experience for each? 
Those are the required demographic questions. Now we can move on to deployment 
factors... 
5. I would like you to walk me through the planning process for a contingency 
deployment, one that would be suited to an expeditionary-sized deployment. I know 
there are many levels of decision-making, but I am interested in your views at your level 
of the process. In determining the proper aircraft asset sets to send, what factors do you 
look at? Please consider the situations and theaters with which you are most familiar and 
have the greatest recall. 
Are there any more details or factors, no matter how insignificant you may feel they 
are? 
7. Are these all of the factors you can think of at this time? Please tell me of any others. 
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8. I have extracted numerous factors from content analysis of regulations/guidance. Do 
you agree with the existence of these? (show to subject, compare and contrast, integrate 
if possible). Now show Buzo 's. Please evaluate these factors in like manner. 
9. We've established quite a list. It is crucial to have each factor independent of the 
other factors. Are each of the factors listed independent of the others, or does one or 
some depend on one or more of the others in its evaluation? I realize that each affects the 
total outcome, but does a change in any factor affect another factor directly? (if A 
changes, does B change because A did?) 
10. Can these factors be divided into two groups, one group pertaining to the quality of 
the force mix and another group pertaining to the situation? Put another way, are some 
factors extrinsic to the mission capability of an asset set and other factors intrinsic to that 
capability? 
11. How would you define an extrinsic factor? An intrinsic factor? Here are my 
definitions (after the response). What do you think? 
12. Finally, let's define each of these extrinsic factors. What changes should I make to 
some of the definitions I've already got? 
Thank you VERY much for the interview! Soon, I will begin the second phase of this 
research that will consist of email questionnaires. Your participation during this phase 
will be vitally important in determining a decision support tool that is the main point of 
the study. The next questionnaires will be designed for user-friendliness and fast 
accomplishment in order to keep the demand on your time as low as possible and to keep 
your interest in the study. 
Again, it has been a sincere pleasure. I thank you very much and look forward to your 
continued support over the next few weeks. 
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Appendix C: Extrinsic Decision Factors 
Constraints: 
1. Politics—Desired Force Mix Allowed? 
2. Operating Location—Runway Length and Width Adequate? 
3. Operating Location—Ramp Space Sufficient? 
4. Operating Location—Runway and Ramp Weight Capacity Sufficient? 
5. Operating Location—No IFR, Distance Less Than 700 (Fighters) and 3000 
(Bombers) Miles from Targets? 
6. Desired Force Mix Available? 
Value Function Factors (to be Weighted and Scored): 
1. Multi-National Compatibility 
2. Beddown Location—Fighter Distance (From Targets, Refueled) 
3. Beddown Location—Bomber Distance (From Targets, Refueled) 
4. Munitions Storage Area—Fighter 
5. Munitions Storage Area—Bomber 
6. Ability to Resupply 
7. Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants (POL) Storage/Delivery 
8. Tanker Support Provided 
9. Operating Location—Topography 
10. Operating Location—Climate 
11. Mission Capable Status of Force Mix 
12. Inter-mission Flexibility of Force Mix 
13. Force Mix Utilization Rate 
14. USAF vs. Enemy Capability Ratio 
15. Enemy Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Impact 
16. Enemy Interference Impact (at operating location) 
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Appendix D: Extrinsic Decision Factors—Definitions and Ranges 
(those weighted and scored as value functions) 
Title: Multi-National Compatibility 
Description: The extent to which host nation assets, to include combat aircraft, 
equipment, spares, and ground support equipment can be incorporated along side and into 
USAF combat aircraft [Buzo, 2000: 105]. 
Range of Measurement: 0-100 percent for a monotonically increasing function. At 100 
percent compatibility, the host nation's candidate operating location for US forces 
maintains and operates fully compatible assets for 100 percent of the assets in the 
candidate force mix. USAF combat aircraft can be incorporated into the operating 
location without bringing in test equipment, spares or excessive maintenance equipment. 
At 0 percent, none of the host nation assets are compatible with those of the candidate 
force mix. In this case, campaign planners would need to arrange for sending a complete 
supply of testing equipment, spares, and maintenance and repair equipment for all combat 
aircraft sent to the operating location. The entire range of percentages of host nation 
compatibility is possible. 
Title: Beddown Location—Fighter Distance from Targets, Refueled 
Description: The effectiveness of an individual aircraft type within a candidate force mix 
is dependent upon its distance from the operating location to its primary mission targets. 
Range of Measurement: 0-3000 miles. Given availability of tanker support to provide 
In-flight refueling (IFR), this is a measure of time-to-target as much as distance— 
becoming an aircrew effectiveness limitation (and loiter time limitation) as the distance 
from the operating location to the primary target areas approaches 3000 miles. The entire 
range of 0 to 3000 miles is possible. 
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Title: Beddown Location—Bomber Distance from Targets, Refueled 
Description: The effectiveness of an individual bomber aircraft type within a candidate 
force mix is dependent upon its distance from the operating location to its primary 
mission targets. 
Range of Measurement: 0-7000 miles. This measure is identical to that of Fighter 
aircraft, with the only difference being the greater range of bomber aircraft. 
Title: Ability to Resupply 
Description: Continuation of aerospace missions from the operating location is 
dependent upon the ability of USAF forces to resupply equipment, materials, and spares 
as necessary. The candidate operating location can impact resupply capability and 
combine with individual aircraft resupply requirements to affect overall mission 
accomplishment. Aircraft that require smaller amounts of POL, munitions, and other 
equipment and spares will have a higher independent value than aircraft that require more 
resources, especially if resources are difficult to come by at the candidate operating 
location. 
Range of Measurement: 0-1, ratio of resupply to consumption. As the ratio of resupply 
to consumption increases to 1, USAF forces' ability to resupply the operating location 
equals the consumption at that location. As the ratio approaches 0, consumption rates far 
exceed supply at the operating location. Ratios above 1 are not expected because they 
would imply an excessive application of resources in time of crisis. The entire range of 0 
-1 is possible. 
Title: Munitions Storage Area—Fighter 
Description: Continued combat fighter operations depend on the operating location's 
ability to store and deliver adequate munitions in a timely manner. Fighters can bring to 
theater only one load of munitions each. Additional aerospace missions require the 
operating location to store and deliver munitions. 
Range of Measurement: 0-100 percent sorties supported. At 100 percent sorties 
supported, the operating location can store and deliver all of the munitions necessary to 
conduct the required aerospace operations. At 0 percent sorties supported, the operating 
location can store virtually no munitions, and the only munitions available are those 
loaded upon each aircraft upon departure from its home station. The entire range of 
munitions storage and delivery is possible. 
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Title: Munitions Storage Area—Bomber 
Description: Same as Munitions Storage Area—Fighter 
Range of Measurement: 0-100 percent sorties supported. Same as Munitions Storage 
Area—Fighter 
Title: Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants (POL) Storage and Delivery 
Description: The operating location's POL system includes storage and supply from both 
military and host nation contracted sources. POL capability for a particular force mix 
must take into consideration the per-sortie POL requirements of each individual aircraft 
in the force mix mix as well as the daily sortie requirements for each type of aircraft 
[Buzo,2000: 107]. 
Range of Measurement: 0-100 percent sorties supported. At 100 percent sorties 
supported, the operating location's POL system can store and deliver sufficient POL to 
sustain 100 percent of the projected operational sorties. At 0 percent POL capability, the 
operating location could support no sorties. Of course, this would disqualify the 
operating location as a candidate base. The entire range of POL capability is possible. 
Title: Tanker Support Provided 
Description: Depending upon the operating location's distance from enemy targets and 
the requirements of individual aircraft and aircraft types within a force mix, tanker 
support may be required or highly desirable. 
Range of Measurement: 0-100 percent sorties supported. At 100 percent sorties 
supported, enough tankers are available and included in the deployment plan to support 
all of the aerospace missions necessary. At 0 percent sorties supported, no tanker support 
is available for operations. The entire range is possible. 
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Title: Operating Location—Topography 
Description: The extent to which natural and man-made land formations in and around 
the operating location affect the ability of individual aircraft within a force mix to take- 
off, land, and conduct operations. 
Range of Measurement: 0-100 percent mission degradation. At 100 percent mission 
degradation, no sorties can fly in or out of the operating location due to topographical 
restrictions. Such degradation is a theoretical maximum, since its occurrence would 
necessitate relocation of combat force mixes. At 0 percent degradation, no sorties are lost 
to topographical restrictions. The entire range of scores is possible. 
Title: Operating Location—Climate 
Description: The extent to which heat, humidity, wind, and adverse weather conditions 
affect the ability offeree mixes to conduct operations at or around the operating location. 
RanRe of Measurement: 0-100 percent mission degradation. As in Topography above, 
100 percent degradation would mean that no sorties could be generated, but due to 
weather conditions here. At 0 percent degradation, all sorties could be conducted without 
weather interruption or disruption. The entire range is possible. 
Title: Mission Capable Rate of Force Mix 
Description: Extent to which aircraft in a candidate force mix are operationally capable 
of performing aerospace missions as designated by the theater or component commander. 
Range of Measurement: 0-100 percent average mission capable rate. At 100 percent 
mission capability, all of the aircraft in the candidate force mix have 100 percent mission 
capable rates. At 0 percent mission capable, none of the aircraft within the force mix are 
mission capable. Both extremes are near-theoretical, short of pre-deployment generation 
or the grounding of a fleet for one time inspection or time compliance technical order. At 
50 percent mission capable, some aircraft within the force mix could be higher while 
some are lower. All values within the range are possible. 
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Title: Inter-mission Flexibility 
Description: Extent to which individual aircraft types within a candidate force mix can 
perform all of the aerospace missions defined in AFM 1-1 and AFDD 2-1. The relative 
worth of the force mix would be highest if it could perform all of the missions required 
by the theater or component commander [Buzo, 2000: 110]. 
Range of Measurement: capability to perform 0-100 percent of required missions. This 
is inter-mission flexibility. Therefore, at 0 percent, the force mix can perform one, but 
only one, type of aerospace mission. At 100 percent, the force mix can perform all of the 
potentially-desired aerospace missions as dictated by the theater or component 
commander. It is important to note that the force mix—as a collection of aircraft 
designs—can perform all of the missions. No single aircraft within the mix need be 
capable of such flexibility. All of the values within the range are possible. 
Title: Utilization Rate of Force Mix 
Description: Extent to which aircraft within the force mix are to be used in the 
performance of primary missions. This does not preclude show of force deployments. 
Range of Measurement: 0-100 percent utilization rate. At 0 percent utilization rate, 
none of the aircraft within the force mix are to be used during the contingency. This 
would be an example of a show of force deployment. As utilization rates approach 100 
percent, degradation of mission capability is highly probable. Therefore, this measure is 
monotonically decreasing. The higher the utilization rate, the lower the value to the 
decision maker. All of the values within the 0-100 percent range are possible. 
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Title: USAF versus Enemy Capability 
Description: The comparison of enemy assets to USAF combat aircraft assets as 
contained in the candidate force mix. Assuming US forces' intelligence can discern the 
extent of the enemy's capability, this measure shows the relative worth of the amount of 
aircraft assets sent to the operating location. One issue addressed within the function is 
the number of USAF combat aircraft sent. The second issue is the capabilities of the 
enemy to counter the USAF force mix [Buzo, 2000: 111]. 
Range of Measurement: 0:1 to 3:1, ratio of USAF to enemy forces. As the ratio 
approaches 0:1, USAF forces are severely outmanned. At 1:1, USAF forces are equally 
offset by enemy forces. And as the ratio approaches 3:1, USAF forces gain a decided 
advantage. The entire range of ratios is possible, but as the USAF advantage passes 3:1, 
no additional value is attained and scarcity of resources reserved for other engagements 
becomes an issue. 
Title: Enemy Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Impact 
Description: Addresses the enemy's ability to_see or obtain information on US activity at 
the operating location. Enemy ISR could be obtained through aerial or satellite 
photography, local sympathizers monitoring US activity, or spies within the host nation 
working within or around the operating location [Buzo, 2000: 112]. Also necessarily 
addressed by this factor is the sensitivity to ISR of certain aircraft types within candidate 
force mixes, and the tradeoffs of such sensitivity with the enemy's ISR capabilities at the 
candidate operating location. 
Range of Measurement: 0-100 percent degradation of mission due to enemy ISR. This 
is not a measure of exposure, but rather a measure of the negative impact of such 
exposure. At 0 percent mission degradation, all USAF combat sorties are conducted as 
scheduled and no sensitive assets are compromised. At 100 percent degradation, no 
sorties can go as scheduled due to enemy ISR and/or major, crippling information or 
intelligence has been surrendered to the enemy. All of the values within the range are 
possible. 
146 
Title: Enemy Interference 
Description: Addresses the enemy's ability to interfere with US operations at the 
operating location. Interference is any action on the part of the enemy that could hamper 
US combat operations. The interference could range from relatively harmless 
demonstrations and propaganda to bomb threats and actual sabotage upon USAF assets 
and harm to personnel. This necessarily includes defensibility of the operating location 
from all-out attack upon the base, considering the strength of opposing forces in the 
vicinity of the operating location as well as the projected defense forces in place and/or to 
be sent. 
Range of Measurement: 0-100 percent degradation of mission. At 0 percent 
degradation of mission, no enemy interference of any kind is to be encountered at the 
candidate operating location. At 100 percent degradation, enemy interference will halt all 
combat aerospace operations at the candidate operating location. The entire range of 
values within enemy interference is possible. 
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Appendix E: Rank-Ordering Sheets (Delphi Round 1) 
THE ISSUE AND ITS MEASUREMENT YOUR RANK 
Multi-National Compatibility:  
Compatibility between in-place host nation and US assets (0-100%) 
Beddown Location—Fighter Distance (refueled):  
Deployed location's distance from enemy targets (0-3000 miles) 
Beddown Location—Bomber Distance (refueled):  
Deployed location's distance from enemy targets (0-7000 miles) 
Ability to Resupply:  
Ratio of consumption to resupply (0 to 1) 
Allow Assets In:  
Yes or No constraint 
International Politcs:  
Yes or No constraint 
Intra-National Politics:  
Yes or No constraint 
Inter-Service Politics:  
Yes or No constraint 
Intra-Service Politics:  
Yes or No constraint 
Operating Location—Runway Length and Width:  
Yes or No constraint 
Operating Location—Runway/Ramp Weight Capacity:  
Yes or No constraint 
Operating Location—Ramp Space:  
Yes or No constraint 
Munitions Storage Area—Fighter:  
Percent of fighter sorties supportable per day (0-100%) 
148 
THE ISSUE AND ITS MEASUREMENT YOUR RANK 
Munitions Storage Area—Bomber:  
Percent of bomber sorties supportable per day (0-100%) 
Petroleum, Oil, Lubricants (POL) Storage/Delivery:  
Percent of force mix sorties supportable per day (0-100%) 
Tanker Support Available:  
Percent of force mix sorties supportable per day (0-100%) 
Operating Location—Topography:  
Percent degradation of Mission (0-100%) 
Operating Location—Climate:  
Percent degradation of Mission (0-100%) 
Asset Inter-Mission Flexibility:  
Percent of the required aerospace missions force mix is capable (0-100%) 
Force Mix Utilization:  
Average expected utility of all aircraft in force mix (0-100%) 
Availability of Force Mix:  
Average mission capable rate of aircraft in force mix (0-100%) 
Enemy vs. USAF capability:  
Ratio of enemy-to-allied forces (0:1 to 3:1) 
Enemy Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR) Impact:  
Negative sortie impact of operations exposure to enemy (0-100%) 
Enemy Interference:  
Percent degradation of mission (0-100%) 
Is Force Mix Available to Deploy?  
Yes or No Constraint 
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Appendix F: Instructional Paper on Issue Weighting 
1. The purpose of the upcoming research questionnaire is to obtain opinions and 
knowledge on the relative weightings between the campaign specific issues identified 
during previous interviews and research. The purpose of this background paper is to 
provide an understanding of the process of swing weighting and to present an example of 
such. 
- Previous rounds of this study have determined relative ranking of Campaign Specific 
issues 
— Ranking, based on level of importance, of issues has been determined 
- The actual questionnaire will consist of comparing 15 sets of two separate campaign 
specific issues to determine relative weights of all issues 
2. To understanding how comparisons will be conducted, an example is provided. When 
deciding to purchase a car, many features must be considered. Consider two cars; Car 
'A' has all 3 of the safety features required (i.e. anti-lock brakes, traction control, and 
dual air bags), and costs $25,000. Car 'B' has 1 of the 3 safety features (dual air bags) 
needed, and costs $20,000. For simplicity, other features will be disregarded. 
- First, the value of these issues (safety features available and cost) based upon personal 
requirements must be identified. 
~ Determine 'value' for the price of the car, based on personal requirements 
— Paying $20,000 or less is optimal, resulting in a value of 1.0 at $20,000 
— Paying $30,000 or more is bad, resulting in a value of 0 at $30,000 
— Value decreases linearly between $20,000 and $30,000 ($25,000 results in a value 
of0.5) 
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— Determine 'value' for having safety features, based on personal requirements 
— Having all 3 safety features is optimal, resulting in a value of 1.0 for all three 
— Having none of the safety features is very bad, resulting in a value of 0. 
— Value decreases equally between 3 to no features (1 feature results in a value of 
0.33, 2 features result in a value of 0.66) 
~ Using the example, 'Safety' value of Car 'A' is 1.0, and 'Cost' value is 0.5 
— 'Safety' value of Car 'B' is 0.33, 'Cost' value is 1.0 
Next, relative weighting between two issues must be determined 
~ It is determined that safety features are more important than cost 
— Compare 'range of measurement' of safety (0 to 3 features) to 'range of 
measurement' of cost ($20,000 to $30,000) 
— As safety features more important than cost, compare cost to safety by asking the 
following question: 
WHAT PORTION OF THE 'RANGE OF MEASUREMENT' OF SAFETY 
EQUALS THE 'RANGE OF MEASUREMENT' OF COST? 
— Question determines level of concern over reduced value between two issues 
— If cost swings from $20,000 to $30,000 (best value to worst value), what would be 
the equivalent loss in safety features. 
— Based on personal belief, it is determined a swing in cost from $20,000 to $30,000 
(best value to worst value) is comparable (same level of unhappiness is felt) to a 
swing in losing 1 safety feature (going from 3 to 2 safety features) 
— Although we will not be discussing this in the interview, value analysis of the two 
choices continues with converting range of measurement to value. 
~ It is determined that Safety features are 3 times as important as cost (1 times the 
entire range of cost = 1/3 entire range of safety) 
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- Combining both issues to compare different cars, individual weights must sum to 1 
"cost' + 'safety' = 1 
3 x 'Cost' = 'Safety' 
Combining two equations, 'Cost' + (3 x 'Cost') = 1, Therefore Cost = 0.25 
-- Weight of 'Cost' is 0.25 and weight of 'Safety' is 0.75. 
- Once values and relative weightings identified for two issues, individual cars can be 
compared to determine 'best value' car for the buyer 
~ Comparison of different cars based upon summing the following to determine total 
value: 
Value of 'Cost' x Weight of 'Cost' 
Value of'Safety' x Weight of'Safety' 
~ Using example, Car 'A' commands total value of: 
(0.5 x 0.25) + (1 x 0.75) = 0.88 
~ Car 'B' commands total value of: 
(1.0 x 0.25) + (0.33 x 0.75) = 0.50 
- Therefore, based on value analysis, choose Car 'A' as car with highest total value 
3. Over the course of this research, the ranges of measurement for each individual 
Campaign Specific Issue has been determined. The relative importance ranking of the 
Campaign Specific Issues have also been identified. The purpose of the interview is to 
obtain the relative weightings for these issues in the manner discussed in this paper. 
4. Thank you very much for your time and support of this research effort. If you have 
any questions about the method in which the interview will be conducted or for any other 
reason, please do not hesitate to e-mail me at Paul.filcek@afit.af.mil. 
lLt Paul Filcek/AFIT/ENS/(937)254-5895/12Jan01 
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Appendix G: Delphi Rounds 2 and 3 Questionnaire 
Phase answer all questions on this document and return within an e-mail to: 
Paul.Filcek@afit. af.mil 
The Purpose of this questionnaire is to determine relative weightings: between the sub- 
issues within a parent issue (i.e. Multi-National Compatibility, Allow Assets In, etc. 
within Host Nation); and between parent issues (i.e. Host Nation, Enemy, etc) 
During previous questionnaires, the relative rankings of importance between the 
campaign specific issues have been determined. Based upon these results, issues 
recognized to be more potentially influential will be ranked against those issues not as 
potentially influential to the selection of combat aircraft to deploy in response to a 
contingency crisis. 
Please compare the Campaign Specific Issue in 'Column A' to the Campaign Specific 
Issue in 'Column B'. In each case, the issue in 'Column A' has been identified to be 
more potentially important than the issue in 'Column B'. Looking at the range of 
measurement for each issue, PLEASE STATE HOW MANY TIMES MORE 
IMPORTANT THE SWING FROM BEST SCORE TO WORST SCORE FOR THE 
ISSUE IN COLUMN 'A' IS THAN THE SWING FROM BEST SCORE TO WORST 
SCORE FOR THE ISSUE IN COLUMN 'B'. 
Consider this example. Compare Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants (POL) to Beddown 
Location: Fighter Distance. The swing from best to worst score for POL is 100 percent 
to 0 percent support of asset sorties per day. The swing from best to worst score for 
Beddown Location: Fighter Distance is Omi to 3000mi distance from the pre-determined 
staging base to the enemy target. I believe that, if POL were to drop from 100 percent to 
0 percent, this drop would be 4 times worse than if Beddown Location: Fighter Distance 
were to increase from 0 mi to 3000 mi from the enemy target. As my answer, I put 4 in 
the middle block. 
COLUMN A 
IS HOW TIMES MORE 
IMPORTANT THAN 
COLUMN B 
Petroleum, Oil, Lubricants 
(100% to 0% asset sets 
supported per day) 
4 
1 
Beddown Location: Fighter 
Distance 
(0-3000mi distance to enemy target) 
Based upon this example, please provide your answer to the following comparisons. If 
you feel that the issue in 'Column A' is less important than the issue in 'Column B', 
please use fractions (1/2, 1/3, etc.). 
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QUESTIONNAIRE ANSWER SHEET 
COLUMN A 
IS HOW MANY 
TIMES MORE 
IMPORTANT 
1         THAN 
COLUMN B 
Petroleum, Oil, Lubricants 
(100% to 0% assets supported/day) f I Beddown Location: Fighter Distance (Omi to 3000mi distance to enemy) 
Enemy Vs. USAF Capability 
(3 to 0 USAF to Enemy Ratio) 
Petroleum, Oil, Lubricants 
(100% to 0% asset sets supported/day) 
Enemy Vs. USAF Capability 
(3 to 0 USAF to Enemy Ratio) 
Mission Capable Rate of Assets 
(100% to 0% average MC rate of acft) 
Mission Capable Rate of Assets 
(100% to 0% avg MC rate of acft) 
Multi-National Compatibility 
(100%-0% compatibility w/ host) 
Beddown Location: Fighter Distance 
(0-3000mi distance to enemy targets) 
Beddown Location: Bomber Distance 
(0-7000mi distance to enemy target) 
Beddown Location: Fighter Distance 
(0-3000mi distance to enemy target) 
Ability to Resupply 
(1 to 0 ratio: consumption to resupply) 
Petroleum, Oil, Lubricants 
(100% to 0% assets supported/day) 
Munitions Storage Area: Fighter 
(100-0% fighter sorties supported/day) 
Petroleum, Oil, Lubricants 
(100% to 0% assets supported/day) 
Munitions Storage Area: Bomber 
(100-0% bomber sorties supported/day) 
Petroleum, Oil, Lubricants 
(100% to 0% assets supported/day) 
Tanker Support Required 
(0-100% sorties supported/day) 
Topography 
(100% to 0% mission degradation) 
Climate 
(100% to 0% mission degradation) 
                  
Mission Capable Rate of Assets 
(100%-0% average MC rate of acft) 
Asset Mission Flexibility 
(100-0% capability of all aerospace 
missions) 
Mission Capable Rate of Assets 
(100%-0% average MC rate of acft) 
Asset Set Utilization 
(0-100% utility of all aircraft in set) 
Enemy Vs. USAF Capability 
(3 to 0 USAF to Enemy Ratio) 
Enemy Surveillance, Intel, and Recon 
(0-100% impact of exposure to enemy) 
Enemy Vs. USAF Capability 
(3 to 0 USAF to Enemy Ratio) 
Enemy Interference 
(0% to 100% mission degradation) 
Topography 
(100% to 0% mission degradation) J Beddown Location: Fighter Distance (Omi to 3000mi distance to enemy) 
Thank you very much for your support of this research. I greatly appreciate the time you 
took to complete these questionnaires. I will be concluding this study with a conclusion 
questionnaire in which I will present a summary of these individual Campaign Specific 
Issue weights, as determined by the expert group. You will have an opportunity to revise 
or defend you're your weightings in this final questionnaire. THANK YOU VERY 
MUCH! 
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2.65             0        Rho      -0.28 
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USAF-Wide SDVF: 
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Computed from the following individual single-dimension value functions: 
CentAF SDVF 
Percent 
sorties / day Score 
Rho      -0.31 
SouthAF SDVF 
Percent 
sorties / day Score 
0 0 
1 1        Rho      -0.41 
AEFC SDVF 
Percent 
sorties / day Score 
Rho      1000 
CADRE SDVF 
Percent 
sorties / day Score 
0 0 
0.65          0.5        Rho -0.1495 
1 1        Rho       0.26 
ACC SDVF 
Percent 
sorties / day Score 
0 0 








0.81 0.63       Q 0.43 Range 
0.23 0.03 
Computed from the following individual single-dimension value functions: 
CentAF SDVF 
Percent 
sorties / day Score 
0 0 
1 1 Rho -0.31 
AEFC SDVF 
Percent 
sorties / day Score 
0 0 
1 1 Rho 1000 
ACC SDVF 
Percent 
sorties / day Score 
0 0 
1 1 Rho -0.56 
SouthAF SDVF 
Percent 
sorties / day Score 
Rho      -0.41 
CADRESDVF 
Percent 
sorties / day Score 
0 0 
0.68          0.5        Rho -0.2584 
1 1        Rho       0.28 
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Computed from the following individual single-dimension value functions: 
CentAF SDVF 
Percent 
sorties / day Score 
0 0 
1 1 Rho 1000 
AEFC SDVF 
Percent 
sorties / day Score 
0 0 
1 1 Rho 1000 
ACC SDVF 
Percent 
sorties / day Score 
0 0 
1 1 Rho 1000 
SouthAF SDVF 
Percent 
sorties / day Score 
0 0 
1 1 Rho 1000 
CADRE SDVF 
Percent 
sorties / day Score 
0 0 
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1 1 Rho 1000 
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USAF-Wide SDVF: 
Force Mix Utilization 
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1 1 Rho -0.2113 
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USAF-Wide SDVF: 
Force Mix MC Rate 
0.03 




0            0 
0.1            0 
0.5         0.2 Rho -0.3648 
0.76         0.8 
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Computed from the following individual single-dimension value functions: 
CentAF SDVF 
Ratio: USAF 
to enemy Score 
0 0 
0.8            0 
1 0.2        Rho      -0.03 
1.5         0.5        Rho      -0.22 
3            1        Rho   0.1554 
SouthAFSDVF 
Ratio: USAF 
to enemy Score 
0           0 
0.8            0 












to enemy Score 
0            0 
0.8            0 
1          0.4 PL 
2         0.8 PL 
3            1 PL 
ACC SDVF 
Ratio: USAF 
to enemy Score 
0 0 
1 0.8        Rho      -0.41 
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Appendix I: Sensitivity Analysis on Parent Issue Weights 







a      0.69 
0.67 
0.65 





Final weight used 
0.01       0.025       0.04       0.055       0.07       0.085      0.097      0.115        0.13       0.145 
Weights 
No change in the most favored force mix (#18) within the range of weights used. 
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0.75 - 
Sensitivity Analysis: Operating Location Parent Issue 
^                 Range of weights                    ^  t 
 \ 
tflX27 





>    0.72 
X 




, t^-^r*^'      • 
..-y^            Weightused 
0.69 
0.15         0.21          0.27         0.33        0.366         0.45         0.51          0.57         0.63         0.69 
Weights 
Just one change in the most favored force mix, from #19 to #18, within the range of 
weights used. The actual change in rank occurred near the value of the final weight used, 
lending evidence as to the final weight's appropriateness. 
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Final weight used 
0.05 0.07 0.09 0.11        0.137        0.15 0.17 0.19 0.21 0.23 
Weights 
No change in the most favored force mix (#18) within the range of weights used. 
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Sensitivity Analysis: Enemy Considerations Parent Issue 
0.15 0.21 0.27 0.33 QA    .    ,0.45 0.51 0.57 0.63 0.69 
Weights 
No change in the most favored force mix (#18) within the range of weights used. 
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Appendix J: Sensitivity Analysis on the USAF-Wide SDVF's 















 M IX 24 
■ MIX 27 
1.2 34 5 6 7 8        9       10       11       12       13      14       15       16 
Factors Changed 
Each of the 16 USAF-wide SDVF's was constructed from the 80 individual 
SDVF's elicited from AEFC, CentAF, ACC, CADRE, and SouthAF (five for each of 16 
factors). The 16 USAF-wide SDVF's comprise the extrinsic force evaluation tool (go/no 
go filter notwithstanding). 
The graph above represents the top four force mixes as scored using the USAF- 
wide SDVF's. However, each point along the X-axis has one of the 16 factors 
represented by the most divergent individual SDVF for that factor (i.e., AEFC for POL). 
As can be seen, none of the top four force mixes change their relative ranking 
using a single dissenting SDVF. This provides evidence for the robustness of the USAF- 
wide SDVF's. 
It is important to note that a small number of changes in rankings did occur 
among lower ranked force mixes. However, these changes were, in every case, among 
force mixes of almost identical assets. Among differentiated force mixes, no rank 
changes occurred. 
175 
Appendix K: Input Sheets for Scoring Force Mixes 
The "Go /No Go Filter" (constraints) sheet, less the Go /No Go score column (included 
in actual sheet). The constraints are specific to the aircraft types within a candidate force 
mix, which then drive a force mix's initial feasibility. This sheet is linked by formulas to 
the "Scored Force Mixes" sheet. Manual inputs into either sheet affect the other. 





 i  
FLAG: 






FB FC     B1 
1         1 
"1 '       1 
1         1 
1         1 
1         1 
F 
1         1 
B2 
force 
Test 2 lOPEJWINO LOCATION: Runway Length/Width 
test 3 tOPERAT INQ LOCATION: Runway Weight Capacity 
Test 4 tOPERATINO LOCATION: Ramp Space 
Test 5 [Oesfred Force Mix AVAILABLE? 
Ifreconstftution, rotations, fleet modifications, etc) 
Test 6 JNON-tFR DISTANCE: •c700iT»/Fighter, 3Cö0mi/Bornber 
«applies if no tankers available, distance can't exceed} 
"|              F; Acondrtion that must be accounted tor in the constraint formula specific to the 
MIX     FA     FB     FC     Bl      B2    teat 1  Test 2 "fest 3 Test 4 tcMt ÜTc; ;t 6   Posscd 
Calc box for distance: Tankers Available: 
Miles from target/F: 
Miles fromtarget/B: 
2 24 12 0 3 0 
3 24 12 0 0 3 
4 12 24 0 0 3 
5 12 0 24 3 0 
6 0 12 24 3 0 
7 12 0 24 0 3 
8 0 12 24 0 3 
9 0 24 12 3 0 
10 24 0 12 3 0 
11 0 24 12 0 3 
12 24 0 12 0 3 
13 12 24 0 2 1 
14 24 12 0 1 2 
15 24 12 O 2 1 
16 12 24 0 1 2 
17 12 0 24 2 1 
18 0 12 24 1 2 
19 12 O 24 2 1 
20 D 12 24 i 2 
21 0 24 12 2 1 
22 24 0 12 1 2 
23 O 24 12 2 1 
24 24 0 12 1 2 
25 36 0 0 3 0 
26 36 0 0 0 3 
27 36 0 0 2 1 
28 0 36 0 3 0 
29 O 36 0 0 3 
30 0 36 0 1 2 
31 0 0 36 3 0 
32 0 0 36 0 3 
33 0 0 36 2 1 
34 18 18 0 1 2 
35 0 18 18 2 1 
36 18 0 18 1 2 
37 18 18 O 3 0 
38 0 18 18 3 0 
39 18 0 18 3 0 
40 18 18 0 0 3 
41 0 18 18 0 3 
42 18 0 18 0 3 
43 12 12 12 2 1 
44 12 12 12 1 2 
45 12 12 12 2 1 
46 12 12 12 3 0 
47 12 12 12 3 0 
48 12 12 12 3 0 
49 12 12 12 0 3 
50 12 12 12 0 3 
51 12 12 12 0 3 
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The "Straw Model" sheet, including situational (host nation/base) inputs but less the 
breakout of force mix composition and suitability (in the actual spreadsheet). This sheet 




Republic of Cantonia 
Blue Coral AB, ROC 
MULTI-NATIONAL COMPATIBILITY: 
DISTANCE FROM TARGETS: 






ENEMY ISR MULTIPLIER: 
ENEMY INTERFERENCE IMPACT: 
90-DAY RUNNING MC RATE OF MDS: 
STATUS FB FC B2 
No Mult. 0.7 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.7 
900 0.9 1 1.1 2.5 2.7 
0.95 0.95 0.75 0.85 0.7 0.8 





0.4 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.22 0.11 
0.3 
No Mult. 0.92 0.83 0.8 0.75 0.84 
"BLUEPRINT: SPECIFIC TO HOST BASE 
(GUI idea: user can scroll a list of MDS's, gain 90-day MC rate and particular Multi-National Compatibility score-Perfect for ALP's real time info networ 
ALP's real time logistics architecture can have ALL of the BLUE data for host bases continually updated, to be displayed and calculated within model 
automatically upon base selection. 
Multl-   Baddown Beddown MSA        MS« 
National   Fighter    Bomber Resupply Fighter   Bomber 
Tanker Enemy     Enemy       Enemy 
FlaxIbilltyUtlllzatlon Support Topography Climate MC Rate Capability     ISR     Interference 
0.84 0.87 2.25 0.83 0.78 0.66 0.78 0.83 0.32 0.70 
0.78 0.84 2.25 0.77 0.84 0.66 0.75 0.79 029 0.67 
0.76 0.84 2.43 0.77 0.84 0.76 0.74 0.78 0.28 0.68 
0.82 0.87 2.43 0.84 0.78 0.76 0.77 0.82 0.31 0.70 
0.78 0.93 2.25 0.77 0.84 0.66 0.69 0.72 027 0.76 
0.84 0.96 2.25 0.83 0.78 0.66 0.72 0.76 0.31 0.78 
0.76 0.93 2.43 0.77 0.84 0.76 0.69 0.71 027 0.76 
0.82 0.96 2.43 0.84 0.78 0.76 0.71 0.74 0.30 0.79 
0.87 0.93 2.25 0.86 0.74 0.66 0.76 0.81 0.33 0.76 
0.75 0.87 2.25 0.73 0.87 0.66 0.71 0.74 0.27 0.70 
0.85 0.93 2.43 0.87 0.74 0.76 0.75 0.80 0.32 0.76 
0.73 0.87 2.43 0.74 0.87 0.76 0.70 0.73 0.26 0.70 
0.83 0.87 2.31 0.83 0.78 0.70 0.77 0.83 0.32 0.70 
0.77 0.84 2.37 0.77 0.84 0.73 0.74 0.79 0.28 0.68 
0.77 0.84 2.31 0.77 0.84 0.70 0.75 0.79 0.29 0.67 
0.83 0.87 2.37 0.83 0.78 0.73 0.77 0.82 0.31 0.70 
0.77 0.93 2.31 0.77 0.84 0.70 0.69 0.72 0.27 0.76 
0.83 0.96 2.37 0.83 0.78 0.73 0.72 0.75 0.30 0.79 
0.77 0.93 2.31 0.77 0.84 0.70 0.69 0.72 0.27 0.76 
0.83 0.96 2.37 0.83 0.78 0.73 0.72 0.75 0.30 0.79 
0.86 0.93 2.31 0.86 0.74 0.70 0.76 0.81 0.33 0.76 
0.74 0.87 2.37 0.74 0.87 0.73 0.70 0.73 0.26 0.70 
0.86 0.93 2.31 0.86 0.74 0.70 0.76 0.81 0.33 0.76 
0.74 0.87 2.37 0.74 0.87 0.73 0.70 0.73 0.26 0.70 
0.72 0.81 2.25 0.70 0.90 0.66 0.72 0.76 0.26 0.65 
0.70 0.81 2.43 0.71 0.90 0.76 0.71 0.74 0.25 0.65 
0.71 0.81 2.31 0.71 0.90 0.70 0.72 0.75 0.25 0.65 
0.90 0.90 2.25 0.89 0.71 0.66 0.80 0.87 0.35 0.73 
0.88 0.90 2.43 0.90 0.71 0.76 0.80 0.86 0.34 0.73 
0.89 0.90 2.37 0.89 0.71 0.73 0.80 0.86 0.34 0.73 
0.81 0.91 2.25 0.80 0.75 0.66 0.68 0.70 028 0.81 
0.79 0.99 2.43 0.81 0.81 0.76 0.67 0.69 0.28 0.81 
0.80 0.94 2.31 0.80 0.77 0.70 0.68 0.70 0.28 0.81 
0.80 0.83 2.37 0.80 0.79 0.73 0.76 0.80 0.30 0.69 
0.85 0.90 2.31 0.85 0.72 0.70 0.74 0.78 0.31 0.77 
0.75 0.88 2.37 0.76 0.83 0.73 0.69 0.72 027 0.73 
0.81 0.79 2.25 0.80 0.75 0.66 0.76 0.81 0.30 0.69 
0.85 0.87 2.25 0.84 0.70 0.66 0.74 0.78 0.32 0.77 
0.76 0.83 2.25 0.75 0.79 0.66 0.70 0.73 027 0.73 
0.79 0.86 2.43 0.81 0.81 0.76 0.75 0.80 0.30 0.69 
0.84 0.95 2.43 0.85 0.76 0.76 0.73 0.77 0.31 0.77 
0.75 0.90 2.43 0.76 0.86 0.76 0.69 0.72 0.26 0.73 
0.80 0.85 2.31 0.80 0.77 0.70 0.73 0.77 0.29 0.73 
0.80 0.88 2.37 0.80 0.79 0.73 0.73 0.77 0.29 0.73 
0.80 0.85 2.31 0.80 0.77 0.70 0.73 0.77 0.29 0.73 
0.81 0.83 2.25 0.80 0.75 0.66 0.73 0.78 0.30 0.73 
0.81 0.83 2.25 0.80 0.75 0.66 0.73 0.78 0.30 0.73 
0.81 0.83 2.25 0.80 0.75 0.66 0.73 0.78 0.30 0.73 
0.79 0.90 2.43 0.81 0.81 0.76 0.73 0.76 0.29 0.73 
0.79 0.90 2.43 0.81 0.81 0.76 0.73 0.76 029 0.73 
0.79 0.90 2.43 0.81 0.81 0.76 0.73 0.76 0.29 0.73 
0.16 0.16 0.85 1.18 0.07 
0.17 0.15 0.88 1.18 0.07 
0.17 0.16 0.89 1.18 0.06 
0.16 0.16 0.86 1.18 0.07 
0.17 0.18 0.83 1.18 0.09 
0.16 0.19 0.81 1.18 0.09 
0.17 0.18 0.84 1.18 0.08 
0.17 0.19 0.81 1.18 0.09 
0.16 0.18 0.81 1.18 0.09 
0.18 0.16 0.87 1.18 0.07 
0.16 0.18 0.82 1.18 0.08 
0.18 0.16 0.88 1.18 0.07 
0.16 0.16 0.85 1.18 0.07 
0.17 0.15 0.88 1.18 0.07 
0.17 0.15 0.88 1.18 0.07 
0.16 0.16 0.86 1.18 0.07 
0.17 0.18 0.84 1.18 0.09 
0.17 0.19 0.81 1.18 0.09 
0.17 0.18 0.84 1.18 0.09 
0.17 0.19 0.81 1.18 0.09 
0.16 0.18 0.82 1.18 0.09 
0.18 0.16 0.87 1.18 0.07 
0.16 0.18 0.82 1.18 0.09 
0.18 0.16 0.87 1.18 0.07 
0.18 0.14 0.91 1.18 0.06 
0.18 0.15 0.91 1.18 0.06 
0.18 0.15 0.91 1.18 0.06 
0.15 0.17 0.82 1.18 0.08 
0.16 017 0.83 1.18 0.08 
0.16 0.17 0.83 1.18 0.08 
0.17 0.19 0.80 1.18 0.10 
0.17 020 0.80 1.18 0.10 
0.17 0.19 0.80 1.18 0.10 
0.17 0.16 0.87 1.18 0.07 
0.16 0.18 0.81 1.18 0.09 
0.18 0.17 0.86 1.18 0.08 
0.17 0.16 0.87 1.18 0.07 
0.16 0.18 0.81 1.18 0.09 
0.17 0.17 0.85 1.18 0.08 
0.17 0.16 0.87 1.18 0.07 
0.16 0.18 0.82 1.18 0.09 
0.18 0.17 0.86 1.18 0.08 
0.17 0.17 0.84 1.18 0.08 
0.17 0.17 0.85 1.18 0.08 
0.17 0.17 0.84 1.18 0.08 
0.17 0.17 0.84 1.18 0.08 
0.17 0.17 0.84 1.18 0.08 
0.17 0.17 0.84 1.18 0.08 
0.17 0.17 0.85 1.18 0.08 
0.17 0.17 0.85 1.18 0.08 





















































"Input Sheet" for the Straw Model: 
*Based upon notional suitability ratings for required missions AA, AG, and PB, the five 
available aircraft are mixed into candidate forces that meet the mandatory mission 
capability for day X.   Each force mix then produces its own suitability score. The 
combination of suitability and capability comprise an intrinsic value. The suitability 
scores and rankings of scores in the right hand columns are not to be confused with 
overall intrinsic values. 
1     SUITABILITY 
FA        FB         FC         B1         B2 
AA            0.8        03        0-6    0.001     0001 
AG           0 4        0.8        06    0.001     0.001 
PB        0.001     0.001         0.1        0.8        0.4 
1     CAPABILITY 
B AA        AG        P 
10         20          2 
nn        nr\        nn        m        nn Suitability 
Rank 
1 
AA         AG         PB    |    AA         AG         PB    |    AA         AG         PB    |    AA         AG         PB    |    AA         AG         PB MIX        FA         FB         FC         B1         B2                 Score 
10                              r   .20                                                                                       2 1              12         24           0           3           0:                25.6 
20             j;  10                                                                             2 2              24         12           0           3           0                 12.6 48 
20               r.-. 10                                                                                                                              2 3              24         12           0           0           3                 11.8 51 
.  .10                                 I                  20                                                                                                                                           2 4              12         24           0           0           3                24,8 4 
■    10                              l'                                     ■■          ■     20                                                 2 5              12           0         24           3           0                21.6 9 
■■■   10                                                20                                                 2 6               0         12         24           3           0                 16,6 39 
.   10                                                                                 .     20                                                                                       2 7              12           0         24           0           3                20.3 14 
'■':■.. 10                                                20                                                                                       2 8               0         12         24           0          3                 15.8 43 
20                 ;    10                                                             2 9     v        0         24         12           3           0                23.6 5 
20                                                             10                                                             2 10-24           0         12           3           0                 15.6 44 
20                        10                                                                                                               2 11    ;          0         24         12           0           3                22.8 8 
20                                                            10                                                                                                    2 12    :        24           0         12           0           3                 14.8 47 
10                                                     20                                                                                                 11 13    J        12         24           0           2           1                 25.2 2 
20                 ;    10                                                                                                     14    ;        24         12           0           1           2                 12.2 49 
20                 \    10                                                                                                    11 15             24         12           0           2           1                 12.2 49 
10                                                     20                                                                                                  16              12          24            0            1             2                  25,2 2 
10                                 ;                                                             20                                                      11 17    ;         12            0          24            2            1                   21.2 11 
10                                                     20                                                      1                                         1 18    ';'        0         12         24           1           2                 16.2 41 
10                                                                                                20                                                      1                                         1 19    :         12            0          24            2            1,                  21.2 11 
10                                                     20                                                      1                                         1 20    ':         0         12         24           1           2                 16.2 41 
20                        10                                                                    1                                         1 21     |          0          24          12            2            1                   23.2 6 
20                                                              .10                                                                    1 22             24           0         12           1           2                 15.2 45 
20                   i     10                                                                     1                                         1 23    :           0          24          12            2            1                   23.2 6 
20                                                              "-10                                                                    1                                         1 24    ;         24            0          12            1            2                   15.2 45 
10          20                                                                                                                                            2 25    ;;::■:.    36           0           0           3           0                 17.6 34 
10          20                                                                                                                                                                                      2 26    ) ■    .    36            0            0            0            3                   16.8 37 
10          20                                                                                                                                            1                                         1 27    ;;       36           0           0           2           1                 17.2 35 
;'.■   10          20                                                                                                 2 28    !:■:■'■■'   . 0          36            0            3.0                  20.6 16 
■■  10          20                                                                                                                                           2 29    i'".::    .0          36            0            0            3                   19,8 19 
;    10          20                                                                                                 1                                         1 30    $<''■   . 0          36            0         :  1            2                   20.2 17 
10          20                                                      2 31     Ij!'.;:       0            0          36            3            0                   19,6 21 
10          20                                                                                                 2 32     ■■'         0   '.     0          36            0            3                   18,8 26 
■     10          20                                                      1                                         1 33              0          0         36           2        . 1.                 19.2 23 
5           10                         5           10                                                                                                 1                                         1 34    .         18          18            0            12                   16.7 27 
;     5          10                       5          10                                                 1                                     1 35    ;..■■      0          18          18            2            1                   19,7 20 
5          10                                                             5          10                                                 1                                     1 36             18        : 0         18           1           2                 10.2 32 
5          10                       5          10                                                                                       2 37     . .      18          18            0            3            0                   19.1 24 
5          10                      5          10                                                 2 38    i           0          18          IB            3            0                  20,1 18 
5          10                                                        ..   5          10                                                 2 39    :         18            0          18            3            0                   18 6 29 
S           10                         5           10                                                                                                                                           2 40    ;         18          18            0            0            3                   18,3 30 
5          10                      5          10                                                                                       2 41       :         0          18          18            0            3                   19.3 22 
5          10                                                        ■    5          10                                                                                       2 42    :        18           0         IB           0           3                 17.8 33 
5            5                          5            5                                        10                                                      1                                         1 43     .         12          12          12            2            f                   18.7 27 
10                 ;     5           5                        5           5                                                  1                                     t 44     '■       12          12          12            t             2                   16,7 38 
5           5                                    10                      5           5                                                  1                                     1 45    =        12         12         12           2           1                 21.2 11 
5            5                          5            5                                        10                                                      2 46             12         12         12           3           0                 19.1 24 
10                         5            5                          5            5                                                       2 47             12         12      .   12           3           0                 17.1 36 
5            5                                        10                         5            5                                                       2 43              12          12        .12            3            0                   21.6 9 
5           5                        5           5                                    10                                                                                       2 49              12          12          12            0            3                   16.3 30 
10                         5            5                          5            5                                                                                                  2 50              12          12          12      .     0            3:                  16.3 40 
5            5                                        10                         5            5                                                                                                  2 51    ■        12         12         12           0           3                 20.8 14 
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Appendix L: The Subject Matter Expert Pool 
Col. JoelPetersen 
Lt. Col. Larry Brockshus 
Mr. Gary Hitz 
Mr. William Mattson 
Lt. Col. Connie Vandermarliere 
Lt. Col. Michael Duvall 
Lt. Col. Petitto McMahon 
Maj. Dennis McDevitt 
Maj. William Carter 
Maj. Gregory Broardt 
Maj. LouKaelin 
Lt. Col. William Doneth 
Maj. Thomas Nankervis 
Mr. Jeffrey Brown 
Mr. Don Niederkopfler 
Lt. Col. Barrett Clay 
Lt. Col. N. Gonzalez 
Maj. Steven Wackowski 
Col. Kenneth Poole 
Lt. Col. Bryan Johnson 
Maj. Kirby Locklear 
Mr. Clay Olschner 
Mr. Michael Urban 
Maj. Chuck McCleen 
Lt. Col. Marty Spitek 
Col. Ernest Howard 
Col. Shirley Rawls 
Lt. Col. Raymond Santiago 
Maj. Laletta Tatum 
Mr. Robert Barthelmess 
Dr. Adolph Perry 
Maj. J. D. Haas 
Lt. Col. John Stankowski, III 
Lt. Col. Burrell Jones, III 
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Appendix M: Visual Basic Coding for SDVF's 
The following code for Microsoft Excel Visual Basic was provided by Kirkwood 
for converting hand-drawn value function elicitations into exponential or piecewise linear 
value function curves [Kirkwood, 1997: 81]. 
Sub kirkwood (expon) 
Function ValueE(x, low, high, monotonicity, rho) 
' Determines the value score for an expon value function 
Select Case UCase(monotonicity) 
Case "I" 
delta = x - low 
Case "D" 
delta = high - x 
End Select 
If UCase(rho) = "INF" Then 
ValueE = delta / (high - low) 
Else 
ValueE = (1 - Exp(-delta / rho)) / (1 - Exp(-(high - low) / rho)) 
End If 
End Function 
Function ValuePL(x, Xi, Vi) 
1 Determines the value score for a piecewise linear function 
i = 2 
Do While x > Xi(i) 
i = i+l 
Loop 




Appendix N: Excel Formulas Used to Incorporate the 16 SDVF's 
*The first two formulas provide short explanations. The MSA factors for Bombers and 
Fighters, as well as the Distance factors for both, are complementary in their weighting. 
The short explanation provided for "Beddown Location—Fighter Distance" (second, 
below) also pertains to "MSA—Fighter," "MSA—Bomber," and "Beddown Location— 
Bomber." 
Excel Formula for scoring the "Multi-National Compatibility" SDVF vs. a candidate 
force mix: 
=$D$4*IF(*ConstraintFilter'!$AA3>0,IF('StrawModer!V4>,Multi-National 
Compatibility'! $ AE$ 11,1 ,IF('Straw Model'! V4>'Multi-National 
Compatibility*! $ AE$ 12,0.5+0.5 * ValueE('Straw Model' !V4,'Multi-National 




Where the first shaded area is the global weight, the second shaded area is the go / 
no go feasibility multiplier. The IF statements compute different segments along 
the value function's curve, and the shaded multipliers maintain value 
advancement along the curve. 
Excel Formula for scoring the "Beddown Location—Fighter Distance" SDVF vs. a 
candidate force mix: 
=(($E$4*(SUM('Straw Model'!P4:R4)/('Straw Model* !04)))+('Scored Force 
Mixes'!$F$4-((SUM('Straw Model'! S4:T4))/'Straw Model'!04)*'Scored Force 
Mixes'!$F$4))*IF('ConstraintFilter'!$AA3>0,IF('StrawModel'!W4<'Beddown 
Fighter'!$AJ$11,1,IF('Straw Model'!W4<Beddown 
Fighter'!$AJ$12,ValueE('Straw Model'!W4,'Beddown Fighter'!$AJ$11, 'Beddown 
Fighter'!$AJ$12,"D",'BeddownFighter'!$AM$12),0)),0) 
Where the first shaded area represents a complementary relationship between this 
factor's weight and that of "Bomber Distance." It is this factor's weight times its 
percent of the force mix plus the sum-product of the other factor's weight minus 
its percentage of the force mix times its weight. Other components of the formula 
are similar to the "multi-National Compatibility" factor's formula. 
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Excel Formula for scoring the "Beddown Location—Bomber Distance" SDVF vs. a 
candidate force mix: 
=(($F$4*(SUM('StrawModel'!S4:T4))/'StrawModer!04)+($E$4-((SUM('Straw 
Model'!P4:R4))/('Straw Model'!04))*('Scored Force 
Mixes,!$E$4)))*(IF('ConstraintFilter'!AA3>0,IF('StrawModer!X4<'Beddown 
Bomber'!$AJ$11,1,IF('Straw Model'!X4<Beddown Bomber'!$AJ$ 12, 
ValueE('Straw Model'!X4,'Beddown Bomber'! $ AJ$ 11,'Beddown 
Bomber'!$AJ$12,"D",'BeddownBomber'!$AM$12),0)),0)) 
Excel Formula for scoring the "Resupply" SDVF vs. a candidate force mix: 









$AJ$1 l,0.18*ValueE('Straw Model'!Y4,'Ability to 
$AJ$11,Ability to Resupply'!$AJ$10,"D",'Ability to 
$AM$1 l),IF('Straw Model'!Y4<'Ability to 
$AJ$12,ValuePL('Straw Model'! Y4,Ability to 
$AJ$11 :$AJ$12,'Ability to 
$AK$11 :$AK$12),0.62+0.38*ValueE('Straw Model' !Y4,'Ability to 
$AJ$13,'Ability to Resupply*!$AJ$12,"D",*Ability to 
$AM$13))),0) 
Excel Formula for scoring the "MSA—Fighter" SDVF vs. a candidate force mix: 
=(($H$4*((SUM('Straw Model'!P4:R4))/('Straw Model'!04)))+(('Scored Force 
Mixes'!$I$4)-(((SUM('Straw Model'!S4:T4))/('Straw Model'!04))*('Scored Force 
Mixes'!$I$4))))*(IF('ConstraintFilter'!$AA3>0,IF('Straw 
Model'!Z4<MSA_Fighter!$AJ$l 1,0.5*ValueE('Straw 





Excel Formula for scoring the "MSA—Bomber" SDVF vs. a candidate force mix: 
=(($I$4*((SUM('Straw Model'!S4:T4))/('Straw Model'!04)))+(('Scored Force 
Mixes'!$H$4)-(((SUM('StrawModel'!P4:R4))/('StrawModel'!04))*('Scored 










w Model'!AB4,POL!$AJ$l 1,POL!$AJ$12,"I",POL!$AM$12)),0) 
Excel Formula for scoring the "Inter-Mission Flexibility" SDVF vs. a candidate force 
mix: 
=$K$4*IF('ConstraintFilter'!$AA3>0,IF('Straw 
Model'! AC4<Flexibility! $ AJ$ 11, ValueE('Straw 
Model'! AC4,Flexibility! $ AJ$ 10,Flexibility! $ AJ$ 11 /'Flexibility! $ AM$ 11), 1 ),0) 
Excel Formula for scoring the "Force Mix Utilization" SDVF vs. a candidate force mix: 
=$L$4*IF('ConstraintFilter'!$AA3>0,IF('Straw 
Model'! AD4<Utilization! $ A J$ 11,1 ,IF('Straw 
Model'! AD4<Utilization! $ AJ$ 12,ValuePL('Straw 
Model'! AD4,Utilization!$AJ$l 1 :$AJ$12,Utilization!$AK$l 1 :$AK$12),0.94*Val 
ueE('Straw 
Model'! AD4,Utilization! $AJ$ 12,Utilization! $AJ$ 13, "D", Utilization! $ AM$ 13))), 
0) 
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Excel Formula for scoring the "Tanker Support Available" SDVF vs. a candidate force 
mix: 
=$M$4*IF('Constraint Filter' !$AA3>0,IF('Straw Model'! AE4<Tanker 
Support'!$AJ$l l,ValueE('Straw Model'!AE4,'Tanker Support' !$AJ$10,'Tanker 
Support' !$AJ$ll,"i",'Tanker Support'!$AM$11),1),0) 






Excel Formula for scoring the "Operating Location—Climate" SDVF vs. a candidate 
force mix: 
=$0$4*IF('Constraint Filter' !$AA3>0,IF('Straw 
Model'!AG4<Climate!$AJ$ll,ValueE('Straw 
Moder!AG4,Climate!$AJ$10,Climate!$AJ$ll,"D",Climate!$AM$ll),0),0) 
Excel Formula for scoring the "Force Mix MC Rate" SDVF vs. a candidate force mix: 
=$P$4*IF('Constraint Filter' !$AA3>0,IF('Straw 
Model'! AH4<Availability! $ AJ$ 11,0,IF('Straw 
Model' !AH4<Availability! $ AJ$ 12,0.4* ValueE('Straw 
Model'! AH4, Availability! $ AJ$ 11 Availability! $ A J$ 12, "I", Availability! $ AM$ 12), 




Excel Formula for scoring the "Enemy Capability" SDVF vs. a candidate force mix: 
=$Q$4*IF('Constraint Filter' !$AA3>0,IF('Straw Model'!AI4<'Enemy 
Capability*!$AJ$l 1,0,IF('Straw Model'!AI4<'Enemy 
Capability'!$AJ$12,0.42*ValueE('StrawModer!AI4,'Enemy 
Capability'!$ AJ$ 11,'Enemy Capability'!$AJ$12,'T7Enemy 
Capability'! $ AM$ 12),IF('Straw Model'! AI4<'Enemy 
Capability'!$AJ$13,0.42+0.58*ValueE('StrawModel'!AI4,'Enemy 
Capability'!$AJ$12,'EnemyCapability'!$AJ$13,"I",'Enemy 
Capability'! $ AM$ 13), 1 ))),0) 
Excel Formula for scoring the "Enemy ISR" SDVF vs. a candidate force mix: 
=$R$4*IF('Constraint Filter' !$AA3>0,IF('Straw Model'!AJ4<Enemy 
ISR'!$AJ$1 l,ValueE('Straw Model'!AJ4,'Enemy ISR'!$AJ$10,'Enemy 
ISR'!$AJ$1 l,"D",'Enemy ISR'!$AM$11),0),0) 
Excel Formula for scoring the "Enemy Interference" SDVF vs. a candidate force mix: 







$AJ$1 l,0.5+0.5*VameE('Straw Model'!AK4,'Enemy 
$AJ$10,'Enemy Interference'!$ AJ$ 1 l,"D",*Enemy 
$AM$1 l),IF('Straw Model'!AK4<'Enemy 
$AJ$12,0.5*ValueE('StrawModel'!AK4,'Enemy 
$AJ$ 11 ,'Enemy Interference'! $ AJ$ 12,"D",'Enemy 
$AM$12),0)),0) 
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Appendix O: External Sensitivity Analyses 
(suitability) 
ExIrin @ | 
Typical 
Intrin @  [ 
Typical 
Multiplic. [ 
Result MIX Rank Rank Rank | 
1 0.713534 15 25.6 1 18.26647 1 
2 0.714978 8 12.6 48 9.008728 48 
3 0.71603 2 11.8 51 8.449152 51 
4 0.714309 9 24.8 4 17.71487 4 
5 0.710151 34 21.6 9 15.33927 9 
6 0.70924 38 16.6 39 11.77338 39 
7 0.711153 25 20.8 14 14.79197 15 
8 0.709751 35 15.8 43 11.21406 43 
9 0.710476 30 23.6 5 16.76722: 5 
10 0.712788 16 15.6 44 11.11949 44 
11 0.711142 26 22.8 8 16.21403 8 
12 0.714035 10 14.8 47 10.56772 47 
13 0.713743 12 25.2 2 17.98633 3 
14 0.715651 4 12.2 49 8.730945 49 
15 0.715283 5 12.2 49 8.726451 50 
16 0.71402 11 25.2 2 17.9933 2 
17 0.710439 31 21.2 11 15.06131 11 
18 0.709478 36 16.2 41 11.49355 41 
19 0.710439 31 21.2; 11 15.06131 11 
20 0.709478 36 16.2 41 11.49355 41 
21 0.710648 27 23.2 a 16.48703 6 
22 0.713594 13 15.2 45 10.84662 45 
23 0.710648 27 23.2 6 16.48703: a 
24 0.713594 13 15.2 45 10.84662 45 
25 0.715222 6 17.6 34 12.58791? 34 
26 0.716797 1 16.8* 37 12.04219: 36 
27 0.715707 3 17.2- 35 12.31016 35 
28 0.711992 23 20.6 ■ 16 14.66704: 16 
29 0.712621 20 19.8 19 14.10989 18 
30 0.712379 22 20.2: 17 14.39005' 17 
31 0.70073 50 19.6' 21 13.7343 21 
32 0.710606 29 18.8 26 13.3594 26 
33 0.70368 45 19.2 23 13.51066 23 
34 0.71145 24 18.7 27 13.30412 27 
35 0.704337 44 19.7 20 13.87544 20 
36 0.708184 40 18.2 32 12.88894 32 
37 0.704945 43 19.1 24 13.46444 24 
38 0.701729 49 20.1 18 14.10476 19 
39 0.700554 51 18.6 29 13.03031 31 
40 0.71521 7 18.3 30 13.08835 29 
41 0.710439 33 19.3 22 13.71147 22 
42 0.712593 21 17.8 33 12.68415 33 
43 0.705602 41 18.7 27 13.19475 28 
44 0.70902 39 16.7; 38 11.84063 38 
45 0.705602 41 21.2: 11 14.95876 13 
46 0.702531 46 19.1 : 24 13.41834 25 
47 0.702531 46 17.1 36 12.01328 37 
48 0.702531 46 21.6 9 15.17466 10 
49 0.712772 17 18.3 30 13.04373 30 
50 0.712772 17 16.3 40 11.61819 40 
51 0.712772 17 20.8 14 14.82566 14 
(suitability) 
Extrin @ | 
Typical 
intrin @ | 
.9 and .1 
Multiplic. [ 
Result MIX Rank Rank Rank | 
1 0.713534 15 28.8 1 20.54978 1 
2 0.714978 8 4.8 44 3.431896s 44 
3 0.71603 2 3.2 50 2.291295: 50 
4 0.714309 9 27.2 7 19.42921 7 
5 0.710151 34 12.8 21 9.089935 23 
6 0.70924 38 4.8 44 3.404351 *45 
7 0.711153 25 11.2 37 7.964909 42 
8 0.709751 35 3.2 50 2.271203 !:;S1 V,: 
9 0.710476 30 28.8 1 20.4617 2 
10 0.712788: 16 12.8 21 9.123686 22 
11 0.711142 26 27.2 : 7 19.34305 •:'*■■■■■'! 
12 0.714035 10 11.2 37 7.997193 38:*: 
13 0.713743 12 28 3 19.98481 4   : 
14 0.715651 : 4 4 46 2.862605 46 
15 0.715283 5 4 46 2.861131 47 
16 0.71402 11 28 3 19.99255 3 
17 0.710439 31 12 28 8.525268 31 
18 0.709478: 36 4 46 2.837913; 48 
19 0.710439' 31 12 28 8.525268: 31 
20 0.709478 ; 36 4 46 2.837913 48 
21 0.710648 27 28 3 19.89813 5 
22 0.713594* 13 12 28 8.563124 29 
23 0.710648 27 28 3 19.89813 5 
24 0.713594! 13 12 28 8.563124 29 
25 0.715222 6 12.8      I 21 9.154844 21 
26 0.716797» 1 11.2 37 8.028124 37 
27 0.715707* 3 12        ; 28 8.58848 28 
28 0.711992 23 20.8     ; :-;.9 14.80944 9 
29 0.712621 20 19.2      ' ■■13:" 13.68232 14 
30 0.712379; 22 20 11 14.24757 11 
31 0.70073: 50 12.8 21 8.969341 26 
32 0.710606 29 112 :37 7.958791 43 
33 0.70368 45 12 ! 28 8.444161 36 
34 0.71145' 24 16 17 11.3832 17 
35 0.704337 44 16 17 11.2694 18 
36 0.708184' 40 12 28 8.498204 34 
37 0.704945 43 16.8 15 11.84307 15 
38 0.701729 49 16.8 15 11.78905 16 
39 0.700554 51 12.8 21 8.967096 27 
40 0.71521: 7 15.2 19 10.8712 19 
41 0.710439 33 15.2 19 10.79867 20 
42 0.712593 21 11.2 37 7.981041 41 
43 0.705602 41 12 28 8.46722 35 
44 0.70902: 39 12 28 8.508238 33 
45 0.705602 41 20 11 14.11203!: 12 
46 0.702531 46 12.8 21 8.992394 24 
47 0.702531 : 46 12.8 21 8.992394 24 
48 0.702531 46 20.8 9 14.61264 10     : 
49 0.712772 17 11.2 37 7.983048 39 
50 0.712772 17 11.2 37 7.983048 39 
51 0.712772 17 19.2 13 13.68523 13 
186 
Extrin @ 
MIX I  Typical 
(suitability) 
Intrin @ |_ 
.8 and .2 
Multiplic. 
Result Rank | 
1 0.713534 15 
2 0.714978 8 
3 0.71603 2 
4 0.714309 9 
5 0.710151 34 
6 0.70924 38 
7 0.711153 25 
8 0.709751 35 
9 0.710476 30 
10 0.712788 16 
11 0.711142 26 
12 0.714035 10 
13 0.713743 12 
14 0.715651 4 
15 0.715283 5 
16 0.71402 11 
17 0.710439 31 
18 0.709478 36 
19 0.710439 31 
20 0.709478 36 
21 0.710648 27 
22 0.713594 13 
23 0.710648 27 
24 0.713594 13 
25 0.715222 6 
26 0.716797 1 
27 0.715707 3 
28 0.711992 23 
29 0.712621 20 
30 0.712379 22 
31 0.70073 50 
32 0.710606 29 
33 0.70368 45 
34 0.71145 24 
35 0.704337 44 
36 0.708184 40 
37 0.704945 43 
38 0.701729 49 
39 0.700554 51 
40 0.71521 7 
41 0.710439 33 
42 0.712593 21 
43 0.705602 41 
44 0.70902 39 
45 0.705602 41 
46 0.702531 46 
47 0.702531 46 
48 0.702531 46 
49 0.712772 17 
50 0.712772 17 



























































































































































Extrin ig | 
Typical 
Intrin @ [ 
.7 and .3 
Multiplic. [ 
Result MIX Rank Rank Rank | 
1 0.713534 15 22.4 1 15.98316 1 
2 0.714978 8 10.4 44 7.435775. 44 
3 0.71603 2 9.6 50 6.873886 50 
4 0.714309 9 21.6 7 15.42908 7 
5 0.710151 34 14.4 21 10.22618: 23 
6 0.70924 38 10.4: 44 7.376093 45 
7 0.711153 25 13.6 37 9.671675: 42 
8 0.709751 35 9.6 50 6.813609 51 
9 0.710476 30 22.4 1 15.91465 2 
10 0.712788 16 14.4 21 10.26415: 22 
11 0.711142 26 21.6 7 15.36066: 8 
12 0.714035 10 13.6 37 9.710877: 38 
13 0.713743: 12 22 3 15.70235' 4 
14 0.715651 4 10 46 7.156512: 46 
15 0.715283 5 10 46 7.152828 47 
16 0.71402: 11 22 3 15.70844 3 
17 0.710439 31 14 28 9.946146 31 
18 0.709478 36 10: 46 7.094782 48 
19 0.710439 31 14; 28 9.946146 31 
20 0.709478 36 10" 46 7.094782 48 
21 0.710648 27 22 3 15.63425: 5 
22 0.713594 13 14* 28 9.990311: 29 
23 0.710648 27 221 3 15.63425 * 5 
24 0.713594 13 14? 28 9.990311: 29 
25 0.715222 6 14.4 21 10.2992: 21  ; 
26 0.716797 1 13.6! 37 9.748436' 37 
27 0.715707 3 14 28 10.01989 28 
28 0.711992 23 18.4 9:: 13.10066 9 
29 0.712621 20 17.6' 13 12.54212 14 
30 0.712379 22 18 11 12.82281 11  : 
31 0.70073 50 14.4' 21 10.09051 26 
32 0.710606 29 13.6: 37 9.664246 43 
33 0.70368 45 14» 28 9.851521 36 
34 0.71145 24 16 17 11.3832' 17 
35 0.704337 44 16f 17 11.2694 18 
36 0.708184 40 14: 28 9.914571 34 
37 0.704945 43 16.4 15 11.56109 15 
38 0.701729 49 16.4 15 11.50836 16 
39 0.700554* 51 14.4' 21 10.08798 27 
40 0.71521' 7 15.6 19 11.15728 19 
41 0.710439 33 15.6 19 11.08285: 20 
42 0.712593 21 13.6 37 9.6912641! 41 
43 0.705602 41 14 28 9.878424 35 
44 0.70902 39 14 28 9.926278 33 
45 0.705602 41 is: 11 12.70083: 12 
46 0.702531 46 14.4 21 10.11644: ::24;'. 
47 0.702531 46 144* 21 10.11644 24 :■ 
48 0.702531 46 18.4; 9 12.92657 10 
49 0.712772 17 13.6 37 9.693702; 39 
50 0.712772 17 13.6s 37 9.693702: 39 
51 0.712772 17 17.6 13 12.54479 13 
187 
(suitability) 
Extrin @ | 
Typical 
Intrin @ [ 
.6 and .4 
Multiplic. L 
Result MIX Rank Rank Rank | 
1 0.713534 15 19.2 1 13.69985 1 
2 0.714978 8 13.2 44 9.437715 44 
3 0.71603 2 12.8 50 9.165182 50 
4 0.714309 9 18.8 7 13.42902 7 
5 0.710151 34 15.2 21 10.7943 23 
6 0.70924 38 13.2 44 9.361965 45 
7 0.711153 25 14.8 37 10.52506 42 
8 0.709751 35 12.8 50 9.084811 51 
9 0.710476 30 19.2 1 13.64113 2 
10 0.712788 16 15.2 21 10.83438 22 
11 0.711142 26 18.8 7 13.36946 8 
12 0.714035 10 14.8. 37 10.56772 37 
13 0.713743 12 19 3 13.56112 4 
14 0.715651 4 13 46 9.303466 46 
15 0.715283 5 13 46 9.298677 47 
16 0.71402 11 19 3 13.56638 3 
17 0.710439 31 15 28 10.65658 29 
18 0.709478 36 13 46 9.223216 48 
19 0.710439; 31 15 28 10.65658 29 
20 0.709478; 36 13 46 9.223216 48 
21 0.710648 27 19: 3 13.50231 5 
22 0.713594 13 15' 28 10.7039 25 
23 0.710648 27 19: 3 13.50231 5 
24 0.713594!; 13 15 28 10.7039 25 
25 0.715222: 6 15.2! 21 10.87138 21 
26 0.716797 s 1 14.8 37 10.60859 35 
27 0.715707 3 15 28 10.7356 24 
28 0.711992 23 17.2 9 12.24627 9' 
29 0.712621 20 16.8 13 11.97203 14 
30 0.712379 22 17 11 12.11044 10 
31 0.70073' 50 15.2 21 10.65109 31 
32 0.710606' 29 14.8 37 10.51697 43 
33 0.70368 45 15: 28 10.5552 38 
34 0.71145 24 16 17 11.3832 16 
35 0.704337 44 16 17 11.2694 19 
36 0.708184 40 15 28 10.62276 34 
37 0.704945 43 16.2 15 11.42011' 15 
38 0.701729 49 16.2 15 11.36802 17 
39 0.700554 51 15.2 21 10.64843 32 
40 0.71521 7 15.8 19 11.30033 18 
41 0.710439 33 15.8 19 11.22494 20 
42 0.712593 21 14.8 37 10.54638 41 
43 0.705602 41 15 28 10.58403 36 
44 0.70902 39 15 28 10.6353 33 
45 0.705602 41 17 11 11.99523 12 
46 0.702531 46 15.2 21 10.67847 27 
47 0.702531 46 15.2 21 10.67847 27 
48 0.702531 46 17.2 9 12.08353 11 
49 0.712772 17 14.8 37 10.54903 39 
50 0.712772 17 14.8 37 10.54903 39 
51 0.712772 17 16.8 13 11.97457 13 
(suitability) 
Extrin @ | 
Typical 
Intrin @ |_ 
.51 & .49 
Multiplic. L 
Result MIX Rank Rank Rank | 
1 0.713534 15 16.32 1 ' 11.64487 1 
2 0.714978 8 15.72 44 11.23946 38 
3 0.71603 2 15.68 50 11.22735 41 
4 0.714309 9 16.28 7 11.62896 4 
5 0.710151 34 15.92; 21 11.30561 28 
6 0.70924 38 15.72: 44 11.14925s 48 
7 0.711153 25 15.88 37 11.2931s 32 
8 0.709751 35 15.68 50 11.12889 51 
9 0.710476 30 16.32 1 11.59496' 5 
10 0.712788 16 15.92 21 11.34758 20 
11 0.711142 26 16.28 7 11.57739 8 
12 0.714035 10 15.88 37 11.33888 23 ': 
13 0.713743 12 16.3 3 11.63402: '■'3 
14 0.715651' 4 15.7 46 11.23572; 39 
15 0.715283 5 15.7 46 11.22994N :;40.s': 
16 0.71402 11 16.3 3 11.63852 ■:\m 
17 0.710439 31 15.9! 28 11.29598 29 ': 
18 0.709478 36 15.7? 46 11.13881 49 
19 0.710439 s: 31 15.9' 28 11.29598 29 
20 0.709478 36 15.71 46 11.13881 49 
21 0.710648' 27 16.3 3 11.58356 6 
22 0.713594 s 13 15.9 28 11.34614 21 : 
23 0.710648 s 27 16.3 3 11.58356 6 
24 0.713594 s 13 15.9 28 11.34614 21 
25 0.715222: 6 15.92 21 11.38634 14 
26 0.716797 1 15.88 37 11.38273 16 
27 0.715707" 3 15.9 28 11.37974 17 
28 0.711992' 23 16.12 9 11.47732 9 
29 0.712621s 20 16.08 13 11.45894 12 
30 0.712379 s 22 16.1 11 11.46929 10 
31 0.70073; 50 15.92 21 11.15562 46 
32 0.710606 29 15.88 37 11.28443 33 
33 0.70368 45 15.9 28 11.18851 43 
34 0.71145 24 16 17 11.3832 15 
35 0.704337 44 16 17 11.2694 35 
36 0.708184 40 15.9 28 11.26012 36 
37 0.704945 43 16.02: 15 11.29322 31 
38 0.701729 49 16.02* 15 11.24171 37 
39 0.700554 51 15.92 21 11.15283 47 
40 0.71521 7 15.98 s 19 11.42906; 13 
41 0.710439 33 15.98 19 11.3528V 19 
42 0.712593 21 15.88 37 11.31598s 27 
43 0.705602 ■■ 41 15.9 28 11.21907? 42 
44 0.70902 39 15.9 28 11.27342 34 
45 0.705602 41 16.1 11 11.36019 18 
46 0.702531 46 15.92 21 11.18429 44 
47 0.702531 46 15.92; 21 11.18429s 44 
48 0.702531 46 16.12' ' 9 11.3248 24 
49 0.712772 17 15.88 37 11.31882 25 
50 0.712772 17 15.88 37 11.31882 25 
51 0.712772 17 16.08' 13 11.46138 11 
Extrin @ 
.9 and .1 Rank 
(suitability) 





Extrin @ | Intrin @ | Multiplic. 
Result 
I 
MIX .8 and .2 Rank Typical  Rank Rank | 
1 0.49235 41 
2 0.653574 18 
3 0.613193 30 
4 0.451663 47 
5 0.819733 1 
6 0.653574 18 
7 0.78455 13 
8 0.613193 30 
9 0.49235 41 
10 0.819733 1 
11 0.451663 47 
12 0.78455 13 
13 0.478048 43 
14 0.626065 26 
15 0.639323 23 
16 0.464825 46 
17 0.807273 6 
18 0.626065 26 
19 0.807273 6 
20 0.626065 26 
21 0.478048 43 
22 0.795755' 10 
23 0.478048 43 
24 0.795755' 10 
25 0.819733 1 
26 0.78455 13 
27 0.807273 8 
28 0.348434 49 
29 0.315672 51 
30 0.325735 50 
31 0.80881 4 
32 0.78455 13 
33 0.799638 9 
34 0.542366 38 
35 0.554912 37 
36 0.791744 12 
37 0.568733 35 
38 0.568733 35 
39 0.80881 4 
40 0.53048 39 
41 0.53048* 39 
42 0.78455 13 
43 0.636165 24 
44 0.624431 29 
45 0.636165 24 
46 0.648993 20 
47 0.648993 20 
48 0.648993 20 
49 0.613193 30 
50 0.613193 30 













































































































































































































1 0.506263 41 
2 0.628016 18 
3 0.597701 30 
4 0.476315 47 
5 0.755414 1 
6 0.628016 18 
7 0.72688 13 
8 0.597701 30 
9 0.506263 41 
10 0.755414 1 
11 0.476315 47 
12 0.72688 13 
13 0.495807 43 
14 0.607488 26 
15 0.617526 23 
16 0.485907 46 
17 0.745687 6 
18 0.607488 26 
19 0.745687 6 
20 0.607488 26 
21 0.495807 43 
22 0.736306 10 
23 0.495807 43 
24 0.736306 10 
25 0.755414 1 
26 0.72688 15 
27 0.745687 6 
28 0.39244 49 
29 0.365731 ; 51 
30 0.374094 50 
31 0.747397 4 
32 0.72688 15 
33 0.740096 9 
34 0.54412: 38 
35 0.553233" 37 
36 O.733377: 12 
37 0.563006 35 
38 0.563006 35 
39 0.747397 4 
40 0.535424 39 
41 0.535424 39 
42 0.72688 15 
43 0.614627' 24 
44 0.605988: 29 
45 0.614627: 24 
46 0.623809 20 
47 0.623809 20 
48 0.623809 20 
49 0.597701 30 
50 0.597701 30 














































































































































































































Extrin @ j 
MIX    .7 and .3 Rank 
(suitability) 
Intrin @ |_ 
Typical    I 
Multiplic. 
Result 
1 0.520554 41 
2 0.602426 18 
3 0.581509 30 
4 0.500702 47 
5 0.68704 1 
6 0.602426 18 
7 0.664659 16 
8 0.581509 30 
9 0.520554 41 
10 0.68704 1 
11 0.500702 47 
12 0.664659 16 
13 0.513772 43 
14 0.588415 26 
15 0.595484 23 
16 0.507162 46 
17 0.679619 6 
18 0.588415 26 
19 0.679619 6 
20 0.588415 26 
21 0.513772 43 
22 0.672173 10 
23 0.513772 43 
24 0.672173 10 
25 0.68704 1 
26 0.664659 13 
27 0.679619 6 
28 0.442299 49 
29 0.422002* 51 
30 0.42863 50 
31 0.681652 4 
32 0.664659 13 
33 0.675903 9 
34 0.545882 38 
35 0.551567 37 
36 0.670248 12 
37 0.557503 35 
38 0.557503 35 
39 0.681652 4 
40 0.54043 39 
41 0.54043 39 
42 0.664659 13 
43 0.592831 24 
44 0.587043 29 
45 0592831 24 
46 0.598575 20 
47 0.598575 20 
48 0.598575 20 
49 0.581509 30 
50 0.581509 30 














































































































































































































Extrin @ | Intrin @ | Multiplic. 
Result MIX .6 and .4 Rank Typical  Rank Rank | 
1 0.535307 41 
2 0.576024 18 
3 0.565757 30 
4 0.5253 47 
5 0.617574 1 
6 0.576024 18 
7 0.607589 16 
8 0.565757 30 
9 0.535307 41 
10 0.617574: 1 
11 0.5253 47 
12 0.607589 16 
13 0.531929 43 
14 0.569136 26 
15 0.572557 20 
16 0.528595 * 46 
17 0.614222 4 
18 0.569136 26 
19 0.614222 4 
20 0.569136! 26 
21 0.531929 43 
22 0.610899 10 
23 0.531929: 43 
24 0.610899 10 
25 0.617574 1 
26 0.607589 13 
27 0.614222 4 
28 0.495856 49 
29 0.486008' 51 
30 0.489252 50 
31 0.613368 7 
32 0.607589* 13 
33 0.611323 9 
34 0.547553 38 
35 0.549864 37 
36 0.609399 12 
37 0.552286 35 
38 0.552286 35 
39 0.613368 7 
40 0.545356 39 
41 0.545356 39 
42 0.607589 13 
43 0.570138 24 
44 0.567885 29 
45 0.570138 24 
46 0.572511 21 
47 0.572511 21 
48 0.572511 21 
49 0.565757 30 
50 0.565757 30 















































































































































































































Extrin @ | 
.51 & .49 Rank 
(suitability) 











1 0.548908 38 
2 0.552966 18 
3 0.551908 24 
4 0.547853 45 
5 0.557038 1 
6 0.552966 18 
7 0.555978 9 
8 0.551908 24 
9 0.548908 38 
10 0.557038 1 
11 0.547853 45 
12 0.555978 9 
13 0.548556 40 
14 0.55226 21 
15 0.552613 20 
16 0.548204 44 
17 0.556684' 4 
18 0.55226 21 
19 0.556684 4 
20 0.55226 21 
21 0.548556 40 
22 0.556331 7 
23 0.548556' 40 
24 0.556331; 7 
25 0.557038 1 
26 0.555978 9 
27 0.556684' 4 
28 0.544864 49 
29 0.543812* 51 
30 0.544162 50 
31 0.55375 16 
32 0.555978 9 
33 0.554421 15 
34 0.549095 37 
35 0.548385 43 
36 0.555162 14 
37 0.547741 47 
38 0.547741 47 
39 0.55375 16 
40 0.549879 32 
41 0.549879 32 
42 0.555978 9 
43 0.550393 30 
44 0.551114 29 
45 0.550393 30 
46 0.549741 34 
47 0.549741 34 
48 0.549741 34 
49 0.551908 24 
50 0.551908 24 













































































































































































































1 0.713534 15 
2 0.714978 8 
3 0.71603 2 
4 0.714309 9 
5 0.710151 34 
6 0.70924 38 
7 0.711153 25 
8 0.709751' 35 
9 0.710476 30 
10 0.712788 16 
11 0.711142 26 
12 0.714035 10 
13 0.713743 12 
14 0.715651 4 
15 0.715283 5 
16 0.71402 11 
17 0.710439 31 
18 0.709478 36 
19 0.710439 31 
20 0.709478 36 
21 0.710648 27 
22 0.713594 13 
23 0.710648 27 
24 0.713594 13 
25 0.715222 6 
26 0.716797 1 
27 0.715707 3 
28 0.711992 23 
29 0.712621 20 
30 0.712379 22 
31 0.70073 50 
32 0.710606 29 
33 0.70368 45 
34 0.71145 24 
35 0.704337 44 
36 0.708184 40 
37 0.704945 43 
38 0.701729 49 
39 0.700554 51 
40 0.71521 7 
41 0.710439 33 
42 0.712593 21 
43 0.705602 41 
44 0.70902 39 
45 0.705602 41 
46 0.702531 46 
47 0.702531 46 
48 0.702531 46 
49 0.712772 17 
50 0.712772 17 
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